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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia -
AT RICI-11\IOND. 
Record No. 1693 
EDITH DOBSON-PEACOCK .A.ND SWIFT NELMS, JR .. , 
Plaintiffs in Error (Defendants Below)~ 
versus 
LELIA :NI. CURTIS, Defendant in Error (Plaintiff Below). 
PETITION FOR. "\VRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable Judges of the Suprerne Court. of .Appeals 
of Virginia: 
Your petitioners, Edith Dobson-Peacock and Swift Nelms, 
Jr., respectfully represent that they are aggri~ved by the 
final order of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, entered on the 23rd day of March, 1935, whereby judg-
nlent 'vas rendered against your petitioners for the sum of 
Ten ~Phousancl Dollars ($10,000.00) in a certain action at law 
then pending in said court, wherein Lelia ~f. Curtis was 
plaintiff and H. Dobson-Peacock, Edith Dobson-Peacock and 
Swift Nelms, Jr., were defendants. 
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A transcript of the record in this cause is herewith pre-
sented. 
IPor the purpose of clarity the parties to the action will 
be referred to as they appeared in the action in the Circuit 
Court. 
I. STATE~IENT. 
On the 8th day of N ovem be1~, 1934, the plaintiff, Lelia M .. 
Curtis, a retired school teacher, was a pedestrian walking in 
a westerly direction on the south side of Olney Road, in the 
City of Norfolk. When she arrived at a point approximately 
sixty feet from the intersection of Botetourt Street and Olney 
Road she decided to cross the said Olney Road, not at a regu-
lar crossing, going from the south to the north side. On the 
witness stand she explains her reason for crossing between 
intersectionR as follows: ''As a matter of fact, your crossing 
in front of the grocery store, wasn't it really to save the· ad-
ditional steps of going to the intersection and crossing? A~ 
Yes." (R., p. 62.) 
Olney Road at the point of the accident is a heavily traveled 
street, bearing a large share of the traffic to and from the 
down town area. According to the testimony of Mrs. Curtis, 
when she· reached the center of the street she saw a car 
coming ''rapidly down the street from her ~ight on the north 
side of the street. (R., p. 64.) The car proved to be the car 
ovroed by ~irs. Edith Dobson-Peacock, the wife of a local 
Episcopal minister, and was being driven by Swift Nelms, Jr., 
a young man twenty -one years of age, who was bringing 
~Iiss ~farjorie Peacock, the daughter of Mrs. Peacock, from 
the Union Station, where she had been to see a friend who 
was leaving the City. 
Testimony in behalf of the plaintiff is to the effect that 
the automobile was approaching at a reckless speed and that 
skid marks (apparently of locked wheels) measured shortly 
after the accident extended to the point of accident from a 
point about eighty feet eastward. 
The car driven by Nelms when :first observed by Mrs. Cur-
tis was one hundred feet, or less, away. She placed its posi-
tion as not further than the garage space to the west of the 
·Y. W. 0. H. (R., p. 66). There were no other cars going 
east or west, according to the plaintiff's testimony, and there 
were no objects· to interfere with her vision of the oncom-
ing car. (R,,, p. 66.) Thinking that she could cross the 
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street ahead of the car (R., p. 67), Mrs. Curtis hastened 
her steps (R., pp. 64 and 167). 
Nelms, the driver of the car, saw Mrs. Curtis as she_ reached 
the center of the street ana applied his brakes, turning, as he 
approached her, to the right to avoid striking her. Mrs. Cur-
tis continued walking and watching the car until she was 
struck (R., pp. 68 and 72) by the left hand front fender of 
the automobile. There was some conflict in the testimony as 
to the point at which she was struck, whether close to the 
center of the street or near the sidewalk. ·The most elo-
quent testimony on this point was the position in which she 
was lying when picked up. .All of the witnesses are in agree-
ment that when she was ·picked up she was lying approxi-
mately in the center of the street in front of the Model Gro-
cery. 
Mrs. Curtis was taken to the Sarah Leigh Hospital, where 
she was attended for her injuries by Dr. Southgate Leigh, Jr. 
The situation may best be visualized by reference to the 
plat which was filed and certified as an original exhibit to tbfs 
court. 
II. ASSIGNNIENTS OF ERROR. 
Counsel for the defendants assign the following errors: 
1. The verdict is excessive. 
2. The verdict is contrary to the law and evidence. 
3. The court erred in overruling the motion to strike the 
evidence as to the defendant, Edith Dobson-Peacock, made 
at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, and a like motion made 
at the close of all the evidence, on the ground that said de-
fendant could not be held under the family purpose doctrine. 
4. The court erred in refusing to strike the plaintiff's evi-
dence as to all defendants made at the close of the plaintiff's 
evidence, and the like motion made at the close of all the evi-
dence, on the ground that the evidence disclosed contributory 
negligence on the part of the plaintiff proximately Qontribut-
ingo to her injury. . 
5. The court erred in refusing instruction "0" requested 
by the defendants, and in modifying said instruction over 
the defendants' objections. 
6. The court erred in g-ranting on the motion of the plain-
tiff the instructions which were objected to by the defend-
ants. 
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III . .ARGUMENT. 
1. THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT LIABLE BECAUSE 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF PROXI-
MATELY CONTRIBUTED TO HER INJURY. 
The court erred in refusing to strike the evidence of the 
plaintiff, in refusing to set aside the verdict as contrary to 
the law and evidence, in granting- plaintiff certain instruc-
tions, and in refusing and in modifying defendants' instruction 
"0", because the evidence clearly showed that Mrs. Curtis 
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
This case reveals clearly that the accident which occurred 
between 1\rirs. Curtis, pedestrian, on the one hand, and the 
car driven by Nelms on the other, could not have happened 
without the contributory negligence of the pedestrian. 
The evidence shows that 1\frs. CUrtis, ·a woman of age, ex-
perience and intelligence, crossed the street known as Olney 
Road, not at a regular crossing, with nothing- to obstruct her 
vision, and, before reaching the center of the street, saw the 
car of Nelms, as she expressed it, "coming rapidly" from 
her right. She preferred to elect the chance of a collision 
rather than to take the course of safety, and attempted to 
cross in front of the oncoming car, hastening- her steps. (R., 
pp. 57, 64 and 67.) No other cars were·coming in either di-
rection to prevent her from stopping or retreating to avoid 
the oncoming automobile. Instead of this she watched the 
car and continued ·her steps up to the very moment of impact, 
when she was struck by the left front fender of the car. 
Her own testimony is as follows (R., p. 68): 
"When you first saw this machine, as you deseribe, you 
quickened your paces to try to get across in front of it. Did 
you continue to watch it as it came towards you Y 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. You didY 
''A. Yea. 
"Q. So that you could see what the driver of that car was 
doing, cob.ldn 't you! 
"A. Yes." 
Such testin1ony, reiterated at page 72,· defeats her recov-
ery. 
What other construction could be placed on her testimony 
when, being in a position confessedly negligent by crossing 
the street at a point between intersections, she chose to con-
test 'vith the car whq should reach the point first T The fol-
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lowing rule enunciated in the case of Va .. Rwy. & Power Co. 
v. B11.;.,, 145 Va. 338, 133 S. E. 776, 778, is pointedly germane: 
'• Even if the jury believed that there was negligence, either 
primary or secondary, on. the part of the defendant company 
which would otherwise support a recovery, nevertheless if 
previous to the accident and after the discovery of his own 
peril the decedent by the exercise of ordinary care could 
then have avoided his own injury, then he could not recover. 
McNaunara v. RainCJJ Corp .. , 1il9 Va. 210~ 123 S. E. 515." 
·At any moment after the discovery of the rapidly approach-
ing automobile a mere step back or stopping would have 
avoided the injury. 
If there remains in Virginia any vestige of the common 
law rule of contributory negligence, and the court has re-
peatedly said that there doesJ Mrs. Curtis was clearly guilty 
of such negligence as bars a recovery in this case. 
It is appropriate to quote here the pertinent case of 
llfeade v. Sattnders, 151 Va. 636, 144 S. E. 711. 
''If it can be said that he 'vas struck by the front of the 
car which bore down upon him, we are confronted with a 
situation where a pedestrian, who sees an automobile ap-
proaching leaves the curb to cross the street in front of the 
approaching car. The car is all the while in full view if lie 
but looks, and he knows it is coming. Assume that the de-
fendant was negligent up to the instant of the accident for 
failing to see and avoid injuring plaintiff, there was an equal 
opportunity for the plaintiff to have seen and avoided the 
collision, and he was therefore negligent in not doing so. 
As 'vas said by Kelley, P., in the Stephen Putney Shoe Co. 
v. Ormsby's Ad·m·r., 129 Va. 297, 105 S. E. 563: 
'' 'In other w·ords, if he did look, he was bound to see the 
truck and was negligent as a matter of law in stepping in 
front of it; and if he did not look his negligence as a matter 
of law is none the less apparent.' Virginia Railway&; PowBr 
Co. v. Boltz, 122 Va. 649, 95 S. E. 467; Hend-ry v. Va. Rail-
'Way & Powe1· Co., 1RO Va. 282, 107 S. E. 715. 
''Here the car and the pedestrian are traveling at right an-
gles and their paths must cross only a few feet ahead. There 
~sa clear vi~'Y and the pedest~ian has seen the car approach-
Ing. A colhs1on under such Circumstances can only arise as 
the result of the concurring or independent negligence of the 
plaintiff. 
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If the continuing negligence of a plaintiff up to the time 
of the injury concurs with the negligence of the defendant 
in causing the injury, the plaintiff cannot recover. Consu~- · 
ers Bre1.vm·y Co. v. Doyle's .A.d1nr., 102 Va. 399, 46. S. 
E. 390, quoted with approval in. Green v. Ruffin, 141 Va. 
628, 125 R. E. 7 42. '' 
And again the court thus stated the applicable principle 
in tile case of Va. Rwy. cf!: P. Co. v. Boltz, 122 Va. 649, 95 S. 
E. 467: 
''The case simply resolves itself into one in which a woman 
of intelligence and activity, aware of the danger of the situa-
tion and ·with nothing to distract her attention or hinder her 
pre-vision, walked upon a street railway track, not at a regular 
crossing, but at a point 27 feet beyond the crossing, without 
taking· adequate precautions for her safety. In such a case, 
upon settled principles, there can be no recovery as a matter 
of law.'' 
The evidence further shows that the driver had no last 
clear chance to avoid the injury to the plaintiff, but, to the 
contrary, that the plaintiff herself 'vas the only one who could 
have had a last clear chance to save herself. 
The rule is very clearly stated in Va. Electric & P. ·co. v. 
Yelli1~e.s, .... Va ..... , 175 S. E. 35, in the follo-wing terms: 
"It is only when some new active. negligence of defendant 
becon1es immediate proximate cause of accident that last 
clear chai)ce ruJe applies, in which case antecedent negligence 
of plaintiff becomes remote; and the rule is inapplicable where 
proximate cause of accident is concurrent negligence of both 
parties, unbroken by any efficient supervening cause.'' 
It is not alleged or proven that Nelms did anything after 
the discovery of Mrs. Curtis' approach except attempt to 
stop his car by the application of his brakes. The plaintiff, 
however, continued to wend her way in front of a car which 
she admits she saw coming "rapidly". There could be no 
application of the rule of last clear chance to the defendant .. 
''The last clear chanlce rule is inapplicable where negli.-
~ence of person injured continued to time of injury, unless 
def~ndant should have been aware that plaintiff was uncon-
scious of peril.'' 
Barnes v. Ashworth, 154 Va. 218; 153 S. E. 711. 
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It is difficult to .explain the jury's verdict in this case un-
less they proceeded, as juries sometimes do, on the theory of 
comparative negligence. 
It is possible that the jury interpreted the testimony of 
the eig·htv foot skid with locked wheels .as indicative of wan-
ton recklessness on the part of Nelms, against which they may 
have refused to weigh the contributory negligence of Mrs. 
Qurtis. Any such skid was denied by defendants' witnesses, 
and it is indeed incredible that a modern Ford with brake-
locked wheels would proceed any such distance without 
stopping; yet the jury may have accepted the plaintiff's ver-
sion and applied the rule of comparative negligence. But 
con1parative negligence is not the law of Virginia except in 
Railway crossing cases where the Audible Warnings Act is 
in i~sne and in railway Employers Liability Act cases; and 
no recoYery in this case based upon that principle can be sus-
tained. 
ltV aynick v. W a.lrond, 155 Va. 400; 154 S. E. 522. 
So many cases involving the doctrine of last clear chance in 
all of its phases have been before this court that it is use-
less to multiply citations on this point, and profitable only 
to discuss each case on its own facts in the light of the gen-
eral principles running through the decisions. P'erhaps it 
is pertinent here to select and make reference to the fol-
lowing cases : 
Green v. R~tffin, 141 Va. 628; 125 S. E. 742. 
Consume1·s Bre~very v. Doyle,s Admr., 102 Va. 399; 46 S. 
E. 390. . 
H&ndry v. Va. R'Wy. db P. Co., 130 Va. 282; 107 S. E. 715. 
lt is useless to deal in detail with this question of contribu-
tory negligence as it is involved in the instructions appearing 
at pages 218, et .seq., of the record, the instructions asked by 
the plaintiff being numbered and those asked by the defend-
ants being lettered. Suffice it to say that if the defendants 
prevail on this point none of the in~tructions gTanted the 
plaintiff should have been given and the issue raised on the 
defendants' objections thereto is the same issue raised on 
the defendants' motions to strike the evidence as to all of 
the defendants. 
Before closing our argument on this crucial question going 
to the merits of the whole case it is appropriate to add a fe'\v 
paragraphs dealing specifically with the application of the 
8 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
last clear chance doctrine to the conduct of Mrs. Curtis and 
of the ·driver Nelms. 
As a te:xt for this discussion we make the following quota-
tion from Green v. Ruffin, supra. Speaking of the pedestrian 
in that case fhe court said in its opinion: 
''She had the same last clear chance to protect herself as 
the defendant had to protect her, for the doctrine of last 
clear chance is a duty imposed by law on both the plaintiff 
and defendant. If, being in plain view of each other, and with 
equal opportunity to prevent the accident, they are guilty of 
concurring negligence, there can be no recovery.'' 
In the case at bar 1\{rs. Curtis' first act of negligence was 
in crossing the street midblock instead of at the intersec-
tion. If it can possibly be held in this case that she can re-
cover, then there is no virtue in Section 2154(126) of· the Vir-
ginia Code, which gives vehicles priority over pedestrians 
between street crossings, and that statute might as well 
be expunged fr01n the books. Indeed, an affirmance of this 
case would expunge it in effect. It is to be presumed that in 
the enactment of this law the Legislature intended that the 
status of a midblock street crosser should be less favorable 
than that. of the pedestrian obedient to the law. 
Having committed the first negligent act of entering the 
roadway midblock, Mrs. Curtis necessarily essayed her cross-
ing with e\ery presumption against her and in favor of the 
vehicle. Her second act of negligence was in persisting in 
continuing across 'vhen she admitted that she saw the rapidly 
approaching automobile, which she claims was being oper-
ated with wanton recklessness, and when the squealing of its 
brakes or locked wheels (if that evidence be accepted) must 
have shouted the same warning to her as was heard by sev-
eral of her witnesses. It was simple and easy for her as a 
pedestrian to stop in her tracks and avoid the skidding car. 
If she had seen it approaching for a distance of eighty feet 
or more, that is about the length of the skid 1narks measured 
off by her 'vitnesses shortly after the accident. This was an 
act of recklessness on her part at least equal to any reckless-
ness of which the driver Nelms is accused, and she cannot sus-
tain a recovery for the result of her own imprudence and 
hurry to cross the street. The greater the recklessness with 
which the car was approaching the greater was the reckless-
ness of Mrs. Curtis in hurrying across its path instead of 
remaining in a place of safety, even after she had started 
across the street. Mrs. Curtis had the last clear chance to 
protect herself, but she did not take it. 
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On the other hand, the driver had no last ~lear ~hance 
to save her from her own imprudence. A skidding car is 
beyond control. Whatever negligence he was guilty of was 
ervstallized and consummated from the time that he applied 
the brakes at the east end of the skid. After that there was 
nothing else that he did or could have done or could have re-
frained from doing that would or could have affected the 
situation. However neglig-ent he may have been, his agency 
for such negligence ended at the beginning of that skid. 
There 'vas within his power no means of control after that 
time and place. He did not have a last clear chance to pre-
vent the accident. 
ln the preservation of this point in the record under the 
defendants' motions to strike the evidence, there appear our 
arguments in the trial court upon this issue. For an elabora-
tion of what we have said in t4e paragraphs immediately 
preceding 've refer the court to that discussion as found at 
pages 146 to 148, inclusive, and pages 214 to 218, inclusive. 
While the trial judge finally let this case go to the jury 
on the question of last clear chance, it is appropriate and 
fair to quote the following expression from Judge Hanckel, 
found at pag·e 217 of the record: 
''I realize the difficulties of this case. >.!: • * It is diffi-
~ult where the two doctrines do not hinge on it, and I think it 
is a question to go to the jury.'·' 
To this ruling by Judge Hanckel our deepest error is as-
signed. 
The plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, and 
there 'vas no. last clear chance to avoid striking her. The 
verdict of the Circuit Court should be reversed and final 
judgment entered for the defendants. 
Reverting to Section 2154 ( 126) of the Code, we are con-
tent to close this phase of our argument with the following 
quotation from the opinion of Justice Holt in the case of 
Moore v. Scott, 160 Va. 610 and 169 S. E. 902, 'vherein he 
quoted and approved as follo"rs the earlier case of V. E. db P. 
Cu. v. Blu.nt's Ad1nr.·, 158 Va. 421 and 163 S. E. 329: 
· "In Blunt's case, Greg·ory, J., after calling attention to 
the fact that reciprocal duties theretofore imposed had been 
changed by statute, said: 'But since the enactment of the 
statute and ordinances here involved, the former general 
rule outlined above as to the measure of care required of 
both has been changed. The pedestrian, under such regula-
tions, for his own protection, is required to exercise a greatet· 
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deg·ree of vigilance when he crosses a street between intersec-
tions. This is because the vehicle has the superior right 
there. On the other hand, the operator of a vehicle must ex-
ercise a greater degree of vigilance at an intersection because 
the pedestrian has the superior right there. While the rule 
of ordinary care (which is flexible) applies to both at all 
t-imes, yet the measure of ordinary care which the operator 
of a vehicle must exercise at an intersection is greater and 
higher tllan the care a pedestrian must exercise. Likewise, at 
places in the street other than at intersections, where a pedes-
trian desires to cross, the ordinary care he is required to exer-
cise is greater and higher than that required of the operator 
or driver of- a vehicle. If this were not true, it would be 
useless to have the statutes and ordinances.' 
"We have no intention of receding from any statement 
there made. The statute means what it says and is too plain 
to require construction. '' 
2. IN NO EVENT IS THE DEFENDANT EDITH DOB-
SON-PEACOCI{ LIABLE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF 
THE FAMILY PURPOSE AUTOMOBILE, BECAUSE 
THAT DOCTRINE IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE 
HEAD OF A FAMILY, AND SAID DEFENDANT WAS 
NOT THE HEAD. OF HER FAMILY. 
This action was originally brought ag·ainst H. Dobson-Pea-
cock, Edith Dobson-Peacock and Swift Nelms, evidently with 
the intention of holding Dr. Peacock, the head of the Peacoek 
family, liable under the doctrine of the family purpose car. 
To that end it 'vas alleged that l1e o"rned the car driven 
by Nelms at the time of the accident, as will appear from the 
plaintiff's notice of motion and bill of particulars .. The ef-. 
fort to prove this fact wholly failed, and, just before the lunch 
adjournment on the first day of the trial, Mr. Parsons, of 
counsel for plaintiff, stated as follows (R., p. 125) : 
''At this time, having introduced the evidence on the· facts 
of ownership of the car, and nothing else having developed, I 
feel that it is my duty to take a nonsuit as to Dean Peacock 
himself. .Apparently I could not hold him.'' 
The court erred in granting instruction No. 9 on behalf of 
the plaintiff. This instruction which was granted without 
amendment. over the objection of counsel for the defendants, 
read as follows: 
''The court instructs the jury that if they find from the ~vi-
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dence that Mrs. Edith Dobson-Peacock purchased the automo-: 
ble in this case involved for the use of herself and family, 
including her daughter Majorie Peacock, and thereafter inade 
an arrangement and agreement with the defendant Swift 
Nelms to drive the car for herself and her daughter and hus-
band at such times as needed and requested by either of them, 
and he was at the time of the accident to the plaintiff acting 
in her service, pursuant to and fn accordance with such ar-
rangement and agreement (regardless of pay), then any neg-
ligent act or acts found by the jury under the evidence to have 
been committed by him in such service is in law chargeable 
to her." 
This instruction, while not entirely clear, attempts to in-
struct the jury either that they should consider the driver 
of the car, Swift Nelms, the agent of Mrs. Peacock, or on the 
other hand, hold her liable under the so-called ''family pur-
pose'' doctrine. Under neither view can the instruction be 
sustained. 
The entire testimony on which these views are based is 
found in the record on pages 30 to 36, inclusive. At no point 
in this testimony is there found even a suggestion that the 
car was being used for or at the request of Mrs. Peacock. The 
statement which was never contradicted by the witnesses for 
the plaintiff was that the car in question· was used· by Miss 
Marjorie Peacock to drive to the Union Station in the City of 
Norfolk in order to say farewell to a friend who was leaving 
the City. It further appears (R., p. 32) that Miss Marjorie 
Peacock r~quested 1\rir. Nelms to drive the car for her. There 
is in this record no intimation that on the occasion of the ac-
cident in suit either Miss Marjorie Peacock or Nelms was 
the agent of 1\:frs. Peacock, or performing any service for her. 
Therefore, the only possible justification for such an instruc-
tion would be under the "family purpose" doctrine, which has 
been adopted by our court in Virginia, as stated in the case 
of Baptist v .. Slate, 173 S. E. 512 ..... Va. 0. o •• We submit 
that the court never intended the doctrine to be enlarged to 
cover such a case as this. 
In sin1ple and brief form the question is this: Is the owner 
of an automobile responsible for injuries caused thereby 
when said automobile is used by members of the owner's fam-
ily when the owner is not the head of the family? 
· Counsel has undertaken to examine every reported case in 
which this doctrine, now known as the ''family purpose'' doc-
trine, has been invoked. This examination shows that the 
courts have never intended this dootrine to be applicable to 
others than heads of families. The reason is that the car is 
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provided in the same manner as all other necessaries and 
recreational facilities. In no case has simple ownership been 
the test; on the contrary, the duty to support and maintain for 
the health and comfort of the family is the test. 
In the instant case Mrs. Peacock had no duty to support 
or maintain the family or furnish a car for the family's use. 
As to her husband, Dr. H. Dobson-Peacock, a co-defendant in 
this suit, counsel for the plaintiff voluntarily nonsuited this 
action, and chose to ask for a judgment against 1\frs. Peacock 
simply on the ground that she 'vas the owner of the car. 
The first Virginia case in which the family purpose doctrine 
was applied \Vas Litz v. Ifannon, 151 Va. 363, 144 S. E. 477; 
and in this case the court quoted with approval the following 
statement taken from Anno. Cases 1917 -D, page 1003: 
"The rule has been said to rest in the view that where a 
father provides an automobile for the purpose of furnishing 
members of his family \vith outdoor recreation, the use of the 
car for such purpose is 'vithin the scope of the father's busi-
ness, analogously to the furnishing of food and clothing or 
ministering to their health. '' 
Certainly if we follow this reasoning·, which is sound, the 
wife could not be held liable when these duties are performed 
by the husband. 
The above quotation from Litz v. Harmon was again re-
peated in Baptist v. Slate, .... Va ..... , 173 S. E. 512. The 
court made also in this case the following quotation: 
''In Ruling· Case Law Supp., Vol. 4, p. 153, this is said as 
to the 'family purpose' doctrine: 'When the head of a family 
supplies an automobile for the use and pleasure of the family, 
permitting tbe members thereof to use it at 'viii, those mem-
bers thus using the automobile become the agents of the head 
of the family, and each one using it, even for his sole personal 
pleasure, is carrying out the purpose for which the automobile · 
is found, and is the agent or servant of the head of the family, 
so that the latter is liable for injuries resulting from negli-
gence'.'' 
The ·February, 1934, issue of the North Carolina Law Re-
view, Vol. XII, No. 2, very clearly sets out the rule as applied 
by a number of states which have adopted this doctrine and 
contains this statement : 
''The dominant consideration throughout the reported cases 
in determining the existence of the required family relation-
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ship is the degree of dependence of the tort-feasor upon the 
family head for support. Joh!nson v .. Hare, 30 Ariz. 265, 246 
Pac. 546 (1926); Jones v. Golick, 46 Nev. 10; 206 Pac. 679 
(1922); Cole v. 1Vright, 18 S. W. (2d) 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1929.) Age and emancipation are not considered decisive of 
the status of a person as a member of a family. Watson v. 
B'ltrley, supra, note 8. And further, the mere fact that the neg-
ligent driver resides with the car owner is not enoug·h to estab-
lish the relationship. Jones v. Goliolc, s~tpra. It should be 
noted that in the cases which hold the owner liable, the driver 
of the automobile is usually related to him by blood or mar-
riage. lJfogle v. Scott & Co., 144 l\finn. 173, 174 N. W. 832 
(1919), (no reeovery for employee's use of car); Reich v. 
Cone, 180 N. C. 267, 104 S. E. 530 (1920), (no liability for 
butler's driving); Keller v. Federal Bon Brannon Truck Co., 
151 Tenn. 427, 269 S. W. 914 (1925), (doctrine not applicable 
to corporations). Contra: 81nart v. Bissonette, 106 Conn. 
447, 138 Atl. 365 (19.27) priest's housekeeper held to be mem-
ber of his family). In brief, since the occasion for the de-
velopment of the doctrine was the financial irresponsibility of 
the individual dependent family member, Lattin, ·vicarious 
Liability and the Family Automobile (1928), 26 .M:ich. L. Rev. 
846; Ill cO all, The Family A.uto1nobile (1930), 8 N. 0. L. Rev. 
256, the degTee of dependence upon the family head represents 
the most appropriate and conclusive test of the family rela-
tionship. '' 
In conclusion we may add that in an examination of the 
authorities applying this principle no case has been found 
that held a mother or other member of the family group lia-
ble for the negligent act of another member of the family un-
less that person was the head of the family and its main sup-
port. And there is no reason or authority for extending the 
doctrine to cover mere ownership of a car apart from the 
owner'EI relationship as head of the family. The evidence 
clearly shows that Mrs. Peacock was the owner of the car 
but not the head of the family. Her husband, Dr. Peacock, 
was the family's sole head, and· it was to him alone that the 
daughter might look for support. 
· A similar situation was before the North Carolina court 
in the very recent case of 1Vhite v. M dCabe, 180 S. E. 704. 
That court stated in that case: 
'' rrhere was error, however, in the instruction that the neg-
ligence of J. T. McCabe is imputable to Margaret 1\fcCabe 
as a matter of law. This exception must be sustained. 'The 
owner of an automobile is not liable for personal injuries 
-·~ 
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caused by it, merely because of his ownership.' Linville v. 
Nissen, 162 N.C. 95, 77 S. E. 1096. Nor would she be liable 
as a matter of la'v under the family purpose doctrine. Mc-
Oee v. Crawford, 205 N. C. 318, 171 S. E. 326; .Allen Gari-
baldi, supra.'' 
vVherefore it follows that in no event can the judgment be 
sustained as to the defendant Edith Dobson-Peacock. 
3. THE DAl\IAGES AWAR.DED THE PLAINTIFF BY 
THE JURY'S VERDICT ARE FLAGRANTLY EXCES-
SIVE. 
The verdict of the jury in this case was $10,000. The in-
juries claimed to have been suffered by the plaintiff were 
as follows: 
A broken pelvic bone, 
Broken bone in. hand, 
Bladder trouble produced by injury, 
Inability to remember, 
Confinement to the hospital for a period of three months 
and eleven days, 
Sleeplessness. 
The evidence produced in support of these allegations did 
not bear out the gravity of the injuries as claimed by the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff .was brought slowly into the court 
ro01n supported by two attendants, one on each side, walked 
with crutches, and apparently could not move without as-
sistance. 
Dr. Vann. a bone specialist, testified that the plaintiff had 
a fracture of one of the "rami of the pubic bone'' and a 
fracture of the ''left radius'' above the wrist. On ·Febru-
ary 11, 1935 (eight days before the trial) he examined her 
and found that the plaintiff could walk, sit dow_n, ''cross her 
legs and get about a chair and bending and such as that'"'. 
She showed no dizziness or pain in these movements. Dr. 
Vann further subjected the pelvic bone to certain stresses, 
and found that Mrs. Curtis had fully recovered from the pel.;. 
vic injury. He did not see her use any crutches to assist 
her in walking at any time (R., pp. 92-102.) 
A.s to the wrist injury, Dr. Vann testified that on his last 
visit, February 11, 1935, ~Irs. Curtis had some stiffness to 
her left l1and 'vhich could be overcome by persistent endeavor 
to exercise the bones of the hand. 
A.s to the bladder trouble, the record clearly shows that 
Edith Dobson-Peacock, .et al., .v. Lelia M. Curtis. 15 
this trouble antedated the injury. Mrs. Curtis gave to the 
attending physician, on the day of the accident, her his.-
tory, from which it appeared that she had had this trouble 
for several years. (R., p. 87.) · 
It is true that Mrs. Curtis was confined in the_ hospital 
for the period from November 8, 1934, until the day of trial, 
February 19, 1935. But the testimony of her physician was 
to the effect that she could have left several weeks before 
the trial, but did not care to do so as she preferred the at-
tentions received in a hospital. In writing to counsel for the 
tlefenda.nt under date of January 16, 1935, he used these 
words: 
"I am writing to say that she (Mrs. Curtis) is walking 
satisfactorily and could leave the hospital if she had a place 
to go where she could be properly taken care of. So far as 
I see there will be no permanent effects from her injury of 
November 8, 1934." (R., p. 82.) 
In his testimony he stated that she had some definite dis-
ability, ''I would say, totaling it up, about 15% or 20% from 
her pelvis, and probably 5% from her hand and probably 
5% from her bladder condition". 
':[lhe testimony concerning any loss of memory was very in-
dC\finite. All physicians stated that they had no way of de-
termining this difficulty, and Dr. Vann stated that he saw no 
evidence of same from his 45 minute examination on Feb-
ruary 11, 1935 . 
.As to sleeplessness the record discloses that for over a 
month previous to the trial the hospital record contained the 
notations "comfortable day, slept well". Dr. Leigh explained 
this by saying that the patient was given sleeping assistance 
in the shape of capsules, but, on cross-examination, admit-
ted that frequently there were ''sugar pills',. to give the pa-
tient psychological assistance in sleeping. (R., pp. 92-93.) 
It is submitted that the most that can be made of the in-
juries of the plaintiff is that her left hand has a certain 
amount of stiffness that may or may not be permanent, that 
she suffered a broken pelvic bone from which no permanent ef-
fects were suffered, and that she incurred certain hospital and 
doctors bills to the nxtent of approximately $750.00. From 
which it follows that the $10,000.00 verdict of the jury was 
flagrantly exc.essive. 
The relief to which the defendants are entitled with respect 
to. the excessive judgment, even if the case should not be 
reversed on the merits, is to have the plaintiff put on terms 
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to accept a reasonable amount of damages, or else the case 
should be remanded for a rehearing on damages. 
Virginia Code, #6365. 
Burk's Pleading & Practice, 3rd Ed., #407, p. 769. 
IV. 1'HE JUDGJJ!lENT OF THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD BE REVERSED AND JUDGMENT ENTERED 
FOR DE"P'END.A.NTS; OR AT LEAST IN FAVOR OF THE 
DEFBNIJ.A1VT EDI.71ll DOBSON-PE.ACOCJ(. IN ANY 
EVENT THE AMOUNT OF THE RECOVERY SHOULD 
BE REDUCED BY PUT1'ING THE PLAINTIFF ON 
TERllfS, OR THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED ON 
D.AJtlAGES. 
Finally, for errors, herein stated, and for other errors ap-
parent on the record, your petitioners pray for writ of error 
and supersedeas to the judgment aforesaid, and that the said 
judgment may be reviewed and reversed. Petitioners fur-
ther pray that, if in the opinion of the court it is proper, 
judgment may be entered for the defendants, pursuant to 
the statute in such cases made· and provided, or the plaintiff 
may be put on terms as to the amount of her recovery, or 
such other relief may be granted your petitioners as they 
may be entitled to receive. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL HEARING AND RECITAL OF 
DELIVERY OF COPY TO OPPOSING COUNSEL. 
Pursuant to Rule II-a of the rules of the Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals, petitioners pray to be allowed permis-
sion to appear and state orally, in support of this petition, 
their reasons for their application for writ of error in this 
cause. 
The petitioners moreover aver that a copy of this petition 
was delivered to 1\riessrs. Venable, Miller, Pilcher & Parsons, 
of counsel for defendant in error, on the 5th day of August, 
1935. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
August 5th, 1935. 
DONALD W. SHRIVE·R, 
R. 1\ri. HUGHES, JR., 
LEON T. SEA WELL, 
By R. M. H. JR. 
Counsel for Petitioners. 
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CERTI·FICATE OF COUNSEL. 
We, Donald W. Shriver and R. M. Hughes, Jr., attorneys 
at law, practicing in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, do certify that in our opinion the judgment complained 
of in the foregoing petition should be reviewed and reversed. 
Received Aug. 5_, 1935. 
DONALD W. SHRIVER, 
R. M. HUGHES, JR. 
.r. w. E·. 
Writ of error and supersedeas awarded. Bond $12,000. 
Aug. 21, 1935. 
JNO. W. EGGLESTON. 
Rec'd Aug. 22, 1935. 
M. B. W A.TTS, Clerk. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, 
on the 15th day of May, in the year of our Lord, nineteen 
hundred and thirty-five. 
BE IT REME:M.BER.ED, that heretofore, to-wit: In the 
Circuit Court aforesaid, on the 14th day of January, in the 
year 1935, came the plaintiff Lelia M. Curtis, and docketed 
her notiee of motion for judgment against the defendants, 
H. Dobson-Peacock, Edith Dobson-Peacock and Swift Nelms, 
Jr., in the following 'vords and figures: 
NOTICE OF MOTION. 
Virginia: In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
Lelia ~L Curtis, Plaintiff, 
v. 
H. Dobson-Peacock, Edith Dobson-Peacock and Swift Nelms, 
Jr., Defendant. 
Please Take Notice that on the 14th day of January, 1935, 
at 10 o'clock A. ~L, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be 
18 Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia 
heard, I will move the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk 
at the Court Room thereof for a judgment against you in 
the sum of Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00) to-
gether with interest from November 8, 1934, and execution and 
costs, due to me by you on account of your negligence, care-
lessness, recklessness and violations of law on or 
page 2 ~ about November H, 1934, on Olney Road, a public 
Street in the city of Norfolk, Virginia, near Bote-
tourt Street, when the defendant Swift NelmR, Jr., was cun-
trolling and operating a certain automobile owned and regis-
tered in the name of Edith Dobson-Peacock and owned, op-
erated and controlled by both Edith Dobson-Peacock and H. 
Dobson-Peacock and used by them as a family car. 
By reason of the said negligence, carelessness, recklessness 
and violations of law and as a proximate result thereof I was 
run into and violently struck by the said automobile so owned, 
operated and controlled at the time by the defendants as 
aforesaid, and was severely, painfully and permanently in-
jured in and about my entire person, various and sundry of 
my bones fractured, my nervous system deranged and per-
manently impaired; I was required to have medical, surgical 
and hospital attention, am still confined to the hospital un-
der treatment and care of a physician, a.nd it will be neces-
sary for me to continue in the future to have medical treat-
ment in an endeavor to overcome and be cured and relieved 
as near as may be "from the injuries so inflicted; I was 
caused to Ruffer, am now suffering and will in the future con-
tinue to suffer great pain and mental anguish; I was rendered 
unable, am still unable and will in the future be unable to 
carry on my ordinary affairs and business ; my injuries were 
of such a serious nature that they affected and still affect my 
reasoning power and ability to concentrate and think in the 
same manner as I could before the said injuries, the shock 
of the. said injuries was so severe that I have not 
page 3 ~ recovered therefrom and believe and therefore al-
leg~ that I will not recover therefrom or be able 
to overcome . the smne during· my natural life. 
Wherefore this notice of motion. 
LELIA 1ri. CURTIS, 
By Counsel. 
VENABLE, ~{ILLER, PILCHER ~ P .ARSONS, p. q. 
December 21, 1934. 
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The following are the Sergeant's returns made on the fore-
. going notice of motion: 
Executed in the City of Norfolk, Va., this the 22 day of 
Dec. 1934, by serving a Copy hereof ·on Edith Dobson Pea-
cock in person. 
CHAS. E. FRANCIS, 
Sergt. City of Norfolk, Va. 
By W. CARMINE, Deputy. 
Not finding H. Dobson Peacock at his usual place of abode I 
executed the within in the City of Norfolk, Va., this 22 day 
of Dec. 1934 by delivering a copy hereof to Mrs E. D. 
Peacock she being then and there, .a member of his family 
and over the age of 16 years, and. giving information of its 
purport to her. 
CHAS. E. FRANCIS, 
Sergt. City of Norfolk, Va. 
By W. CARMINE, Deputy. 
Not finding Swift Nelms, Jr., at his usual place of abode I 
executed the within in the City of Norfolk, Va. this 
page 4 ~ 22 day of Dec. 1934 by delivering a copy hereof to 
his Mother she being then and there, a member of 
his fan1ily and over the age of 16 years and giving informa-
tion of its purport to her. 
- / 
CHAS. E. FR.A.NCIS, 
Sergt. City of Norfolk, Va. 
By W. CARMINE, Deputy. 
And on the same day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said, on the 14th day of January, 1935 : 
Upon the motion of the plaintiff, by her attorney, Vena-
ble, etc., it is ordered that this notice of motion be docketed. 
And thereupon came as well the plaintiff, by her attorneys, 
as the defendants, by their attorneys, D. W. Shriver and 
Hughes, Little & Seawell, and thereupon the said defend-
ants pleaded the general issue, to which the plaintiff replied 
generally, and issue -is joined. And thereupon on the motion 
of the said defendants, the said plaintiff is required to file 
herein 'vithin ten days from the date hereof a bill of the par-
ticulars of her claim; and thereupon the said defendants, H. 
Dobson Peacock and Edith Dobson Peacock, filed herein their 
joint demurrer, to the said plaintiff's notice of motion, in 
which said demurrer, the said plaintiff joined, the further 
hearing on which said demurrer is continued; and thereupon 
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the said defendants, H. Dobson Peacock and Edith Dobson 
Peacock, filed herein therein respective affidavits. and the fur-
ther hearing is continued. 
The follo,ving is the demurrer filed by leave of the fore-
going order : 
page 5 ~ OYER AND DEMURRER TO NOTICE OF 
MOTION. 
H. Dobson-Peacock, one of the def.endants in the above 
entitled cau~e, comes and craves oyer of the Virginia State 
registration record of the automobile involved in this canse 
and bearing license plate No. 112-234 of the State of Virginia 
for the year 1934, and which is in the plaintiff's notice of mo-
tion mentioned; 'vhich registration record being read to him 
is in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
And thereupon, the said defendant, H. Dobson-Peacock, by 
his counsel, says that the said notice of motion is insufficient 
in law, and as his grounds of demurrer the said defendant as-
signs: 
1. That it appears from the said registration certificate that 
the said defendant is not the owner of the automobile men-
tioned in the plaintiff's notice of motil>n. 
2. The notice of motion fails to show that the said automo-
bile was being operated or controlled by the said defendant, 
H. Dobson-Peacock, or being operated in his behalf or in con-
nection with any business or affairs of his. 
DONALD W. S.HRIVER, 
HUGHES, LITTLE & SEA WELL. 
The following are the affidavits filed herein by leave of the 
foregoing order: 
page 6 ~ DENIAL OF OWNE·RSHIP, OPERATION OR 
CONTROL OF INSTRUMENTALITY. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
Harold Dobson-Peacock, being duly sworn, made oath as 
follows: 
I am one of the defendants in the above entitled cause. I 
did not own, operate or control the automobile in contact with 
which the plaintiff was injured, and the same was not being 
Edith Dobson-Peacock, et al., v. Lelia M. Curtis. 21 
operated in my behalf or in connection with any business or 
affairs of mine. 
HAROLD DOBSON PEACOCK. 
Subscribed and s1vorn to before me this 11th day of Janu-
ary, 193Ii 
JULIA K. GOFF, 
Notary Public. 
DENIAL OF OPERATION OR CONTROL OF 
INSTRUMENTALITY. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
Edith Dobson-Peacock, being- duly sworn, made oath as 
follows: 
I am one of the defendants in the above entitled cause and 
am the owner of the automobile connooted with injury to the 
plaintiff. 
., 
At the time that said injury was received I was not operat-
ing or controlling the said automobile; and the same 
page 7 } was not being- operated in my behalf or in connection 
with any business or affairs of mine. 
EDITH DOBSON-PEACOCK. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of J anu-
ary, 1935. 
JULIA K. GOFF, 
Notary Public. 
And at another clay, to-wit: In the Circuit Court aforesaid 
on the 19th day of January, in the year 1935: 
This day came again the plaintiff, by her attorneys, Ven-
able, Miller, Pilcher & Parsons, and thereupon said plaintiff 
with leave of Court filed herein her Amended Notice of Mo-
tion, the Bill of the Particulars of her Claim, Joinder to de-
murrer of H. Dobson-Peacock, Joinder to sworn special plea 
of H. Dobson-Peacock, and Joinder to special plea of Edith 
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Dobson-Peacock denying operation and control; and the fur-
ther hearing is co~tinued. 
The follo\ving are the Amended Notice of Motion, the Bill 
of Particulars, and the several joinders filed herein by leave 
of the foregoing order : 
Al\iENDED NOTICE OF MOTION. 
To H. Dobson-Peacock, Edith Dobson-Peacock and Swift 
Nelms, Jr.: 
page 8 ~ PLEASE TAI{E NOTTCE that on the 14th day 
of January, 1935, at 10 o 't:.iock A. M., or as soon 
thereafter as counsel may. be heard, I will move the Circuit 
Court of the Citv of Norfolk at the Court Room thereof for 
a judgment against you in the sum of Twenty-five Thousand 
Dollars ($25,000.00), together with interest from November 
8, 1934, and execution and costs, due to me by you on account 
of your negligence, carelessness, recklessness and violations 
of law on or about November 8, 1934, on Olney Road, a pub- · 
lie street in the city of Norfolk, Virginia, near Botetourt 
Street, when th<:' defendant Swift Nelms, Jr., ·was controlling 
and operating a certain automobile owned and registered in 
the nan1e of Edith Dobson-Peacock and owned, operated and 
controlled bv both Edith Dobson-Peacock and H. Dobson-Pea-
cock and used by them as a family car. 
By reason of the said negligence, carelessness, reckless-
ness and violations of law and as a proximate result thereof 
I was n1n into and violently struck by the said automobile so 
owned, operated and controlled at the time by the defendants 
as aforesaid, and was secerely, painfully and permanently in-
jured, both internally and externally, in and about my en-
tire person, various and sundry of my bones were fractured, 
my nervous system was deranged and permanently impaired, 
my bladder, kidney, heart and other internal organs were 
seriously injured and affected, and I 'vas otherwise seriously, 
painfully and permanently injured; I was required to have 
medical, surgical and hospital attention, am still confined to 
the hospital under treatment and care of a physician, and it 
will be necessary for me to continue in the future to have 
medical treatment in an endeavor to overcome and 
page 9 ~ be cured and relieved as near as may be from the 
injuries so inflicted ; I was caused to suffer, am now 
suffering and will in the future continue to suffer great pain 
and mental anguish; I was rendered unable, am still unable 
and will in the future be unable to carry on my ordinary af-
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fairs and business ; my injuries were of such serious nature 
that they affected and still affect my reasoning power and 
ability to concentrate and think in the same manner as I could 
before the said injuries, the shock of the said injuries was so 
sereve that I have not recovered therefrom and believe and 
therefore allege that I will not recover therefrom or be able 
to overcome the same during my natural life. 
Wherefore this notice of motion. 
LELIA M. CURTIS, 
By Counsel. 
VENABLE, MILLER, PILCHER & PARSONS, p. ':1· 
January 18, 1935. 
BILL OF PARTICULARS. 
In compliance with the motion made by Messrs. Hughes, 
Little and Sea,vell, of counsel for the defense, the plaintiff, 
states the following as her bill of particulars: 
The plaintiff, a woman of mature age was (as she had a 
right to do and in the lawful exercise of such right) crossing 
a certain public street in the City of Norfolk, Virginia, to-
. wit: Olney Road, at or near the intersection of said 
page 10 ~ Olney Road with Botetourt Street, and at or near 
the point of a bus stop on the said public street, 
where people are accustomed to cross the said street and 
wl1ich said point of said street is extensively used by pedes-
trians. While the plaintiff w.as crossing the said public 
street, a certain automobile being driven and operated by the 
defendant, Swift Nelms, Jr., in a careless, reckless, negligent 
and improper manner and in violation of the laws of the 
State of Virginia and the ordinances of the City of Nor-
folk, ran into the plaintiff with great force and violence, re-
sulting in the severe, painful and permanent injuries alleged 
in the plaintiff's notice of motion. The said defendant, Swift 
·Nelms, Jr., was negligent in the following particulars: 
1. He was operating· the said automobile at a reckless and 
dangerous rate of speed. 
2. He was not operating the said automobile at a speed 
that was reasonable and proper, having due regard to the 
traffic, surface and width of the highway and of the other 
conditions then existing and at such speed as to endanger the 
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life, limb and property of other persons, particularly the 
plaintiff herein. 
3. He was operating the said autmobile in excess of 
twenty -five miles per hour. 
4. He was guilty of reckless driving in not having his 
automobile under complete control. 
5. He failed to keep a reasonable and proper lookout for 
persons lawfully upon or crossing the public street, particu-
larly the plaintiff herein. 
page 11 ~ 6. He made no effort to avoid colliding with and 
injuring the plaintiff after he saw, or, in the exer-
cise of reasonable care, should have seen her as she was cross-
ing the public street. 
7. He could have avoided, in tl1e exercise of reasonable 
and proper care, striking and injuring the plaintiff by stop-
ping or checking his speed or turning aside after he saw, or, 
in the exercise of reasonable care or proper lookout, should · 
have seen the plaintiff, and neg·Iigently failed so to do. 
8. He negligently failed to give any warning of the ap-
proach of his automobile. 
9. He was f!,cting in violation of both the traffic laws of the 
State of Virginia and the traffic ordinances of the City of 
Norfolk governing the control, operation and movement of 
motor vehicles upon the public streets in that he failed to 
have his car under complete control; was operating at an un-
reasonable, reckless, dangerous and improper rate of speed' 
under the circumstances and conditions then existing, and was 
guilty of reckless driving as defined in the statute laws of the 
State of Virginia and the ordinances of the City of Norfolk. 
The aforesaid specifications of negligence against the de-
fendant, Swift Nelms, Jr., are chargeable to the defendants, 
H. Dobson-Peacock and Edith Dobson-Peacock, the said Edith 
Dobson-Peacock being the registered owner of the said auto-
mobile, and the said· H. Dobson-Peacock and Edith Dobson-
Peacock operating and controlling the same through the said 
Swift Nelms, Jr. The plaintiff is informed and, 
page 12 }- therefore, avers not only that the said automobile 
was used as members of the family needed it for 
their purposes and as a family car but on the occasion in 
question and at the time of the accident, the said automobile 
was returning from having· conveyed, at the direction and re-
quest of H. Dobson-Peacock, the said H. Dobson-Peacock 
from his home to a church where he had business, and the said 
Swift Nelms, Jr. was actually acting at the time of the acci-
dent for and on behalf of the said other. d~fendants. In 
addition thereto, an adult member of the family, to-wit: Miss 
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l\'Iarjorie Peacock, was an oc<!upant of the said automobile 
at the time the accident occurred, and the said J\1:arjorie Pea-
cock was also guilty of negligence. 
The said automobile was being operated in such a reckless, 
dangerous and unlawful manner and so out of control that it 
mounted the sidewalk upon the north side of the said public 
highway and ran into certain produce containers and ehicken 
coops along the sidewalk in front of a mercantile or grocery 
store, killing the chickens and destroying other property. 
The said automobile being owned, operated and controlled 
as aforesaid was being controlled and operated in such a 
dangerous, reckless and unlawful manner and with such a to-
tal disregard of the rights of others, particularly the plain-
tiff, that it was caused to skid and slide a long distance be-
fore striking the plaintiff. If said automobile had been care-
fully, reasonably and lawfully operated, then such skidding 
would have been unnecessarv and the driver of the said auto-
mobile could have (if he had seen fit so to do) avoided run-
ning into and violently striking the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff further relies upon any evidence 
page 13 }- of negligence which may hereafter come to her 
knowledge or may be produced in exa1nination of 
the witnesses for either the plaintiff or te defendants and 
an examination of the defendants themselves. 
LELIA M. CURTIS, 
By Counsel. 
VENABLE, MILL·ER, PILCHER & PARSONS, p. q . 
• JOINDER. 
Now comes the plaintiff and says that the plea of oyer and 
demurrer filed by the defendant, H. Dobson-Peacock, should 
be overruled because (a) oyer has no application in the case 
afbar and (b) the hvo grounds of demurrer, Numbers 1 and 
2 are in direct conflict with the plaintiff's allegations in the 
notice of motion as to ownership, operation and control, a 
mere certificate of registration not being conclusive evidence 
of sole ownership. 
~Furthermore, oyer of the said registration· certificate in 
the possession of the defendants themselves, or some of them, 
is unnecessary because it is alleged in the plaintiff's notice 
of motion that the said automobile causing the injury to the 
plaintiff was registered in the name of Edith Dobson-Pea-
cock and in H. Dobson-Peacock and the notice of motion spe-
cifically alleges that the said automobile was being operated 
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and controlled in behalf of the said H. Dobson-Peacock in 
and about his affairs and business, and is further set out in 
the hill of particulars herein filed. 
LELIA M. CURTIS, 
By Counsel. 
VENABLE, MILLER, PILCHER & PARSONS, p. q. 
page 14 ~ JOINDER. 
Now comes the plaintiff and joins issue with the defendant, 
Harold Dobson-Peacoc-k, upon his sworn plea that the auto-
mobile ·which struck the plaintiff 'vas not being operated in 
his behalf or in connection with any business or affairs of 
his. The plaintiff has averred to the contrary, that the said 
automobile was being controlled and operated in behalf of the 
defendant, Harold Dobson-Peacock, and in connection with 
affairs and business of his. 
' LELIA M. CURTIS, 
By Counsel. 
VENABLE, ~IJLLER, PILCHER & PARSONS, p. q . 
• JOINDER. 
Now comes the plaintiff and joins issue with the defend-
ant, Edith Dobson-Peacock, upon her sworn plea denying 
operation and control of the automobile which struck and in-
jured the plaintiff, and says on the contrary, that the said de-
fendant, Edith Dobson-Peacock, was the registered owner of 
the said automobile and the same was being operated in her 
behalf and in connection with business and affairs of her~. 
LELIA M. CURTIS, • 
By Counsel. 
VENABLE, ~fiLLER, PILCHER 1& PARSONS, p. q. 
page 15 ~ And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit 
Court aforesaid, on the 2nd day of February, in 
the year 1935. 
This day came again the plaintiff, py her attorneys, Ven-
able, 1Yiiller, Pilcher & Parsons, and with leave of Court filed 
Edith Dobso~-P~acock, _et al., v. Lelia M._ Curtis. 27 
herein the Bill of the Particulars of her Claim; an4 the fur-
ther hearing is continued. . 
The following is the Bill of Particulars filed herein by 
leave of the foregoing order: 
BILL OF P A.RTICUL.A.RS. 
In compliance with motion made by Messrs. Hughes, Lit-
tle & Seawell, of" counsel, for defense, the plaintiff states 
the following- as her bill of particulars. 
The plaintiff, a woman of mature age was (as she had a 
right to do- and in the lawful exercise of such right) crossing 
a certain public street in the- City of Norfolk, Virginia, to-
wit, Olney Road, at or near the intersection of the said Olney 
Road with Botetourt Street, and at or near a point opposite 
the Model Grocery Store on the said public street, where 
people are accustomed to cross the said street and which said 
point of said street is extensively used by pedestrians. While 
the }Jlaintiff was crossing the said street, a certain automo:-
bile being driven and operated by the defendant Swift Nelms, 
Jr., in a careless, reckless, negligent and improper manner 
and in violation of the laws of the State of Virginia and 
the ordinances of the City of Norfolk, ran into the plaintiff 
with great force and violence, resulting in the se-
page 16 }: vere, painful and permanent injuries alleged in 
the plaintiff's notice of motion. The said defend-
ant, Swift Nelms, Jr., was negligent in the following particu-
lars: 
1. He was operating the said automobile at a reckless and 
dangerous rate of speed. 
2. He was not operating the said automobile at a speed 
that was reasonable and proper, having due regard to the 
traffic, surface and width of the highway and of the other con-
ditions then existing and was operating at such speed as to 
endanger the 1ife, limb and property of other persons, par-
ticularly of the plaintiff herein. 
3. He was operating the said automobile in excess of 
twenty-five miles per hour. 
4. :ij:e was guilty of reckless driving in not having his au-
tomobile under complete control. · 
5. He failed to keep a reasonable and proper lookout for 
persons lawfully upon or crossing the public street, particu-
larly the plaintiff herein. 
6. He made no effort to avoid colliding with and injuring 
the plaintiff after he saw or in the exercise of rea·sonable 
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care, should have seen her as she was crossing the public 
street. 
7. He could have avoided, in the exercise of reasonable 
and~ proper care, striking and injuring the plaintiff by stop-
ping or checking his speed or turning aside after he saw or, 
in the exereise of reasonable care or proper lookout, should 
have seen the plaintiff, and negligently failed so to 
page 17 ~ do. 
8. He negligently failed to give any warning of 
the approach of his automobile. 
9. He was acting in violation of both the traffic laws of 
the State of Virg·inia and the traffic ordinances of the City 
of Norfolk goYerning the control, operation and Inovement 
of motor vehicles upon the public streets in that he failed to 
have his car under complete control; was operating at an 
unreasonable, reckless, dangerous and improper rate of speed 
under the circumstances and conditions then existing, and 
was guilty of reckless driving as defined in the statute laws 
of the State of Virginia and the ordinances of the City of 
Norfolk. 
The aforesaid specifications of negligence against the de-
fendant, Swift Nelms, Jr., are chargeable to the defendants, 
H. Dobson-Peacock and Edith Dobson-Peacock, the said Edith 
Dobson-Peacock being the registered owner of the said auto-
mobile, and the sa1d H. Dobson-Peacock and Edith Dobson-
Peacock operating and controlling the same through the said 
Swift Nelms, Jr. The plaintiff is informed and, therefore, 
avers not only that the said automobile was used as members 
of the family needed it for their purposes and as a family 
car, but on the occasion in question and at the time of the 
accident, the said automobile was returning from a trip down 
town, which had been made with the knowledge, ~cquiescence, 
consent and/or direction of the said Edith Dobson-Peacock and 
H. Dobson-Peacock and under the special requet;t, direction 
and control of Miss !.iarjorie Dobson-Peacock, an adult 
daughter of the other defendants, and the said Swift Nelms, 
· Jr., was actually acting at the time of the accident 
·page 18 ~ for and on behalf of the said other defendants. 
In addition thereto, an adult member of the 
family, to-wit, l\Hss lVIarjorie Dobson-Peacock, was an oc-
cupant of the said automobile at the time the accident oc-
curred. 
The said automobile was being operated in such a reckless, 
dangerous and unlawful manner and so out of control that it 
mounted the sidewalk upon the north side of said public high ... 
way and ran into certain produce containers and chicken coops 
along the ·sidewalk in front of a mercantile or grocery store, 
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killing the chickens and destroying other property. The said 
automobile being owned, operated and controlled as aforesaid 
was being controlled and operated in such a dangerous, reck-
less and unlawful manner and with sucll a total disregard of 
the rights of others, particularly the plaintiff, that it was 
caused to skid and slide a long· distance before striking the 
plaintiff. 
If said automobile had been carefully, reasonably and law-
fully operated, then such skidding would have been un-
necessary and t!:te driver of the said automobile could have 
(if he had seen fit so to do) avoided running into and vio-
lently striking the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff further relies upon any evidence of negligence 
which may hereafter come to her knowledge or may be pro-
duced in examination of the witnesses for either the plain-
tiff or the defendants and an examination of the defendants, 
themse]ves. 
LELIA ~I. CURTIS, 
By Counsel . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' p. q. 
page 19 } And at another day to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
aforesaid, on the 19th day of February, in the 
year, 1935: 
This day came again as well the plaintiff, by her attorneys, 
Venable, Miller, Pilcher & Parsons, as the defendants, by 
their attorneys, D. W. Shriver and Ilughes, Little & Seawell, 
and thereupon said defendants, with leave of .court, filed here-
in their statement of their intention to rely upon the con-
tributory negligence of said plaintiff; and thereupon came· a 
jury, to-wit: J. II. Kegebein, T. L. Harrell, H. P. Randolph, 
W. N. Cootes., F. E. Marshall, J. M. Burfoot and A. P. Burck-
ard~ who were sworn to well and truly try the issue joined, 
and having heard a part of the evidence at five o'clock, P.M., 
the hour of adjournment having been reached, were ad-
journed until tomorro,v, Wednesday, morning, the 20th day 
.of February, in the year, 1935, at ten o'clock A. M. for the 
further consideratio·n of this case. 
The following is the statement of Plaintiff's Negligence, 
filed by leave of the foregoing order: 
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STATEMENT OF PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE~ 
The defendants, before the beginning of the trial, hereby 
aver that the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injury was 
her own want of ordinary care in general, and especially in 
the following particulars : 
page 20 ~ 1. She crossed the street between intersections 
instead of at an intersection or cross walk. 
2. She crossed the street diagonally instead of at right 
angles. 
3. She entered the street not only between intersections 
but from behind a parked automobile, by which she was ob-
scured from the view of approaching motorists. 
4. She failed p~~operly to use her eyes and ears to discover 
and avoid the automobile. 
5. Having improperly entered the roadway s~e failed to 
stop before placing herself in a position of danger after she 
knew, or in the· exercise of ordinary care should have known 
of the approach of the automobile. 
DONALD W. SHRIVER, 
HUGHES, LITTLE & SEA WELL, 
p. d. 
February 19, 1935. 
And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said, on the ~Oth day of February, in the year, 1935: 
This day came again as well the plaintiff, by her attorneys, 
Venable, :Miller, Pilcher & Parsons, as the defendants, by 
their attorneys, D. W. Shriver and Hughes, Little & ~ea:well, 
and pursuant to adjournment again came the jury, to-wit: 
J. H. Kegebein, T. L. Harrell, H. P. Randolph, W. N. Cootes, 
F. E. Marshall, J. M. Burfoot, and A. P. Burckard, who were 
sworn on yesterday, and thereupon on the motion of said 
plaintiff, by her attorneys, it is ordered that this notice of 
motion be dismissed as to said defendant, H. Doh-
page 21 ~ son-Peacock, and that said defendant go hence 
without day and recover of said plaintiff his costs 
about his defence in this behalf expended, and thereupon said 
jury ha~ing fully heard the evidence and argument of coun-
sel returned their verdict in the following words, to-wit: 
''We, the Jury, :find for the Plaintiff Fix the Damages at 
Ten Thousand Dollars.'' And thereupon said defendants, by 
their attorneys, moved the Court to set aside the verdict of 
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the jury and grant them a new trial on the grounds that the 
same is contrary to the law and the evidence; and the further 
hearing of which motion is continued. 
And at another day, to-wit: ·In the Circuit Court afore-
said on the 21st day of February, in the year, 1935: 
This day came again the defendants, Edith Dobson-Pea;. 
cock and Swift Nelms, Jr., by their attorneys, D. W. Shriver 
and Hughes, Little and Seawell, and thereupon said defend-
ants, with leave of Court filed herein their statement of their 
Grounds of the Motion to set aside the verdict of the jury 
heretofore rendered herein; and the further hearing of which 
motion is continued. 
The following is the statement of defendants filed herein by 
leave of the foregoing order: 
GROUNDS FOR DEFENDANTS' :MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE JURY'S VERDICT OF YESTERDAY; 
FEBRUARY 20, 1935. 
1. The verdict is excessive . 
. page 22 } 2. The verdict is contrary to the law and the 
evidence. 
3. The Court erred in overruling the motion to strike the 
evidence as to the defendant Edith Dobson Peacock made at 
the close of plaintiff's evidence and the like motion made at 
the close of all the evidence, the grounds of which motions 
fully appeared in the record. · 
4. The Court erred in refusing to strike the plaintiff's evi-
dence made at the close of the plaintiff's evidence and the 
like motion made at the close of all the evidence, the grounds 
of which motions fully appeared in the record. 
5. The court erred in granting on the motion of the plain-
tiff the instructions which were objected to by the defendant, 
the grounds of which objections fully appeared in the record. 
6. The court erred in refusing certain i'n\structions re-
quested by the defendant and in modifying other instructions 
requested by defendant, the grounds for which fully appeared 
in the record. · 
February 21! 1935. 
DONALD W. SH·RIVER, 
HUGHES, LITTLE & SEA WELL, 
p. d. 
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The following is a stipulation filed herein. 
STIPULATION. 
It is agreed between counsel that the certificates of John 
T. Rhodes, Director of the Division of 1\1:otor Vehicles, dated 
the 7th day of January, 1935, with reference to au-
page 23 ~ tomobile 1934 license number 112234, that applica-
tion and registration certificate attached thereto 
may be attached as if inserted in the plea of "oyer and de-
murrer" filed by H. Dobson-Peacock in the above-entitled 
case, subject, however, to any proper objections and excep-
tions to the plea or any of its contents. 
January ·13, 1935. 
VENABLE, 1\ifiLLER, PILCHER & 
PARSONS, 
p. q. 
HUGHES, LITTLE & SEA WELL, 
p. d .. 
Note: The certificate of the Director of the Division of 
Motor Vehicles, and application and registration certificate 
attached thereto, may be found in a separate envelope con-
taining the exhibits introduced in the trial of this case. 
And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk, on the 23rd day of March, in the year, 1935: 
This ·day came again as well the plaintiff, by her attorneys, 
Venable, Miller, Pilcher & Parsons, as the defendants, Edith 
Dobson-Peacock and Swift Nelms, Jr., by their attorneys, 
D. W. Shriver and Hughes, Little & Seawell, and the mo-
tions heretofore made herein by said defendants having been 
fully heard and maturely considered by the Court are over-
ruled. Whereupon it is considered by the Court that said 
plaintiff recover of said defendants, Edith Dobson-Peacock 
and Swift Nelms, Jr., the sum of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) 
Dollars, as by the jury in its verdict ascertained, 
page 24 ~ with legal interest thereon from the 20th day of 
February, in the year 1935, till paid, together with 
her costs about her suit in this behalf expended, to all of which 
said defendants, by their attorneys, duly excepted. 
And thereupo·n said defendants, having signified their in-
tention of applying to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia for a writ of error and supersedeas to the foregoing 
judgment, it is ordered that· execution upon said judgment 
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be suspended for the period of sixty (60) days from the end 
of this term of the Court upon said defendants, or someone 
for them, entering into and acknowledging· a proper :suspend-
ing bond before the clerk of this Court, in the penalty of 
Eleven Thousand ($11,000.00) Dollars, witli surety to be ap-
proved by said clerk, and with coudition according to law. 
And now, at this day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said, on the 15th day of May, 1935, the day and year first 
hereinabove written: 
This day came again the parties, by counsel, and the de-
fendants tendered their several bills of exception to certain 
rulings of the Court on the trial of the case, which said bills 
of exceptions are numbered consecutively from 1 to 4, in-
clusively, and it appearing to the Court that the said plaintiff 
has had reasonable notice in writing of the time and place 
application would be made for the signing of same, 
page 25 ~ they are duly signed, sealed and made a part of 
the record of this case, within sixty (60) days from 
the date on which final judgment herein was entered, to-wit: 
on the 23rd day of March, in the year, 1935. 
The following are the Bills of Exception, numbered one 
to four, inclusively, and filed by leave of the foregoing order: 
page 26 ~ In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, 
Virginia. 
·Lelia M. Curtis 
v. 
H. Dobson-Peacock, Edith Dobson-Peacock and S'vift Nelms, 
Jr. 
At Law On Motion. 
BILLS OF EXCEPTION. 
BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 1. 
To Refusal to Set Aside Verdict. 
BE IT REMEMBERED that at the trial of the above-en-
titled cause on February 19 and 20, 1935, after the jury had 
been sworn, the plaintiff and defendants introduced certain 
evidence which is set out in full in the proceedings in this 
cause certified by me, A. R. Hanckel, Judge of the Circuit 
Court of the .City of Norfolk, Virginia, by certificate executed 
simultaneously with this bill of exception {which proceed-
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ings are hereby referred to and made a part hereof as fully 
as if set out herein) ; . 
WHEREUPON the jury rendered their verdict as set out 
in the said ·proceedings certified by me as aforesaid; 
AND THERElTPON the defendants moved the ·court to 
set aside the said verclict as set out. in said certified proceed-
ings and assigned as grounds for said motion the grounds 
therein set out (reporter's transcript pages 216 and 217), and 
the said motion was fully argued by counsel and the court's 
decision reserved and rendered on the 23rd day of March, 
1935. 
BUT THE ~COURT refused to set aside the said verdict 
and enter judgment for the defendants or grant defendants a 
new trial or reduce the amount of the said verdict; but did 
on the 23rd day of March, 1935, enter a judgment against the 
defendants Edith Dobson-Peacock and Swift Nelms, Jr., for 
the sum of $10,000.00. . 
page 27 } TO THE REFUSAL of the court to set aside 
said verdict and to the entry of judgment thereon 
the defendants, by counsel, excepted, and now tender this, 
their bill of exception No. 1, and pray that the same may be 
signed, sealed and made a part of the · record in this cause, 
which is accordingly done this 15th day of May, 1935, and 
within sixty days from the time at which the said judgment 
was entered, and after reasonable notice by defendants to 
plaintiff of the tender of this bill of exception. 
ALLAN R. HANCKEL, (Sean 
Judge of said Court. 
The following is the evidence mention<!d in the foregoing 
Bill of Exception No. 1 : 
page 28 } In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, 
Virginia. -
Lelia M. Curtis 
v. 
H. Dobson-Peacock, Edith Dobson-Peacock and Swift Nelms, 
J~ ' 
NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
To Messrs. Venable, Miller, Pilcher & Parsons, Attorneys for 
Lelia M. Curtis : 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE That on the 15th day of May, 
1935, at 10 A. 1\L, or as soon thereafter as we may be heard, 
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the undersigned will present to the Judge of the Circuit Court 
of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, their certificate of exception 
to be signed. by the Judge and made a part of the record in 
this case. 
Also the undersigned will, at the same time and place, re-
quest the Clerk of said court to make up and deliver to coun-
sel a transcript of the record in the above-entitled cause for 
the purpose of presenting the same with a petition for an ap-
peal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
DONALD W. SHRIVER, 
HUGHES, LITTLE & SEA WELL, 
. p. d. 
Service accepted this 7th day of May, 1935. 
L. S. PARSONS, Attorney. 
page 29 t In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, 
Virginia. · . _ 
Lelia M. Curtis 
v. 
H. Dobson-Peacock, Edith Dobson-Peacock and Swift- Nelms; 
Jr. 
RECORD. 
Stenographic report of the testimony, instructions (offered, 
granted, amended and refused), objections, rulings, excep-
tions and other incidents of the trial of the above~entitled • 
case, which was tried before Hon. A. R. Hanckel, Judge of 
the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, and jury, 
at Norfolk, Virginia, February 19-20, 1935. 
Present: }rfessrs. Venable, Miller, Pilcher & Parsons for 
the plaintiff. Messrs. Donald W. Shriver and Hughes, Lit-
tle & Seawell for the defendants. 
Phlegar & Tilghman, 
Shorthand Reporters, 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
page 30 t Note : Mter the jury was selected and sworn, 
opening statements were made by Mr. Parsons, ·on 
behalf of the plaintiff, and by Mr. Shriver, on behalf of the 
defendants. 
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Mr. Parsons: If your Honor please, I summoned Miss 
Marjorie Peacock as an adverse witness, and I ask her to take 
the stand. I am not calling her on the question of the acci-
dent, but on the ownership of the car. 
~iiSS MARJORIE PEACOCK, 
called as an adverse witness by the plaintiff, being duly s'vorn,. 
testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Parsons: · 
Q. I want to ask you .about the automobile and not about 
the. ~ccident. I presume counsel will later call you on that. 
On the day of this accident, who was the owner of the auto-
Jnobile? . 
A. My mother. · 
Q. Who was driving the carY 
A. Mr. Nelms. 
Q. Mr. Nelms hn:s been driving the car practically ever since 
you had it, hasn't heY 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was he regularly employed? 
A. He drove it as a favor to us because none of 
page 31 ~ us drive. 
Q. He drove it at your request, or at your moth-
er's request, or at your father's request? 
A. At my request, I think. 
Q. Ordinarily, who requested him to drive the car-just 
anybody who wanted him toY 
A. Just anybody who wanted him to. 
Q. And he was driving it for you, and he drove it for you 
and for your mother and for your father! 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who maintains the automobile? 
A. Sir? 
Q. Who bought the gasoline and kept it running? 
A. Whoever was in it. 
Q. Well, did they have any charge account against your 
father for oil and gasoline and things of that kind? 
A. Not at that time. 
Q. Did you, or not, consider it was his duty to keep the 
car up? 
A. No. 
Mr. Hughes: I object. 
Mr. Parsons: She ~aid no. 
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By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. On the day of this accident had your father been in the 
carY 
A. No. 
page 32 ~ 
Q. Where had you been 7 
A. I had been to the station. 
Q. And Mr. Nelms had driven you to the sta-
tion7 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was your mother at home when you leftY 
A. Yes. 
Q. She knew you were going to the station Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you requested Mr. Nelms to drive you to the sta-
tion 'vith a friend 
A. The friend was not in the car. 
Q. You went down to see a friend off, I understand 7 
A. Yes.· She was down at the station. 
Q. And leaving on the train 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you were on the way back home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Your mother had no objection to you having Mr. Nelms 
drive the car and take you anywhere you wanted f 
A. No. 
Q. The car was used as you all saw fit for family purposes Y 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Hughes: I object to that as a legal conclusion. He 
can show the facts. 
By lVIr. Parsons: 
Q. Any member of the family who wanted to 
page 33 ~ use the car used it whenever they got ready 7 
Mr. Hughes: I object to that as leading. I do not know 
any reason why she is adverse. 
The Court : I don't know whether she is one of the de-
fendants. 
~Ir. Hughes: She is not one of the defendant, and I do 
not think she is adverse. 
By ~fr. Parsons: 
Q. Did, or not, the family use it among themselves when-
every they needed it without any objection on the part of 
anybody? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. If you wanted it, it was all right, and. if your father 
wanted it, it was all right, and if your mother wanted it, it 
was all right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Mr. Nelms would drive for any of youY 
A. Yes. 
Q. How often did he drive? 
A. Whenever we needed it. 
Q. And that was most every day Y 
A. I don't know. 
Q. He did not charge anything for it f 
A. No; he did it as a favor. 
Q. Just a friend of the family Y 
~page 34 } A. Yes. 
Mr. Parsons: That is all. 
Mr. Hughes: No questions. 
Mr. Parsons: I hav:e Rev. Peacock summoned, and I think 
I had better call him. 
REV. H. DOBSON-PEACOCK, 
called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, testified as fol-
lows, after having be.en first duly sworn: 
Examined by Mr. Parsons: 
Q. What do you prefer I call you f 
A. Anything you like. 
Q. Did you have any ownership or control of this auto-
mobile in any way? 
A. None whatever. 
Q. It belongs to your wife f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you purchase it? 
A. No ; my wife purchased it. 
Q. She purchased it with her own funds f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you maintain it? 
page 35 ~ A. No. 
Q. Do you buy gasoline or oil for it 7 
A. If I am in the car I occasionally buy it, but my wife 
looks after that. 
Q. You furnish the money for your family! 
A. Yes, but my wife has an allowance. 
Q. From you-? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And from that allowance she bought the automobile and 
kept -it running? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You· considered it a car you had a right to use when you 
were ready to use it 7 
A. As a matter of fact, I very rarely used the car. I am 
fond of using the bus, and I very rarely use the car. 
Q. I am afraid you did not understand my question. 
A. I think so. 
Q. You considered it a car to use when you got ready, when 
it was not being used by others in the house Y 
A. I used it occasionally. 
Q. You thought you had a right to use itt 
A. Yes. 
Q. You had the same control o~er it Y 
A. No. It was entirely Mrs. Peacock's car to get around 
wherever she wanted. As a matter of fact, when 
page 36 ~ the car was bought I knew nothing about it and 
· was surprised when I got there and found it. 
Q. You considered it a car that any member of the family 
could use at any time they got ready Y 
A. Yes. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hughes: 
Q. Where were you when the car was bought? 
A. In Europe. I was not here at all. I was thousands of 
miles away. 
Q. Had anything been said to you about buying a car when 
you went to Europe Y 
A. Nothing at all. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. Was there another car traded in for it, or was it bought 
outright? 
A. Bought outright. 
By Mr. Hughes: 
Q. It was the first car that the family had had 7 
A. Yes. 
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page 37 ~ C. K. KESSER, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
,Examined by Mr. Parsons: 
Q. What are your initials, Mr. Kesser~ 
A. C. K. 
Q. Where do you live? 
A. Apartment A. Haddon HalL 
Q. What is your business Y 
.A. Grocer. 
Q. What grocery? 
A. l\{odel Grocery. Q. ~at street? 
A. 344 West Olney Road. 
Q. Where were you when the accident happened to Mrs. 
Curtis? 
A. I was at home eating dinner. 
Q. Did you go to the scene of the accident 1 
A. Yes; when the accident happened, my wife was at the 
store, and she called me up and told me there was a big ac-
cident in front of the store. 
Q. How far is your place from the store? 
A. About six blocks. 
Q. When you got there, tell the jury what you found there. 
A. I found an automobile on the sidewalk on top of four 
chicken coops, right on the sidewalk. Right on 
page 38 ~ the sidewalk there was the young lady there and 
the boy right there. This lady-
Q. (Interposing.) Mrs. Curtis Y 
A. Mrs. Curtis was away, and there was a big commotion 
there. When the accident happened I was about six blocks 
away. I have a new 1934 . .Chevrolet, and I got into the ear 
and ran to the· store. When I came there, there was an au-
tomobile on the sidewalk on top of the chickens, all the chicken 
coops broken and c.hickens everywhere. The automobile was 
on the sidewalk. We pushed the automobile off the sidewalk, 
and along at that time I asked was anybody hurt, and they 
said yes, a lady 'vas taken to the hospital. I asked the wife 
who was driving the car, and I asked his name, and after my 
chicke·ns were hurt I wanted to know all about it. I said, 
''Boy, what is your name¥'' and he said, I think, N ~lms. I 
said, "You had a big accident", and he said, "Yes". He 
was shaking all over, and the lady there was shaking all over. 
I saw about seventy-five feet from the store skidding. You 
can see skidding·, you know. It was not raining, and I saw 
/ 
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it. I said, "Boy, you must have been going at a terrific 
speed-
Yr. Hughes: I object to thal 
Mr. Parsons: He can say what he said. He is a defendant. 
"\Vitness: I was talking to Swift Nelms. I was talking to 
the boy. l said, "Boy, you must have been going 
page 39 ~ at a terrific rate of speed'', and he said, ''No ; I 
was going about twenty or twenty-five miles an 
hour'', and I said, ''You know doggone well you can't go 
twenty or twenty-five miles an hour and skid· seventy-five 
feet". I said, "I have a 1934 car and so have you, and I 
can stop quicker going that rate". I went into the store 
and up comes a little boy and gives me a pair of shoes, and 
I said-
1\fr. Schriver (Interposing) : I object to that. . 
The Court : Did the young man take the shoes? 
Witness: No; he was there. 
The Court: What have the shoes got to do with it 7 
Witness: It was the lady's shoes. 
The Court:· This lady here? 
Witness: Yes, sir. 
~ir. Parsons: Don't state what anybody else said. 
Witness: The shoes were in the store at the time. The 
boy came up and gave the shoes. 
Q. {By Mr. Parsons:) The boy brought you the shoes? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Let me ask you something, Mr. Kesser: These marks 
that you saw, did they follow from where the automobile was 
parked on back? 
A. The skidding was seventy-five feet from the store, but as 
the car came to the store the lady was crossing the 
page 40 ~ street in front, and so he swerved and ran to the 
sidewalk to keep from hitting the lady, but he 
couldti 't miss her-
Mr. Shriver (InterposiJ?.g): He is arguing the case. 
The Court : Listen to the question and answer it. 
Witne_ss : I am telling how the chickens got hurt. 
Q. (By Mr. Parsons:) Quiet down, Mr. Kesser. What I 
want to kno'v is whether you saw the marks leading off in 
the path of the carY 
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A. Yes. Mr. Williams and Mr. Guy and I measured them. 
He had a long rod about an hour after the accident. 
Q. Who pointed out the marks you saw? 
A. We measured it, and it was seventy-five feet skidding. 
Q. Is there any question that these marks were made by 
that carY 
A. It couldn't have been any other car, as it came right 
up on the sidewalk. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Shriver: · 
Q. Now, Mr. Kesser, you did not see the accident at all, 
did you? · 
A. No, sir. I was there when the car was on the sidewalk. 
The Court : He asked you if you saw the car. Do you 
know anything about "Yes" or ''No"? 
page 41 ~ Witness: No, I didn't see it. 
By Mr. Shriver: 
Q. The only interest you have in this case is to show some-
thing about some alleged skid marks; isn't that true Y 
A. The car was on the sidewalk and the skid marks is all. 
Q. Let me get this clear : Do I understand you to say you 
measured the skid marks with a rule Y 
A. With a long surveying rod-one of those things which 
ravels up. 
Q. Do yon know the length of it 
A. It had the feet on it. 
Q. You saw the measurement Y 
A. Mr. Williams and Mr. Guy and I measured it, and I was 
curious to .know what it was. It was in front of my place. 
Q. I think it is natural curosity. 
A. No doubt of it. 
Q. The skid marks apparently showed a turn .in to your 
storeY 
A. It skidded up to the sidewalk and on top of the chickens. 
When I came there I helped to push the car off the chicken 
coop. 
Q. The front wheels were overT 
A. That is right. 
Q. The seventy-five feet you measured was from where you 
first saw the skid marks Y 
page 42 ~ A. Where the back tire skidded. 
Q. They were not continuous all the way T 
A. Yes, until it came on the sidewalk. 
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Q. And then there were no skid marks 7 
A. No skid marks. 
Q. You say it was seventy-frv:e feet; where did you take 
the end of it-at the little tree in front of your storeY 
A. No; where the car came on top of the chicken coop. 
We measured from where the car started skidding, Mr. Wil-
liams or Mr. Guy-I didn't know who they were, and had 
never seen them before,-but they told me that they were Mr. 
Guy and Mr. Williams, and he told me he came t<;> ·measure 
the skid marks, and I have a boy in the store- and I was curi-
ous, and I went to see what was what, and he put the rod 
there where they started to where they stopped, and it was 
seventy-five feet. 
Q. It was on a curve, wasn't it? 
A. No, not a curve, but it made a bend. 
Q. It made a curvef 
A. Why, sure. 
,I 
page· 43 } MISS PEARL SHAW, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
Examined by ~fr. Parsons: 
Q. Miss Shaw, where do you live·y 
A. 324 Fairfax· Avenue. 
Q. Do you mind telling us your age f 
A. Twenty-three. 
Q. And what is your occupation? 
A. Bookkeeper at Memorial Hospital. 
Q. I wish you· would talk so this last gentleman can hear . 
you. Were you on Olney Road near the scene of this acci-
dent the day that it occurred to Mrs. Curtis? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. Tell the jury just where you were? 
A. I was on the north side of Olney Road walking east. 
Q. About how far were you~o you know where the Model 
Grocery Store is Y -
A. Yes. 
Q. About· how far away from that store were you~ 
A. About fifty feet, I reckon. 
Q. Towards Colonial or towards Boush f 
A. Towards Colonial. · 
Q. You were between the store and where Botetourt buts 
in? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Now, Miss Shaw, do you, know whether or 
page 44 } not there were cars parked along the same side 
of the street beyond the store from you T Do you 
recall whether there were some cars parked along on the 
north side of the street, the same side that the grocery st~re 
is, and beyond the store from you? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Yon will not say whether there were or were not Y 
A. I think there were; but I do not know for sure. 
Q. Did you notice any parked ca.rs where Mrs. Curtis 
started across the street 1 
A. No ; there were .. no cars there. 
Q. There were no cars parked there T 
A. No. 
. 
By the Court : 
Q. That is the south sideY 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Parsons: 
· Q. You saw Mrs. ·Curtis coming across the street, did you 1 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Now, tell the jury, Miss Shaw, in your own way just 
what occurred? 
A. Mrs. Curtis started across the street-I didn't notice 
any cars coming at the time she left the sidewalk; when she 
got about midway of the street, she picked up her gait, and 
I heard some brakes, as if some one slamming on brakes, 
and I looked up and saw a car coming. When Mrs. 
page 45 ~ Curtis was just about two feet from the sidewalk, 
this ·car got in front of the Model Grocery, and it 
turned in, made a s)larp right-hand curve, and the left-hand 
fender struck Mrs. Curtis when she was about two feet from 
the curb, and threw her back in the middle of the street. 
Q. The left front fender struck he·r f · 
A. Yes. · 
- ·Q. And she· was then within about two feet of the curb 1 
A. Yes. 
The ·court: That plat there, is that measured to scale? 
Mr. Parsons : Yes, sir. 
The Court: Does it give the width of Olney Road? 
Mr. Parsons: Yes, sir. 
Q. (By Mr. Parsons:) At that time was there any other 
traffic moving in either direction f 
A. There was not. 
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By the Court: 
Q. What time of day was it 7 
A. I think around 1 :30. 
By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. :1\fiss Shaw, did you go to her after the accident, or did 
somebody else go and pick her up~ 
A. The man that was driving the car went to 
page 46 ~ her. 
Q. You don't know 1\ir. Hanbury, do you Y 
A. No. 
Q. Some other man went out there. Did you see some other 
man go out there? 
A. I saw the man driving the car get out. 
Q. Didn't some other car or truck come up after the acci-
dent? 
A. The Birtcherd Dairy truck was the .first. 
Q. Was that car near the accident when it occurred T 
A. No, it was not. 
Q. Was there anything that would prevent the driver of 
the car that hit her from seeing her 7 
Mr. Hughes: Objected to as leading. 
Q. (1Ylr. Parsons:} Was there any obstruction in the street 
which would obscure the view of Mrs. Curtis Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was there anything to obscure the view of her as she 
left the other side of the street and stepped into the street? 
A. No. 
Q. Could you give us some idea how far away down the 
street the car that hit her was when she started moving faster 
and was moving over to the curb? Could you tell by houses 
or anything of that kind? 
A. He was beyond the bus stop. 
Q. From you beyond the bus stop? 
A. Yes. 
page 47 ~ The ·Court: \tVhat bus stop is that? I haven't 
got the geography of this straight; was it beyond 
Moran Avenue? 
~fr. Parsons: That bus stop is towards Boush Street. 
The Court: Was it bevond Moran Y 
Mr. Parsons : No ; it was east of Botetourt. The bus stop 
is in the ·middle of the block. The bus stop is on the map 
here, and it will show the distance. I would say the bus stop 
is something over 100 feet beyond the store. 
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The Court: What bus stop f 
Mr. Parsons: On the north side of Olney Road. 
The Court : Towards Boush StreetY 
Mr. Parsons : Towards Boush Street, yes, sir. 
Q. (Mr. Parsons:) Miss Shaw, the position Mrs. Curtis 
was in at the time the car turned to the right, would he, or 
not, if he had moved in a straight line ahead, have missed 
Mrs. Curtis? 
A. He would have. 
Q. Was there, or not, anything in the street to prevent his 
turning to the left or keeping straight ahead Y 
A. No. 
Q. He could have Y 
A. He could have. 
Q. If he had done either, he would have missed--
page ~8 ~ 
all. 
Mr. Hughes (Interposing:) Objection. 
Mr. Parsons: It is mere repetition. That is 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hughes: 
Q. Where is 324 Fairfax 7 
A. It is midway between J\1:owbray Arch and Botetourt 
Street. 
Q. North or south side? 
A. North. 
Q. Where were you going from and to at the time you wit-
nessed the accident? 
A.. Going from my work down town. I was 'valking. 
Q. You thought there were automobile's parked in that 
hlock of Olney Road. Have you any impression about how 
many automobiles were parked in that blockY 
A.. No, I have not. 
Q. Do you think a dozen in the whole block would be a 
fair estimate? 
A.. I couldn't say. 
Q. Do· you happen to remember the location of any of 
those parked cars? 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. Do you know whether there were more on the south side 
or on the north side of Olney Road f 
A. I know I didn't see any cars on the south side of the 
street at all. 
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Q. Where was the Compeco automobileY 
page 49 } A. I didn't see it. 
Q. So if that was ·on the south side, it escaped · 
your attention Y · 
A. If it was on the south side it was not near where Mrs. 
Curtis crossed the street. 
Q. If it was on the south side, it escaped your attention 
because you do not remember seeing it on the south side Y 
A. No. 
Q. W4ere did the milk automobile stop when it came up Y 
A. It stopped on the south side of the street. · 
Q. About what part of the blockY 
A. Just in front of 'vhere Mrs .. Curtis was lying. 
By the Court : 
Q. About in front of the Model Grocery, too f 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Hughes: 
Q. How close was that automobile at the time Mrs. Curtis 
was struck? 
A. I didn't see . the Birtcherd Dairy truck at all when she 
was struck.. It was back of me. 
Q. Did you see any cars coming from the east Y 
A. No, I did not, except the car in the accident. 
Q. None except the car in the accident 7 
A. No. 
Q. When did you first see Mrs. Curtis 7 
A. When she left the curb. 
page 50} Q. Was there anything that attracted your at-
tention to her particularly then Y 
A. No. I was just walking along and saw her when she left 
the curb. 
Q. Yon know her? 
A. No, I do not. . 
Q. Which way had she come from when yon saw her leaving 
the curb? 
A. I didn't see her until she stepped down off the curb. 
I couldn't say for sure. . 
Q. Which way was she facing or heading .when she stepped 
downY 
A. She was starting across to the Model Grocery. It ap-
peared that she was going in that direction, kind of north-
~ast. 
Q. Northeast? 
A. Yes, sir. 
-~ 
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Q. So she was walking sort of obliquely across the street 
to the Model StoreY 
A. Yes. 
Q. Heading north and east Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. She was walking at what speed, Miss Shaw? 
A. She was not walking very fast when she started across, 
but· when she got about middleway she kind of speeded up. 
Q. Which way was she facing as she stepped 
page 51 ~ down into the str~et t Which way was her head 
· turnedf · · 
A. She was facing north. 
Q. Which way was her head turned Y 
A. I couldn't say. 
Q. You don't remember about that Y 
A. No. . 
Q. Now, yon say that she proceeded at first not so fast; 
how far did she proceed across the street at that same speed 
that you have just .mentioned? 
A. About half way. 
Q. About half wayY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And, as she proceeded, how was she looking or heading? 
A. Looking in front of her. 
Q. Looking straight ahead. Where was she-what did she 
do after she got about half way. at the speed that you have 
mentioned? What change occurred then in her movement Y 
A. She started walking faster, something like a slow run . 
. She was not really running, but she picked up her speed. 
Q. Had she gotten as far as half way when she began that Y 
A. I think she had. · 
Q. Was she to the south or north of the center . line of 
the street? · 
A. I think she was just about midway. 
Q . .4nd _still looking straight ahead Y 
· ·· · A. Yes. 
P.age 52 ~ . Q. Di.d she change her direction at all before the 
accident occurred f 
A. No, she did not. 
Q. What first attracted your attention to the automobile f 
A. When he put on the brakes and I heard it make a noise. 
Q. Still then you had not seen it? 
A. No. 
Q. Where was she lying when she picked up Y 
A. In the middle of the street. · 
Q. Do you recall which way she was lying absolutely, 
headed, whether lying in the direction of the street or across Y 
--~-. L 
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A. She was lying across the middle of the street with her 
head south. 
Q. Her head south across the street Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was where with reference to the Grocery Store 7 
A. Just about in front of the Grocery Store. 
Q. In front of the middle of it? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. What did you do then, Miss Shaw? 
A. I stood there until the Birtcherd Dairy truck came along 
and they picked her up, and I F'ent on. 
Q. You proceeded on down townY 
A. Yes. 
page 53 } Q. Could you tell what part of the automobile 
struck her? 
A. The left-hand front fender. 
Q. What kind of automobile was it? 
A. I didn't notice. 
Q. I don't mean the make but the type Y 
A. I think it was a sedan. I am not sure, and I didn't pay 
particular attention to the car. ,-
Q. What color Y 
A. Black, I think. 
Q. Did you see the number of occupants in the carY 
A. I saw two people, both sitting on the front seat. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. Miss Shaw, could you say whether or not Mrs. Curtis 
glanced to the left or right as she went across the street Y 
A. I couldn't tell, but I thought she did from her picking 
up her gait like she did. 
Q. Now, tell the jury, Miss Shaw, whether she was walking 
diagonally or practically straight, and, if not, how she wa~ 
going across the street Y Did she start across practically in 
front of the store or not Y In other words, how did she ap-
approach Y Was she going straight across Y 
A. Practically straight, but a little to the east-just slightly. 
Q. Slightly to the east? . 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 54 ~ Q. You call east which way-towards Colonial 
or towards Boush f 
A. Towards Boush. 
Q. Slightly to the east Y 
A. Yes. 
~ 
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Q. With her head, howover, turned . directly across the 
street? 
A. Yes. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hughes: 
Q. You confuse me a little about that. I understood you -
to say, in answer to my question, that she was walking ob-
liquely across the street about northeast. Now, do I under-
stand-
A. She was walking almost straight, but what little dif-
ference there was it was to the east. 
Q. I did not understand you to say that. Is that what 
you said when I questioned you Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. 
page 55 ~ . MRS. LELIA M. CURTIS, 
the plaintiff; ... being duly sworn, testified as follows~ 
Examined by 1¥Ir. Parsons: 
Q. Mrs. Curtis, what is your first name f 
A. Lelia. 
Q. You are the plaintiff and you were injured in this acci-
dent which you have broughf this suit about? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Would you give us your age, please, Mrs. Curtis Y 
A. Sixty-three. 
Q. Mrs. Curtis, how long have you lived in Norfolk? 
A. Nine years. 
Q. And what has been your occupation the major portion 
of your life? -
A. School teacher. 
Q. And where did you teach school T 
A. I taught school in Bluefield, West Virginia. 
Q. For how many years Y 
A. Sixteen years. 
Q. On the d~y of this accident, Mrs. Curtis, where were 
you living? 
A. On Olney Road. 
Q. At what place Y 
A. At the Y. W. C. H. 
Q. Did you leave the house some time during some part 
of that dar? 
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A. Yes; I left about two o'clock. 
page 56 }- Q. About two o'clock Y 
A. Yes, or a little after. 
Q. And where did you intend to goY 
A. I was going to the Model Grocery Store. 
Q. When you left the house, tell the jury where you went 
t() before you crossed the street, or tried to cross the street 1 
A. Tell the Judge what Y 
Q. Where you went, and how did you go towards the storeY 
A .. I left theY. W. to go to the gTocery store. 
Q. ·Where were you when you started across the street! 
Where did you get before you started across Y 
A. I got a short -distance down the street. 
Q. On the sidewalk. or in the street, or where Y 
A. On the sidewalk. 
Q. And when you started across the street, where were 
you with reference to the grocery store on the opposite side Y 
A. I started right across from the grocery store. . 
Q. Did you go at an angle, or did you go practically str~ght 
acrossY 
A. Practically straight across. . 
Q. When you started across the street, was there any traf-
fic coming in either direction? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you look Y . 
A. I looked both ways. 
Q. When was the fi~st time you saw an automo-
page 57 } bile while you were crossing the street Y 
A. When I got out in the middle of the street. 
Q. When you saw that automobile what did you do Y 
A. I hastened my step. · 
Q. Tell the jury where you got to-where you were when 
you were hit Y Where were you with reference to the side-
walk 7 Had you gotten over to it, or where were you Y 
A. I had gotten over to it. 
Q. You had gotten over to the curb line, do you mean Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you feel you were out of ·the lane of any atito-
mobileY · 
Mr. Hughes: Objected to as leading. 
Q. (Mr. Parsons) Were you, Mrs. Curtis, out of the line 
that an automobile would be in if it had followed the line-
Mr. Hughes: (Interposing) Same objection. 
The Court: Get her to state where she was. 
Mr. P·arsons: She said at the curbstone. 
I 
! 
«--.... 
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By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. When you saw the car, was it up against the curb, o~ 
was it coming down the street somewhere off the curb Y 
A. Coming down the street. 
Q. Some distance from the curb f 
A. Yes. 
page 58~ Q. Could that automobile have struck you with-
out turning out of its path to the right! 
A. No. 
Q. Mrs. Curtis, are the facts of this accident totally clear 
to you, or not? 
A. Well, they are not. 
Q. They are not Y 
A. No. I have had right much trouble with my head. 
Q. Trouble with what Y 
A. With my head. 
Q. You did not see the automobile strike you at all, did 
you? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know what happened after it struck youY 
A. No. 
Q. Or were you conscious Y 
A. I don't remember anything about it. 
Q. Did you have any trouble with your memory or with 
your head before the accident Y 
A. No. 
Q. Are you able to concentrate and think clearly as you 
did before? · 
A. No. 
Mr. Hughes: Objected to as leading. 
The Court : Disregard that. 
page 59 ~ Q. (Mr. Parsons) Tell the jury the differenc~ 
between the condition of your memory, if any, be-
fore the accident and since Y What is the difference between 
you then and now Y 
. A. There is all the difference in the world. I can't do any-
thing now. 
Q: Mrs. Curtis, where were you when you first knew any-
thing after the accident f 
A. I was in Sarah Leigh Hospital. 
Q. How long had you been in Sarah Leigh Hospital Y 
A. Since the 8th of November. 
Q. You are still in the hospital f 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And you have been there since 8th of November? 
A. Yes. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Seawell: Perhaps the witness would like to rest a. little 
or would yon like to take another witness now 7 
Mr. Parsons: I will take the doctors. . 
Mr. Seawell: The cross examination will be deferr-ed. 
Mr. Parsons : I think she can probably go ahead now. I 
want her to go back 
By Mr. Seawell: 
Q. Mrs. Curtis, I will ask you just as few questions as 
I can. 
page 60 r A. Thank you. 
Q. You say you have been living in Norfolk nine 
years? 
A. Yes, nine and a half. 
Q. Previous to that time you had been in Bluefield, West 
Virginia, had you? . 
A. Bluefield, West Virginia, and I taught there in the high 
school sixteen years. . 
Q. Did you ever teach school after you came to Norfolk 1 
A. I was teaching at City Point. I taught school at City 
Point. 
Q. How long ago has it been since you taught school? 
A. I taught school nine years. 
Q. Do you mean you stopped teaching school about nin~ 
years ago? 
A. I have not taught for nine years. 
Q. You have not taught school for nine years? 
A. No. · 
Q. Have you been following any occupation since you have 
been in Norfolk! 
A. No. . 
Q. Do you live at the Y. W. Home? 
A. Yes, I ha:ve lived there for awhile. I was going back 
to Newport News but I met with this accident. 
Q. How long had you lived at theY. W. HomeY 
A. Since the first of October. 
Q. You, of course, were familiar with this neighborhood 
surrounding the M'odel Grocery Y 
page 61 r A. Well, I had been there from the first of Octo-
ber until the 8th of November. 
Q. You had been to the Model Grocery on numerous oc-
casions, had you Y 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And, on the occasion when this accident happened, I 
understand you left theY. W. Home up there on Olney RoadY 
A. Yes. 
Q. And went west on the southern side of Olney RoadY 
A. Yes. 
Q. Until you got about opposite the Model Grocery? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then started across Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Botetourt Street is just a little further to the west of 
the place where you attempted to cross, is it not? 
A. Yes. . 
Q. You have seen this plat, have you not, Mrs. Curtis Y 
A. I saw a smaller one than that. 
Q. This represents the location, I believe. There is the 
Y. W. Home here, and here is a garage next to it, to the 
west? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then these dwellings between it and Botetourt 
Street; is that correct 7 · · 
A. Yes. 
page 62 ~ Q. You did not go to the intersection of Bote-
tourt Street and cross OYer to the other side of 
Olney Road, did you Y 
A. No. 
Q. Was there any reason why you couldn't do that Y 
A. (No answer.) 
Q. Can you answer that question f 
A. Repeat it, please. 
Q. Was there any reason why you could not go to the in-
tersection of Botetourt Street and cross Y 
A. I don't know. • 
Q. There was no reason that you knew of why you could 
not have gone to the intersection of the streets and cross 
there, was there·, so far as you can recall now? 
A. No. 
Q. Of course it would have meant taking a few more steps 
from in front of the grocery store to the corner, but, other-
wise, there was no reason why you could not have gone to 
the intersection and crossed, was there f 
A. No. 
Q. So, as a matter of fact, your crossing in front of the 
grocery store, wasn't it really to save the additional steps 
of going to the intersection and crossing! Wasn't that your 
reason? 
A. Yes. 
• 
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Q. Now Mrs. Curtis, do you remember-I know especially 
in· this kind of thing w~ are a little hazy in. our 
page 63 } recollection-but do you remember whether there 
was any other automobile parked in that area, on 
either side of the street 7 Do you remember? 
A. I don't recall any. 
Q. You don't recall any! 
A. No. 
Q. There may have been or there may not have been; is . 
that correct Y 
A. (No answer.) 
Q. As far as you recall; is that correct 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. At the point at which-would you rather I would stop 
now7 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then we will wait a little while. 
Note : A short intermission was had. 
Q. (Mr. Seawell) Does it make you nervous for me to ask 
these questions, because I do not want to make you nervous 
over itT Now, when you started across the street, did you 
start directly in front of the grocery store, or a little to the 
east of it, or a little to the west of it, do you recall f 
A. I think it was right across. 
· Q. You thought it was right across 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. Olney Road, at that point, is fairly wide, isn't 
page 64} itY 
A. Yes. 
Q. The plat shows it is 32 feet from curb to curb. Before 
you stepped off the curb, did you look to see whether there 
was any automobile coniingf 
A. Yes. · 
Q. And you did not see any from either direction, did you 7 
. A. No. 
/ 
Q. And yon proceeded to walk across the street 7 
A. I got to the center of the street and l saw a car ad-
vancing very rapidly, and I hastened my steps. 
· Q. You then hastened your steps Y 
A. Yes, I hastened my steps. 
Q. Now, when you say you got to the center of the street, 
then, for the first time, you saw this car approaching you 
from your right 7 · 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how far was it from you7 
56 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
~ A. The car was about 250 to 350 feet. 
Q. Do you know this bus stop that is over here on the same 
side as the grocery store! 
A. Yes. There is one on either side. 
Q. They are almost opposite one another t 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where was this automobile with reference to those bus 
stops? Had it passed the bus stop, or where was 
page 65 ~ it, when you first saw it when you were crossing 
· the street Y 
A. (No answer.) 
Mr. Parsons: Do you know where it was? If you don't 
know, just tell him, and don't try to think where it was. 
By Mr. Seawell: 
Q. You say you know you saw it Y 
A. I saw the car coming and saw it was coming very 
rapidly. 
/ 
Q. So you had a good enough view of it to see how it was 
approaching you, didn't you t 
A. Yes; very rapidly. 
Q. You could see that without any trouble? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, if you w~re able to see that, can you tell us about 
where it was with reference to the bus stops f 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. You don't recall t 
A. No. 
Q. Then, let us take some larger objects. Do you remem-
ber this big garage space just west of where you live Y 
A. Yes. . 
Q. Where was it with reference to that big garage space 
when you saw it and observed how it was coming? 
A. Coming up from the direction of the meat 
page 66 r market. 
Q. Where was it say with reference to the 
garage? It was coming from the direction of the meat mar-
ket; that is down at the next corner? 
A. Yes. . 
Q. Where was it with reference to the garage spaceY. Had 
it passed that Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. It had passed thatf 
A. Yes. 
Q. So it was somewhere between-you can't say exactly? 
A. No. 
- --~ 
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Q. It was somewhere between this garage space, which_ is 
next to the Y. W. Home, and the store you were going to; is 
that correct f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, in that space you observed just this one cart 
You did not see any other car, did you Y 
A. No. 
Q. There was not any car going east, coming down your 
side of the street, was there Y 
A. No. 
Q. So there was not anything on this southern side of 
Olney Road that would interfere with whatever you wanted 
to do, was there Y . 
A. No. 
Q. But being in that position and seeing .thiR 
PJ8e 67 } car between the garage space and the store, you 
v . thought that you could, by quickening your pace, 
get over in front of it, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Look at me, Mrs. Curtis, and don't look at him. Is that 
true? . 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is correct, isn't it7 
A. Yes. 
Q. As a matter of fact, before you could get to the curb 
you were struck Y 
A. Yes, and I don't remember anything more after that. 
Q. Do you recall what part of the car struck you 7 
A. I don't know. The fender, I reckon. 
Q. Which one? 
A. The one on the-I don't like to think about it ; it makes 
me feel bad. 
Q. But, unfortunately, we have to go through this pro-
ceeding which has been instituted, and, as you are asking 
for damag·es, we must ask you questions. You say it was 
the front fender; which front fender was it 7 
A. It was the one next to the left-hand side. 
Q. The left-hand front fender of the car 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, did you see the automobile make any turn in to-
wards the grocery storeY 
page 68 ~ A. (No answer.) 
Q. Do you remembe·r whether you saw it make 
any turn in towards the grocery store? 
A. It evidently made a turn into there. 
Q. When you first saw this machine, as you describe, you 
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quickened your paces to try to get across in front of it, did 
._ /you continue to watch it as it came towards you¥ 
V A. Yes. Q. You didY · 
A. Yes. 
Q. So that you could see what the driver of that car was 
doing, couldn't you Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Just where were you struck on your body, Mrs. Curtisf 
A. On the right-hand side of my back. 
Q. on· the right-hand side of your ba.ckT 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And, !tfter that, of course, you don't remember any-
thing else that happened Y 
A. No, I do not. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. Mrs. Curtis, if you can wait just a few minutes: Hav~ 
you any suffering or pain now¥ 
· A. Yes. 
page 69 ~ Q. In what part of your bodyY What is it that 
hurts you nowY 
A. My back. 
Q. Do you have any trouble with your feet? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which one? 
A. The right one, and a numb feeling and headache. 
Q. Are yon able to walk with any degree of satisfaction 
at allY 
Mr. Hughes: Objected to as leading. 
Q. (Mr. Parsons) What effect has it on your walking? Can 
you walk without assistance at allY 
A. No. 
Q. Have you any feeling of injury with reference to any 
of your internal organs Y • 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Hughes: Objected to as leading. 
Mr. Parsons : I do not think that is leading. 
The Court: You can ask whether she has any physical in-jury. 
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By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. What other injury! 
A. Bladder and kidney. 
Q. What .effect is it-what is it Y 
page 70 } A. Well, a burning sensation. 
Q. Now, Mrs. Curtis, you were asked about some 
parked cars on each side of the street: Was there any parked 
car at the point you left the curbstone to go across the street? 
A. Were there any parked cars Y · 
Q. Was there any parked car at.thatpoint? 
A. There was not. · 
Q. There was not Y 
A. No. 
Q. You were asked particularly what part_of the car struck 
you; did you look at that car ·at all after you got beyond the 
line of parked cars that were thereY After you got out of 
this line of traffic, did you look after you got across this line 
of traffic! 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Seawell:. She nodded her head yes. 
By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. Did you see this car when it struck you t 
A. I felt it. -
Q. You felt it, but didn't see itf 
A. I didn't see it. 
Q. Did you see the car at all after you passed the line 
that it was coming in Y 
A. No. 
page 71 ~ Q. Then you told Mr. 8eawell that you watched 
it up until you got across the street. By that- and 
the present testimony, you watched it, did you, until you got 
out of its line Y 
A. Yes. 
· Q. Were you at the curb and in a position of safety if he 
had kept his course Y _ · 
Mr. Seawell: I object. That is for the jury to say.-
The Court: She can say where she was. 
By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. Can you tell the jury what suffering you have gone 
through because of this accident Y _ 
A. It was untold suffering. I don't know how to express 
it in words. 
Q. Are you able to sleep well now! 
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A. No .. 
Q. What was the condition of your health before this acci-
dent? 
A. Very good. · · ' 
Q. Did you go to Dr. Martin in 1927 to be examined Y 
A. Yes, just for a slight trouble. 
Q. A slight trouble with some congestion or burning sen-
sationf 
page 72 ~ A. Yes. 
Q . . Did that ever bother you any more after 
that timeT 
A. No. 
Q. It cleared rip Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you had any other doctor besides Dr. Martin to 
see you with reference to anything of that kind up to this. 
accident! 
. A. No. . -
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Seawell: 
Q. ~irs. Curtis, on cross examination you told me that you 
watched that automobile from the time you observed it, when 
you were about in the center of the street, until the time 
of the accident. You have now told J\!Ir. Parsons that you did 
not watch it after you got out of the line of its travel. Now, 
Mrs. Curtis, which is correct Y 
A. The :first one. 
Q. The first one is correct f 
A. Yes. 
Q. In other words, you did continue to observe the auto-
m~~f · 
A. Yes . 
. Q. Is that correctf 
A. Yes. 
page 73 ~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you knew what the automobile was doingf 
A. Yes. 
Q. You could see it f -
Q. There was nothing in the way to obstruct your viewY 
A .. No. 
Mr. Seawell: She shook her head "No". 
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RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION NO. 2. 
By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. I am sorry Mr. Seawell has cast some more doubt, and 
we will have to get this straight. You told me originally on 
direct examination that you did not see this automobile when 
it hit you; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is correct Y ' · ; 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then you told Mr. Seawell on cross examination that 
you watched the automobile until the accident. Then you 
told me you watched it as long as it was in line of traffic Y 
A. Yes, the line of traffic. 
Q. Let us have all of these statements in mind. Tell the 
jury after you saw the automobile how long you saw it and 
how far you saw it, and whether you saw it when it hit you? 
Let us have a summary of the whole thing. You saw it in 
the middle of the street, and you hastened your step Y 
A. Yes. 
page 74 ~ Q. How long did you see it? Did you see it 
when it hit you? You said awhile ago you didn't 
see it but you felt it; is that what you intend to say now? 
A .. Yes. 
Q. Did you see the automobile make any turn Y 
A. No. 
Q. You did not? 
A. No. 
Q. Then you could not have seen the automobile just before 
it struck you Y 
Mr. Hughes: Objected to as leading. 
Mr. P·arsons: I think that is patent. I will stop right there. 
DR. SOUTHGATE LEIGH, JR., 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, testi-
fied as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Parsons : 
Q. You are Dr. Southgate Leigh, Jr.? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Dr. Leigh, how long have you been practicing t 
A. Since 1930. 
Q. You are associated with Sarah Leigh Hospital Y 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Doctor~ when Mrs. Curtis was brought to the 
page 75 ~ hospital, were you the attending physicia.n! 
A. I was the first doctor to see her. 
Q. When she came into the hospital, when you :first saw 
her, did you see her when she first came in, or after? 
A. I saw her after she had been pnt in the emergency room. 
·Q. What was her condition then f 
A. She was in a dazed state mentally. 
Q. Did she make any statement that indicated to yon that 
she was dazed! 
A. Well, I asked her if there was anything wrong with 
her, and .she would say "No, not a thing is wrong with me, 
a.nd I want to go home". 
Q. Did she say anything about. walking? 
A. After going over her I asked if she could walk, and she 
said yes, she could walk, but she could not. 
Q. Tell the jury what injuries you found upon examina-
tion. 
A. Well, starting at the head and going down, she had a 
large bump on the top of her head about this region (indi-
cating), and bruises, quite a few bruises, in different parts 
of the body and on the legs and arms especially. She had a 
fracture of the bone that runs here (indicating), a fracture 
from this place through. 
Q. You mean the middle of the forearm t 
A. Yes, or just past the middle of the forearm; 
page 76 ~ a fracture of this bone in the hand. 
Q. Describe that in the record. 
A. There is a bone in the hand that runs from the wrist-
there is a series of bones here-to the little finger, and that 
hone was broken about at this point. It is close to the proxi-
mal end-tbat is the end nearest to the wrist. Then ~he had 
a marked bruise and deep laceration in the lower back. On 
X-ray we found that she had a fractured pelvis. 
Q. Now, Doctor, what did you do with reference to the 
armY How did you treat that? 
A. With reference to the arm, there was a considerable 
Rwelling of the arm and hand, as usually happens in theRe 
cases where there is a break. So we used wet applications 
to reduce the swelling, and the next day a light cast was put 
on· the arm and hand. 
Q. How long was that cast retained on the arm and hand? 
A.. Approximately six weeks, I think. 
Q. After the cast was taken off, what application did you 
make? 
A. She had a piece of adhesive tape around the wrist to 
keep her from moving it too much, and we tried to get her 
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to move her hand. Always, when you have to put on the 
cast you- have to inu;nobiliz.e it-that is, when the hand js 
kept from moving, the hand and muscles get stiff. 
Q. Will you show the jury about the present. condition 
of opening and closing that the hand has 7 
page 77 } A. Just about like this (illustrating). 
Q. Just curl the fingers up, but can't close the 
handY 
A. She can move a separate finger, but she cannot grab 
anything.. ·· 
Q. She moved a finger to touch the thumb 1 
A. Yes, sir. · · · 
Q. About one-third the way Y .. 
A. She cannot grip normally, but about like that (illus-
trating). 
Q. What is your view as to ultimate recovery of that grip Y 
Will it ever get entirely well? · 
A. She "Will probably have some disability there-some 
slight disability. 
Q. Permanent 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, Doctor, about the pelvis fracture, did that heal upY 
A. Yes. 
Q. In fairly good apposition Y 
A. Very good position. 
Q. She has some complaint of her right foot, a numbness 
i.n her right foot; from the history of the case and these in-
juries she had to the knee, what is the cause of the numb-
ness¥ 
A. Some irritation to the nerves. 
Q. Do you think that this arose from the acci-
page 78 } dent Y · 
A. If she did not have it before. 
Q. She seems to have some difJiculty (you may have noticed 
it on the stand) of concentration ; will you say whether or 
not that probably comes from the accident, bearing in mind 
that she had head injury? 
A. Bearing in mind the head injury and bearing in mind 
a person in bed a great length of time and the nervous shock 
that she has been in, I don't blame her for being unable to 
concentrate. 
Q. You think it would come naturally from the accident Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. I believe Dr. Graves was called to examine the bladder¥ 
A. Yes, to examine the bladder. 
Q. And Dr. V ann was called to examine the bone injury Y 
A. Yes. · 
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Q. Doctor, after all yon say that she has permanent dis-
ability, would you be willing to say to the jury what per-
centage of disability from normal, you have in mind Y 
A. A person her age, it is difficult for them to get back 
to normal. I would say that she has some definite disability. 
I would say totalling it up, about fifteen or twenty per cent 
from her pelvis and probably about five per cent from her 
hand, and probably about five per cent from her bladder con-
dition. 
Q. Can you give us the percentage from mental activity-
seeming lack of memory Y 
A. I think that is a difficult thing to put down. 
page 79 ~ Q. The others you figured up from twenty to 
thirty per cent Y 
A. Yes. . 
Q. Doctor, the treatment of this pelvic injury and arm and 
the bruises and injuries, are painful, are they not Y 
A. Quite painful, yes. 
Q. And that pain continues for a considerable length of 
time, I presume? · 
A. In any break there is pain following a break, and 
especially a person her age. 
Q. Did you have to use hypodermics Y 
A. I don't think she had any hypodermics of morphine. 
Q. Did you use any sort of sedative? · 
A. We used .Barbital derivatives to make her sleep, and 
sedatives. 
Q. In the last few weeks has she been sleeping well, accord-
ing to your records? 
A. She says that she does not sleep well. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Shriver: 
Q. You are the first physician, I believe, that attended Mrs. 
Curtisf · 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Parsons: Just one question: What is your bill? 
Witness : $250.00. 
page 80 ~ Mr. Parsons: Did you bring the hospital bill 
with you? 
Miss Curtis : I did. 
Note: Paper is :filed marked Exhibit No. 1 showing as 
follows: 
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''Norfolk, Va. Feb . .19th, 1935. 
''Mrs. Lelia Curtis 
To THE SARAH LEIGH HOSPITAL, INC., Dr. 
Nov. 8, 1934, to Feb. 19, 1935: 
Private Room 103 days at $4.00 
Medicine & bladder irrigation 
Laboratory $1.00 per week 
X-R.ay 
Cystoscopy 
Crutches 
Cart 
$412.00 
15.00 
10.00 
50.00 
5.00 
2.50 
5.00 
$499.50" 
By Mr. Shriver: 
Q. Dr. Leigh, from the time that she was admitted to the 
hospital up to the present day, she has been confined tq the 
hospital, has she not Y 
A. She has been confined to the hospital, yes. 
Q. These injuries that she had, healed up rather rapidly, 
did they not? 
page 81 ~ A. Healed up fairly well, yes. 
Q. At what time could she have left the hos-
pital Y 
A. Provided she had someone who could have given quite 
a bit of time taking care of her, she might have left six weeks 
or two months after being admitted to the hospital. 
Q. In other words, her physical condition is such that there 
is no need of being in the l1ospital today? 
A. She needs someone to take care of her and to carry 
her up and down the steps, and do things for her. I do not 
know whether I want to go into. some of the of the situations. 
Q. We have to be frank in these things. 
A. Mrs. Curtis, for instance, has to pass her 'vater quite 
frequently at night, and it would be difficult for her to get 
up every two or three hours and go to the bathroom. 
Q. Did you advise her that she could go home? 
A. I talked with Mrs. Curtis and with her daughter about 
taking her home, that it might be possible to take her home, 
but I found that they could not very easily take care of her 
as Miss Curtis has to work during the daytime. 
Q. Now, Dr. Leigh, in regard to her walking, is she able 
to walk all right? 
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A. She can walk, but it is best that she be supported be-
cause she would fall very easily. 
Q. "\Veil, Doctor, she has been walking around your hos-
pital, has she not Y 
page 82 } A. Yes. 
Q. Has she had to use crutches or a caneY 
A. She uses crutches when she takes her daily exercise 
up and down the hall. She is supported by a nurse, but sha 
can walk around when she holds on to the bed or wall. 
Q. _And she has walked around satisfactorily¥ 
A. Yes, some. 
Q. This is your letter, isn't it, that was sent to m~ in 
response to my inquiry to you over the telephone! 
A. Yes. . 
Q. And I believe I wrote you and asked you to confirm it · 
by. letter. Y 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Shriver: If your Honor please, I will omit one para-
graph here. This letter was written by Dr. Southgate Leigh,_ 
Jr., the witness, and it is addressed to me January 16, a 
month and three days ago : ''In reply to your letter of Jan-
nary 15th, concerning Mrs. Lelia ~L Curtis, I am writing to 
say that sha is walking satisfactorily and could leave the hos-
pital if she had a place to go where she could be properly 
taken care of. So far as I see, there will be no permanent 
effects from her injury of November 8, 1934.'' 
Q. (By Mr. Shriver) Doctor, is that statement still true, 
or have you changed your mindY 
A. I would not say I have changed my mind, be-
page 83 ~ cause I believe Mrs. Curtis, if given the time- and 
all, might get back to normal. That was my idea 
in writing. 
Q. You do not think that she is suffering from permanent 
effects of that injury? 
A. A person of that age will take a long time to get back. 
Q. What do you mean by the statement there, so far as 
you could see there would be no permanent effect from the 
injury? Has anything occurred sinceY 
A. We have had her walking around more, and we found 
that she was not as strong as we felt. · 
Q. Doctor, this matter of the hand injury, it is a sort of 
stiffness of the hand; there is no mal-formation 7 
A. Yes. In checking up on the X-rays the other day, we 
found there is a slight shortening of the fifth metacarpal 
bone. · 
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Q. Isn't it possible that with proper exercise that grip will 
come back! · . 
A. Yes, to a large extent. 
Q.· Have you ever exa.miped Mrs. Curtis in regard to that 
numbness of her foot? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Isn't the usual method to touch different points on the 
foot!. · 
·~A. Yes. 
Q. Did she. respond to that t 
page 84 } A. Yes. 
Q. In· other words, she felt every time you used 
an instrument ·on different portions of the foot f 
_A. Yes. 
Q. Is it the front part of the foot! 
A. It is more around the toes at the base of the toes. 
- Q. So she had feeling at each point you touched f 
A. Yes. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. Doctor, it has been more than a month since you sent 
this letter to Mr. Shriver, and: you say that you have found 
out that she is in a little worse condition ·than you thought 
at that time? 
A. Yes. We had not X-rayed the hand, for instance, ·and 
she had not at that time been walking as much. 
Q. Isn't it true after that time Dr. Graves examined he~ 
for bladder trouble t 
A. Yes. 
Q. And after that time you found out more about the head 
condition? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Parsons: This letter of Dr. Martin, can we read it Y 
Mr. Seawell: We were going to read it, ·but you 
page 85 } can read it. _ 
Note: Letter from Dr. Walter B. Martin, dated January 
23, 1935, is filed marked Exhibit No. 3, and is as follows : 
''To whom It May Concern: 
''This is to certify that I examined Mrs. L. M. Curtis on 
September 14 1927. At that time she was complaining of 
recurring attacks of pain low down in the right lower qu~d­
rant, in addition to frequency and some distress on .voiding. 
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"The principal points in the examination were that she 
was a fairly well nourish-ed elderly woman, who looks to be. 
in good general physical condition. Her color 'vas good. 
She.: had no skin eruptions. Her few remaining teeth were 
in good condition, and her gums 'vere clear. There was no 
enlargement of the superficial glands. The heart was slightly 
enlarged, but not out of proportion to her age. The second 
aortic sound was accentuated. The pulse was regular, rate 
80. Blood pressure 170/110. The lungs 'vere clear. There 
was no tenderness over either kidney, the gall-bladder, or the 
appendix. There was no enlargement of the liver. The pel-
vic examination was entirely negative. There was a moderate 
mass of external hemorrhoids, but no bleeding or ulceration. 
There was slight limitation about the right knee 
page 86 ~ joint, and some thickening, but no swelling or ten-
derness. The reflexes were normal. 
''The blood examination showed normal haemoglobin, 
white count and differential. A catherized specimen of her 
urine showed a faint trace of albumin, with no pus cells. 
''My conclusion was that this patient was in good general 
condition, aside from a moderate hypertension, and probably 
the presence of some irritation of the bladder, not due to in-
fection.'' · 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hughes: 
Q. Dr. Leigh, you have pointed out to me on this medical 
record at the hospital the place where you call the history 
is to be found. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that history, as I understand-
Yr. Parsons : I have no objection to the defendant putting 
the entire history in evidence, but to pick out a part of it, 
when I haven't examined it, I object. 
Mr. Hughes : I will put it all in. 
Q. (Mr. Hughes) "\Viii you read the history? 
Mr. Parsons: Read the whole record Y 
page 87 ~ Mr. Hughes: No; just the history. 
Mr. Parsons: I don't know what is in it. I 
haven't read it. 
Mr. Hughes: You had better look at it. 
Mr. Parsons: What do you want Y 
Mr. Hughes: I want him to read the history. 
Mr. Parsons : Just this page Y 
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Mr. Hughes: Yes, just the right-hand column of it. That 
is all I want. Yon c.an put in the rest of it. 
Mr. Parsons : Read those three paragraphs. Read the 
whole blooming thing. 
Witness: This is the personal history of Curtis, Mrs. Lelia, 
331 Olney Road. Date of admission 11/8/34. Age 60. Female. 
Race White. While crossing street near Olney and Bote-
tourt-
By Mr. Hughes: Just the right-hand column. 
A. This is past history: ''Disease from childhood to date, 
fairly good health, never in hospital before; no disease to 
speak of; some frequency of urination with nocturia (for past 
few years). Has been troubled for last fifteen or twenty 
years with a very severe obstinate constipation. Rheumatism 
inflammatory as a child, leaving right knee enlarged and 
slightly stiff. Knee cannot be completely straightened be-
cause of enlargement. Flexion nearly normal." Can I in-
terpret some of that t 
page 88 } Mr. Parsons: If yon want to. Anything which 
will explain to the jury what it means, suits me. 
Witness : It is in a different language. 
Mr. Hughes: I think it speaks for itself. 
~Ir. Parsons: I think the doctor should be permitted to in-
terpret it. • 
The Court: If there is any ambiguity. 
Mr. Parsons: He evidently thinks so or he would not want 
to interpret it. 
The Court: If the jury wishes it. 
Mr. Hughes: The jury can ask any questions they want. 
In this record showing swelling of knee from inflammatory 
rheumatism from a child, in your examination did yon find 
that knee to be all right? 
Witness: Yes. That is further on in the record. These 
are the questions she was asked when admitted to the hos-
pital. That is what the history consists of. 
By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. That injury-you were not taking that into consideration 
in your testimony· as ·coming from this accident-the knee 
condition Y 
A. Nothing has been said about the knee. 
Q. That was an old matter that was thereY 
A. Since childhood. 
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page 89 } By Mr. Hughes: 
Q. Which knee was itt 
A. The right knee. 
By Mr. Shriver: · 
Q. Doctor, this is the hospital record kept by the hospital 
~nthorities, is it not Y 
A. Yes . 
. Q. It carries a full history of the patient's condition? 
A. Yes. · 
Q. Over here under "Remarks"-
Mr. Parsons: (Interposing) If your Honor please, the doc-
tor did not keep this record, and it is not kept, as I under-
stand, under his supervision, but under the supervision of 
the superintendent of the hospital. 
By Mr. Shriver: 
Q. Is this kept under your supervision f Are yon in charge 
of this patient! 
A. Yes. 
Q. And this is made under your supervision each day? 
A. I do not tell the nurse what to write each time she 
puts it down. 
By Mr. Parsons: . 
Q. That is actually kept under the supervision of the 
nurses? 
page 90 } A. Yes. 
Q. Yon do not have anything to do with it! 
A~ I write down the orders, and she writes that. 
By Mr. Shriver: 
Q. In whose handwriting is this made f 
A. In ·the nurse's. 
Q. Is she available at the present time? 
A. I don't know. I would not know which one it is. It is 
the night nurse. 
Mr. Shriver: We offer this. 
The Court: Did you say that you would tell what to write 
and they would write it down? . 
Mr. Parsons: No, certainly not that; it was the order for 
medicine. 
The Court: I overrule the objection. Yon may take an 
exception. 
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:By Mr. Shriver: 
Q. This is right up until today7 
A. Y~. . 
Q. That Tuesday is this morning 7 
A. Yes. 
·The Court : This morning! 
Mr. Shriver: Yes, the 19th of February. 
- . ~· 
. , .- -
;l 
page 91} Q. (By Mr. Shriver:) Over here in this cplumn 
is the nurse's reportY 
A. Yes, that is the nurse's report. 
Q. It says "Slept well" Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. The day before f 
A. Slept well. . . _ 
Q. And then "Had comfortable day". . "Slept well." 
''Slept well.'' We are going back one day at the .time,_ ar~ 
we notY : · ·. : 
Q. ''Slept well; slept ·well; slept well; slept well;·- siept 
well.'' You have gone back now to the lOth of· Fe1rruacy~ 
lta ven 't you T On the 9th ''slept well", and on the 8th, "Slept 
well", and down here is ''A comfortable day'~. On the 7th 
of February "Slept well, comfortable day". 6th "Slept 
well,'' 5th "Slept well, comfortable day". On the 4th ".Slept 
'vell, comfortable day". On the 3rd ''Slept well, comfortable 
day''. The 2nd "Slept well, comfortable day". The 1st 
"Slept well, comfortable day", and the same thing-these 
are medicines? 
A. Yes. 
By Mr. Shriver: He can bring in anything like that; I 
can't read them. That things goes on back. 
· Witness : Some distance. 
By Mr. Shriver: In other words, Mrs. Curtis' statement 
that she had not slept well for the last couple of 
page 92 ~ weeks is not true, according to the record? 
· Witness:.· According to the record. 
Bv Mr. Parsons: 
& Q. There seems to be a kind of stereotype ''Slept well'' 
and "Comfortable day". Have you any means of saying 
that she does not have trouble getting to sleep at night! 
A. If you will notice on the left-hand column there is some 
medicine given for her to sleep every night. 
Q. She has to be given a sedative Y 
A. Yes. 
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Q. That is the purpose! 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is why you give her the nurse, to see that she does f 
A. Yes. 
B~ Mr. Shriver: 
Q. On one oooasion didn't yo:n give her what is known as 
bread pills f 
A. No. 
Q. Didn't ~rs. O.u~tis take you right much to task for that! 
A. It_ was capsules full of sugar. 
By Mr. Parsons: . .. . . 
Q. That is often done with ·patients who are 
page 93 ~ nervous-you make them believe-
Yr. Hughes (Interposing:) I object to that as leading. 
By Mr. Parsons: 
... Q. Doctor, why did you give these sugar pills, or whatever 
they were? 
A. She wanted something to sleep on. 
.. Q. And you thought that that would do the job. at that 
timeT 
A. She slept on them. 
Q. Did you afterwards have to give her something? 
. A. At times she would get one ~f these, but usually she 
would have to be given some sedative. . . 
Q. According to that, she did have to have sedatives to make 
her sleep? 
A. Very frequently, yes. 
DR. FOY V ANN, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, testi-
fied as follows: . 
Examined by Mr. Parsons: 
Q. Dr. Vann; you are an orthopedic surgeon f 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long have you been in that business Y 
A. Fifteen years-sixteen years. 
page 94 ~ Q. You specialize in bone injuries and things of 
that kind? · 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you called by counsel for the defendants to ex-
amine Mrs. Curtis orignally Y 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And when was it you examined her7 
A. The 14th of December. 
Q. And were you later requested by me to return and make 
another examination of 1\irs. Curtis t 
A.. Yes. 
Q. And when was that examination t ' 
A. February 11th. 
Q. As the result of those two examinations, Doctor, will 
you tell the jury what you found and what the condition of 
Mrs. Curtis is at this time f 
A. This examination on December 14th-that was in con-
junction with Dr. Leigh, her physician,-! obtained from Dr. 
Leigh certain histories as to what her injuries were when she 
first came in and what he had done for her, and then I ascer-
tained what the X-rays showed, and, briefly, that was to the 
effect that she had generalized bruises. She had a fracture of 
one of the rami of the pubic bone (that is the bone you sit 
on) and a fracture of the left radius above the wrist, a frac-
ture of the fifth metacarpal bone up near the top. 
page 95 r On this date the splinting from the fore arm had 
been removed. The arm was still swollen. You 
could feel by the :finger tips the point of fracture. Fixation 
was still on the pelvis. There was not a great deal you c~uld 
tell about that except by manipulation and squeezing the pel-
vis. She was in bed at that time. On February 11th Dr. 
Leigh was likewise there. She had been moved upstairs to 
another room, and at that time, she had been walking around, 
so I learned, and the first part of the examination consisted 
in having her to walk and sit down and cross her legs a·nd 
get about a chair and bending and such as that. That was done 
for two or three purposes-first, to ascertaib did she have 
any dizziness or vertigo, and she appeared to show none. 
The next reason was to see if the pelvis was sufficient ot carry 
her weight. In addition to that, so far as the pelvis is con-
cerned, I subjected it to certain stresses to determine if there 
was any soreness there where she had had a fracture. I could 
not find any, and I could not get her to admit that there was 
any pain so far as the pelvis proper was concerned. She 
walked with a limp, and her idea of the limp was that she 
had numbness in the front part of the foot, the front third 
of the foot, we will say, and the limp was observable. The 
appearance of the foot would make me suspect that she had 
one of these Morton's toes. 
By Mr. Hughes: 
Q. Which foot was that? 
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A. The right foot. But there was no pain at-
page 96 ~ tached to it, neither could I manipulate it in any 
manner and get her to admit that she had pain. 
She was walking on account of the numbness. Then that part 
of the foot was tested out for touch with a paper match stick, 
and she would identify all the toes, the front and back, and 
different parts of the toes. I am not clear in my mind why 
she limped. I have not been able to explain that to myself. 
On this same side there is a knee condition, and it was as-
certained that that was an old affair of the knee which 
showed certain deformities and certain limitation of motion. 
That, according to my idea, a long time antedated the injury, 
and the knee sho,vs for itself, and my understanding is that 
the knee has nothing to do with the injury, nor has it been 
aggravated or made worse because of the injury; but I an1 
not able to tell why she limped to give it any definite name. 
There is some back stiffness. On bending the back she would 
state that she had a drawing or pulling sensation. She did 
not bend freely. Of course, her back is rigid, as we find any-
body's of that age. She had received soft tissue injury at 
the lower part of the back on the left side, and I· attributed 
that injury to the explanation why she had pulling when she 
was bending forward. 
By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. Was there still some evidence of that? 
A. Yes. I had not seen that bruise the first time 
page 97 r I examined her because she wa~ lying in bed and I 
did not upset her a great deal. 
The hand: You could feel the enlargement where she had 
the fracture and callus, as we call it. The wrist 'vas moving 
fairly free-not perfectly, but fairly free. The hand grasp 
was about half and the muscle weakness, but no swelling and 
no particular soreness about it. I believe that is all I can 
say. 
Q. Doctor, did you·-
A. (Interposing.) Wait a minute. That particular day we 
asked for new X-rays to see the progress of healing and po-
sition, and it is my belief that they are all right so far as po-
sition and progress of healing at this time. 
A new blood count was made which shows that within the 
reasonable bounds of normal. I did not know anything about 
the lump o·n the head until this examination, and she told me 
about that, and she has told me that there are certain mental 
phenomena as the result of that that I cannot evaluate. I 
listened, but I cannot express an opinion on that. 
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Q. You mean you do not know what to say about that kind 
of thing? . 
A. No; I am just lost. That is what ~he enumerates to 
me, and I listened at it. She described it as this way, from 
what I gather, that if she was telling something, whether a 
stranger or not a stranger, during the course of 
page 98 } the narrative she will lose the main thread of the 
thought (forgetfulness you might call it) and then 
pick it up. I don't know how to test a patient for a thing of 
that sort-surely in one examination; . · ... 
There was nervousness, and she said that she suffered with 
sleeplessness. · I· did check up on the record, and particularly 
since she has been moved _upstairs. I think prior to moving 
upstairs she had become nervous, and it was shown since she 
was moved up there she had been taking something at night 
to make her sleep. The room, perhaps, was not quite as de-
sirable as the other in some respects, and that might have had 
something to do with it and might not. I think that is· every-
thing. 
Q. As to the forgetfulness or losing the main thought, that 
is kind of out of your line, isn't it? 
A. The only way I imagine I could even test that out to 
have an opinion would be to go every day and let her start 
out with her demonstration and see if I could find it. She 
did answer my questions and answered in a satisfactory man-
ner, and, all in all, a rather pleasant experience. We parted 
.as good friends. 
Q. You were not asking her about the accident itself? 
A. I never brought that up at all. I did not interrogate 
l1er as to how she suffered when she was first brought up 
there. I had seen her about a month or five weeks aftet" the 
injury, and she was bright then. She did ask me 
pag·e 99 r some questions as to what I thought, if she was 
doing nicely or something of that kind, the usual 
questions a patient asks, and when I went back the second 
time I didn't go beyond the second examination. I wanted 
to find out what it was as of that particular day. 
Q. What is your bill, Doctor? 
A. I have got no bill. What I have got comes out of you 
fellows for my examination. I have not treated her at all. 
Q. What is your bill for examination 1 It is one of the 
elements in this case? · 
A. I don't know what I charged. 
Q. Will you look at your records? 
A. I will guess. I think I made a bill to Mr. Shriver . for 
$5 and I think I made one to you·for $10. 
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Q. We are interested in what I was charged. 
A. T~t is $10. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hughes: 
Q. You say this head business is a little out of your line f 
A. I have no opinion on the head injury at all. 
Q. Are there any of your profession in this vicinity who 
are qualified in anything like that? 
A. I reckon a whole lot of people could be qualified to 
check a person's forgetfulness. I think we apply 
page 100 ~ that term to different people we associate with and 
say that they are forgetfuL I do not know by 
what yardstick you measure that. 
Q. Do you find that among well-
A. (Interposing·.) I did not want to inject that. Forget-
fulness is a lay term, and that is what she told me, that she 
lost the thread of narrative as she goes along. 1 just give it 
to you the way I got it, and I can't elaborate on it. 
Q. How long were you with her the two occasions 1 
A. I don't know. The first time was not long. I couldn't 
get much examination and could get more from X-rays and 
from the doctors. The next time I don't know whether an 
hour or half an hour or three-quarters of an hour or what 
it was. It was longer at the second time than at the first. 
Q. Did you talk to her a good deal as a part of that examina-
tion? 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. Did she lose the thread of anything that she would tell 
you in answering your questions? 
A. No, sir; but I must say that the question that I would 
ask her could be answered directly. She did not narrate 
anything. She had a little paper on her hand, and to tease 
her I wanted to know what the paper was; after a while she 
referred to it, and I said, ur thought I would get what was 
in that paper",-just to jolly her along. She kept that paper 
in her mind from start to finish. That is not a 
page 101 ~ narrative. 
Q. What was the paper? 
A. A memorandum that she 'vanted to make sure that she 
wa·nted me to examine this and that part about her body-
nine spots that she wanted. q. You say that was about fifty per cent wheJ;I you ex-
amined her-the hand grasp? 
A. Roughly, a~out half. It was weak, but about half. 
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Q. In your judgment, will that respond to treatment and 
be restored Y 
A. I think it is within her power, by perseverance, to gain 
the closing of the hand. 
Q. By taking exercise? 
A. The joints dry out from inactivity in a measure, and 
it is up to her to persist. I think so, if she will persist. 
Q. Are you expecting any after effect from the fracture 1 
A. None I can enumerate. 
Q. So far as you can tell at this time, should she not fully 
recover? 
A. That is with respect to the pelvis fracture, all I can 
tell she is recovered now, from the pelvis, both by examina-
tion and by X-ray. With respect to the fracture of the fifth 
metacarpal, they are recovered from an X-ray standpoint so 
far as union. The fifth one is slightly impacted and may be 
shortened, I don't know how much, but certainly the thick-
ness of a piece of blotting paper. The bony repair has re-
covered. She has not recovered the full grasp of 
page 102 ~ the hand. As I stated, it is entirely in her power 
to regain her grasp. When you get me away from 
there, I have to balk on you there. There are other factors 
in it that I am not conversant with. I believe you asked me 
''fully recovered''. 
Q. Yes. 
A. There are factors in it I have not investigated, and 
neither did I feel like I was qualified to investigate. 
Q. Was she using crutches when you examined her i 
A. No, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXA~1INATION. 
By J\fr. Parsons: 
Q. She had crutches in the room, didn't she? 
A. I think so. 
Q. Furnished by the hospital? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. The grasp, you can't tell how long it will take to get 
that? It depends on how much use she gives it? 
A. I think so. I would make no estimate of the time. 
Q. One person will get it quicker than others? 
A. Yes. It will be sixty-plus. She will be slower than 
other people. 
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page 103 ~ MRS. M. L. HARDISON, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly 
sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Parsons: 
Q. ;Mrs. Hardison, where do you live Y 
A. 336 West Olney Road. 
Q. And is that just a short distance, or not, from the Model 
Grocery StoreY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that is o·n the same side as the ~fodel Grocery 
Store? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 336, and the grocery store is No. 3441 
A. Yes. 
Q. Four doors, or eight numbers apart Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see this accident, Mrs. Hardison T 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. What did you see on that dayY Tell the jury where you 
were and what you saw? 
A. I was standing on my front porch, and I saw the car, 1 / 
and I saw the car when it started to skidding, and saw the V 
lady just beU>re __ sh_e put her foot up on the curb stone, but I 
did norsee1he car Str1ke tile !ady. 
Q. Why didn't you see it strike her f 
A. Because I turned my head to keep from seeing it. 
Q. "\\7 here 'vas she with reference to the curb 
page 104 ~ stone when the blow was struck? j 
A. She. was almost ready to put her foot up 
on the curbing. 
Q. About where was she when the car started to skidding 
with reference to your house f 
A. It started in front of my house. 
Q. It started in front of your housef 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Tell the jury whether or not it continued in that skid-
ding, so far as you could tell, until after it landed on the 
sidewalk¥ 
A. It did. 
Mr. Seawell: I object. 
The Court: I think she said that she saw it start. I do 
not think the question is objectionable, and I overrule the ob-
jection. 
Mr. Seawell: Exception. 
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Mr. Parsons: I will ask it so there will not be any objec-
tion. · 
Q. (By Mr. Parsons:) You saw it skidding; where did it 
finally land up? 
A. On the sidewalk at Mr. Kesser's store. · 
Q. On the sidewalk at Mr. Kesser 's storeY · 
A. Yes, sir. 
, Q. When you saw- Mrs. Curtis near the curb, 
page 105 r state whether or not . ~he was at a point to be 
struck by an automobile if it had gone straight 
ahead? 
A. Well, if the car had gone straight ahead, she would not 
have been struck. 
Q. She would not have been struck Y 
A. No, sir. 
(No cross examination.) 
MRS. W. L. POTTER, . 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, tes-
tified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Parsons: 
Q. Mrs. Potter, where do you live? 
A. 338 West Olney Road. 
Q. Where were you when the accident happened to Mrs. 
Curtis on Olney RoadY 
A. I was standing O'n my porch watching two little chil-
dren on the sidewalk. 
Q. Did you see the automobile that struck Mrs. Curtis 7 
A. Yes, I saw the automobile. 
Q. What called your attention to the automobile? Did you 
l1appen to be looking that way? . 
A. Yes, sir, I was looking in the street. 
Q. Where was it when you fir~t saw it? 
A. Below Mrs. Hardison's house. 
page 106 r Q. That is to the east, you mean,-the other 
side of Mrs. Harjlison's house from your house? 
A. Yes, sir, this side. 
Q. Could you tell anything about its speedY 
A. No, nothing definite. 
Q. Was it going fast or slow? 
Mr. Shriver: She has already said that she couldn't tell 
anything about it. 
The Court: Anything definite about it. · 
80 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. Answer. 
A. It was going fast. 
Q. Then you saw Mrs. Curtis 1 
A. Yes, sir. / Q. Where was she with reference to the curbing? . 
A. She was about two feet from the curbing. 
Q. When you first saw the car, bad you, or not, seen Mrs. 
Curtis, or did you see her after you first saw the carY 
A. I saw Mrs. Curtis before the car hit her. 
Q. As she was coming across the street Y 
A. Yes, sir, as she was coming across. 
Q. Did she, or not, at some point in the street change her 
speed to some extent f 
page 107 ~ l\{r. Hughes: Objected to as leading. 
The Court: It does not make much difference. 
I overrule the objection. 
Mr. Hughes: Exception. 
_ Q. (By Mr. Parsone, :) Did she, or not, at any time, in cross-
ing the street, change her speed or movement 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Where was she with reference to the street the fir.st 
time you saw her? 
A . .About two or three feet from the curb. 
Q. About two or three feet from the curb Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You did not see her struck, you say f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Where· was the automobile after the accident was over f 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you go to it, or did you go somewhere else? 
A. I didn't go to it. I still remained on the porch. 
Q. You did not go out in the street or down to the store f 
A. No, sir. 
Bv the Court: 
· "Q. How many doors are you from the Model Grocery? You 
said you were at 338. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How many doors are between you f 
A. The third door down. 
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page 108} CROSS E.t.~MINATION. 
By.Mr. Hughes: · 
Q. Your house is on the north side of the street, is it, Mrs. 
Potter? 
A. It is on this side (illustrating). 
Q. The same side as the grocery? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were on the downstairs or upstairs porch 7 
A. Downstairs. 
Q. And what kind of automobile was itY 
A. I don't know, sir. 
Q. I don't mean what make, but I mean was it a closed 
car or an open car, or what type of car was it? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. What color was it? 
A. I think it was black .. 
Q. Where was it when you first saw it 7 
A. On the porch-on my front porch. 
Q. That is where you were, but I say, where was the car 
when you first saw it? 
A. Down below my house in front of Mrs. Hardison's 
house, 336. 
Q. It had passed your house? 
A. No, sir, it had not passed my house; it was below my 
house. 
page 109 ~ Q. Is J\tirs. Hardison on the same side of you 
as the grocery store, or the other side 7 
A. On the same side. 
Q. Which way was the automobile moving? 
A. Moving east, this way (illustrating)-east. 
Q. Moving east? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What do you mean by ''east"? 
A. It was going towards the store-Mr. Kesser's store. 
Q. From where Y 
A. From west. 
Q. Do you mean in the direction of Granby Street or in 
the direction of Colonial Avenue Y 
A. From Granby Street. 
Q. From ·Granby Street? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In the direction of Colonial A venue? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is· moving west,. is it not Y 
A. Down that way (illustrating). 
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Q. It was moving· west. Mrs. Hardison's house is between. 
you and the grocery? 
A. Mrs. Hardison's house is on this side (illustrating). 
The Court : I understood 1\!Irs. Hardison to live at 336, 
and this lady at 338. 
page 110 ~ By Mr. Hughes : 
Q. Is Mrs. Hardison's house towards Granby 
Street from you or towards Colonial A venue Y 
A. Towards Granby Street. 
Q. Where was Mrs. Curtis when you :first saw her 7 
A. When I first saw Mrs .. Curtis she was about two or three 
feet from the curb. · 
Q. Which curb? 
A. From the curb on my side. 
Q. On your side? 
A. On the side I live on. 
Q. And, at that time, the automobile was in front of Mrs. 
Hardison's? . · ' 
A. No-in front of Mrs. Hardison's? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No; it was nearer up then. 
Q. How much? · 
A. I don't know how many feet. 
Q. Had it passed your house? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Which way was Mrs. Curtis facing when you first saw 
her? 
A. Facing over towards Mr. Kesser's store, coming across 
on my side of the street. 
Q. ·Did she have her head turned in either direction? 
A. I don't remember.· 
page 111 ~ Q. Did she have her body turned in either di-
rection, or straight in front of her? 
A. She was coming straight across. 
Q. You don't remember whether her head was turned, or 
not? · 
A. No, sir. Her head was turned the way that she was 
coming. · 
Q. Then, it did not have to be turned. She just kept her 
head straight? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. She was struck by what part of the automobile? 
A. I don't know, sir. I didn't see it when it struck her. 
I don't know. 
Q. Where were you looking then? 
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A. I picked up my little grandchild off the porch that was 
going down the step. I stooped down to pick up the little 
grandchild is why I didn't see the accident. 
Q. When you did that, you didn't expect any accident to 
occur? ·· 
A. No, sir. 
Q. There was nothing that appeared or sounded unusual 
to you to attract your attention? 
A. No, sir, only I heard the car when it started to sliding. 
Q. Whe:r;e was it Y 
A. Right in front of Mrs. Hardison's house. 
page 112 ~ Q. You heard it when it started to slide, did 
you say! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Didn't that attract your attention 7 
A. _Yes, sir, I looked. 
Q. Did you keep on looking Y 
A. No. I stooped down to pick up my little grandchild is 
when the car struck the lady. 
ROY POTTER, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, testified 
as follows: 
Examined· by 1\ir. Parsons: 
Q. Roy, how old are you1 
A. Fourteen. 
Q. Was that your mother on the stand just now? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You live there at 338 Olney Road, do you Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where were you the day that this accident occurred Y 
A. I was standing on my front porch. 
Q.' You and your mother were there together 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Tell the jury just what you saw, in your own language. 
A. I was standing on my front porch, about 2 :30, between 
2 :30 and 3 :00 o'clock; I first saw the car when ·it 
page 113 ~ started to sliding, and I looked until it hit Mrs. 
Curtis. 
Q. Where was she when it hit her Y 
A. About two or three feet from the curbing, about ready 
to step on the curbing. 
Q .. Would you say you could judge the speed of an auto-
mobile? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you ride in an automobile much 7 
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A. I go with my daddy. 
Q. What speed would you say that automobile was going! 
A. Around 40 to 45 to 50. 
Q_. 40 to 45 to 50 miles an hour t 
A. Yes, sir. 
·CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Shriver: 
· Q. Did you see Mrs. Curtis out there at the time yon saw 
the carY 
· A. I saw Mrs. Curtis when she got about the middle of the 
street, and I saw the car, and I saw Mrs. Curtis again when 
she was near the curb. 
Q. What did ~Ir. Curtis do when you .first saw her¥ 
A. She was walking about the middle of the street. 
Q. Did she keep on walking Y 
A. Yes, sir, she was walking. 
Q. Did she seem to be observing the antomo:... 
page 114 ~ bile Y 
A. She was walking across the street, and she 
was not looking until the car started sliding. I saw the car 
·sliding, and I looked at J\;Irs. Curtis, and I looked and she 
was .near the curbing then. 
Q. When she heard the car skidding, you think she looked 
up and saw itY · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And up to that time you don't think she saw it Y 
A. No, and when it started to sliding she kept on walk-
ing. 
Q. When she did see it, she kept on walking f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see any automobiles parked on the streetT 
A. No, sir. I saw a truck parked across the street right 
in front of Pike's house. 
Q. That was a Compeco truck Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see any other cars parked on the street Y 
A. I don't -remember. 
Q. You were standing on your mother's porch Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAl\1INATION. 
By Mr~ Parsons: · 
Q. Roy, that Compeco truck was across the ·street? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
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Q. About in front of Pike's? 
page 115 }- A. Pike's house-the sewing or tailor man. 
Q. That is where? 
A. Right in front of my house, 338. 
Q. It was not parked down close to the grocery storeY 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Were there, or not, some cars parked on your side of 
the street? 
A. There was one near I{esser's store. 
Q. Will you tell us whether or not, after Mrs. Curtis ap-
peared to see this automobile, she moved any faster, or nott 
A. She moved faster when she got about three feet from 
the curbing. 
Q. She moved faster then? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. If this automobile had kept a straight course, with the 
position that she was in, would it have hit her, or not Y 
1\ir. Hughes: I object to that question. 
The Court: I overrule the objection. 
Mr. Parsons: I think it. proper but, if he objects, I with-
draw it. 
Q. (1\fr. Parsons:) You say that she was about two or 
three feet from the curb f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The automobile, at that time, was some short distance 
away? · 
page 116 }- A. Yes,. sir. 
Q. If that automobile had continued in a . ./ 
straight course, would it have come in contact with the line V 
that she was on T 
A. No, sir, I don't think so. 
Q. Was there any other traffic in the street to interfere 
with the movement of that automobile? / 
A. As I remember, I don't think there was. Y 
Q. You don't think there was f 
A. No, sir. 
RE.JCROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Shriver: 
Q. You say the automobile was some distance away when 
Mrs. Curtis was only two or three feet from the curbing? 
A. It started sliding and had slid about twenty-five feet 
when she was about three feet from the curbing. 
Q. And then she started to hurry her steps Y 
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A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Then, if she was out of the line of that car, why should 
~he hurry her steps then Y 
A. I don't know. 
Mr. Parsons: I don't think yon should argue with the wit-
ness, but ask questions. 
By Mr. Shriver: 
Q. Where was the parked car with reference 
page 117 ~ to Mr.· Kesser'sY Was it to the west or to the 
east? 
A. To the west, I think. 
Q. Then, there was no car between where you were stand-
ing on your porch, no car between there and the scene of 
the accident T 
A. No, sir. 
Q. On the north side of the street, or on your· side of the 
street? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Are there any trees there 1 
A. Just one in front of my house. 
Q. And that is the only one between there and Kesser's Y 
A. I think that is right. I think there is one. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION NO. 2. 
By Mr. Parsons: , 
Q. Did you tell me you did'n 't know whether there were 
any cars parked on the north side 7 
A. There was one. 
Mr. Hughes: Objected to as leading. 
Q. (By Mr. Parsons:) I ask you if yon didn't tell me this 
morning that there was not a car parked on the north side Y 
A. There was one. 
Q. Didn't you tell me you didn't know whether 
page 118 ~ there was one on the other side Y 
A. A truck. 
Q. Didn't you say this morning you didn't know where it 
was parked-that you didn't pay any attention Y 
Mr. Shriver: I object to that. 
Mr. Parsons : Stand aside. 
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D. V. HANBURY, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn~·_tes­
tified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Parsons: 
Q. lVIr. Hanbury, you drive for Compeco Dye Works? 
A. Yes; sir. : 
Q. Were you on Olney Road the day of the accident, No-
vember 8th, when Mrs. Curtis was hurtY 
A. Yes, sir. 
1Q. Where was your car parked Y 
A. It was parked in front of Mrs. Miller's, I believe, 34~. 
Q. 3437 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Step down here to this map, please. This is house 843; 
where were you when the accident happened Y · 
A. I was on the porch of 341-Mrs. Pike's. 
page 119 ~ Q. That is this house here (indicating) Y 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. And your delivery truck was parked on which side of 
the street? 
A. On the right-hand side, going on Olney Road towards 
Granby Street. . 
Q. That is the south side? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That would be fifty to seventy-five feet east of the front 
of Model Grocery Store, would it not Y 
A. I imagine it would, or something like that. 
Q. Do you recall any other cars parked on that side of 
the street at that time? 
A. On the side I was on? 
Q. The side you were on? 
A. I don't think there was any other car there. If it was, 
it was down near Botetourt Street. 
Q. Were there any cars parked on the north side of· the 
· street opposite where you were, that you noticed Y 
A. I don't think so, Mr. Parsons. 
Q. Do you recall whether there were any cars between the 
bus stop and the Model Grocery Store? 
A. I can't remember. It seems to me there was one parked 
in there, but I am not positive of it. 
Q. Where did it seem to be with reference to 
page 120 ~ the store f . _ 
· A. I imagine in front of-probably about op-
posite where I was. _ , 
Q. 343? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. There might have been one there, but you would not 
be positive about that! 
A. No, sir. · 
Q. When this accident happened, did you actually see the 
impact? 
A. No, .sir. · 
Q. After the impact was over, where was the automobile¥ 
.A.. Th~ automobile was on the·.curbing. 
Q. Where was Mrs. Curtis 1 
A. Lying in the middle of the street .. 
Q. And what did you ·then do? 
A. I ran over to pic~ Mrs. Curtif; up. 
Q. In the middle of the street, about 'vhat point with refer-
ence to the grocery store-east, middle or west? 
. A. I imagine just about the middle of the grocery store, or 
probably a little to the right coming out of the grocery store .. 
Q. That is a little towards Botetourt StreetY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you go to her Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was there a:ny traffic on the highway as 
page. 121 ~ you ran across T · 
A, No. I ran across, and there was no traffic 
at all. 
Q. What was the first traffic that came to the scene? 
A. The first I noticed was a dairy truck, Britcherd 's, I 
believe, which drove up. I was picking Nirs. Curtis up. 
Q. Did he, or not, drive up and park? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where did he park-the middle, or north or south side 
of the street Y 
A. The south side. 
Q. There was nothing to interfere with his parking on 
the south side f 
A. No. He hollered to me to bring her there and he would 
take her to the hospital. 
Q. Did you, or not, state that that was the first vehicle of 
any kind that appeared on the scene? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And he appeared there, did he not, after or just about 
the time you walked from 341 to where she was? 
A. He appeared what 1 
Q. The truck of the Britcherd Dairy? 
A. I didn't see him until I had her in my arms, and he 
was the first that hollered assistance to take her to the hos-
pital. 
Q. Then he came up after you started across there? 
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A. Yes, sir. . 
page 122 } Q. When you put her in the truck was she eon-
scions, or not T 
A. She was unconscious. 
Q. Was she limp, or stiff, or what 7 
A. As limp as a rag, and I had a hard time picking her up. 
Q. Did she speak or say anything from there to the hos-
pital? . 
A. Not until we got to the hospital. She didn't move a 
muscle. 
Q. And you left her at the hospital f 
A. Yes, sir, after I went into the office. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Shriver: 
Q. 1\{r. Hanbury, will you take this pencil and put a mark 
on this plat just where you found Mrs. Curtis, and also the 
position in which she was lying? This is the Model Grocery, 
and this is Pike's house? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. With that in mind, place on there about where Mrs. 
Curtis was lying and the position of her body? 
.A.. This is going south, "is it Y 
Mr. Parsons: This is Botetourt Street, and down there is 
Boush. 
page 123 } By 1\fr. Shriver: 
Q. You are standing on Pike's porch, looking 
towards the 1\1:odel G-rocery? 
A. Well, sir, she was lying about the middle of the street; 
she was lying just about here (indicating). 
Mr. Parsons : Make an A to identify it. 
By Mr. Shriver: 
Q. In which direction was her head? 
A. Her head was lying towards this side-no, opposite the 
store. 
Q. She was lying crossways of the street? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. With her feet towards the Model Grocery? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And just about in the center of the street? 
A. Just about in the center of the street, yes, sir. 
Q. You were the first one that got to her, weren't you? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then after you and the gentleman from Birtcherd 's got 
to her-
A. (Interposing.) He didn't g·et out of the truck, but drove. 
up and said, "Bring her here". 
Q. And you picked her up 7 
A. Yes, sir, 'vith the colored fellow. 
page 124 ~ Q. And Mr. Nelms came and offered assist-
ancef 
A. Yes, sir, but he was too nervous to be of assistance, and 
I called the colored fellow. · 
RE-DIRECT EXA1.1INATION. 
Bv Mr. Parsons: 
.. Q. Did you see the skid marks 7 
A. After I came from the hospital, I did. 
Q. Could you identify those marks as being the marks made 
by the car which struck Mrs. Curtis Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. About how long were they? 
A. I would imagine between 60 and 75 feet. 
Q. Were they very definite marks of skidding, or were they 
just tire marks Y 
A. They were very definite. 
Q. What would you say that those marks were made by-
what kind of wheel, locked or unlocked Y -
A. It appeared to me that they were locked. There were 
no skips in it, but solid skidding. 
Bv Mr. Shriver: 
u Q. You did not measure it Y 
A. No. 
Q. Just an estimate Y 
A. Yes. 
page 125 ~ Q. How much is this room, would you say? 
A. I imagine 50 feet. 
Mr. Parsons: This way? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Parsons: At 'this time, having introduced the evidence 
on the facts of ownership of the car, and nothing else hav-
ing developed, I feel that it is my duty to take a non-suit as 
to Dean Peacock himself. Apparently I could not hold him. 
The Court : Is there any further testimony Y 
Edith Dobs'on-Peacoc~,- et al., v. Lelia M! Curtis. Yl': 
Mr. Parsons; I have two doctors who will be back at three 
o'clock. 
Note: The jury was adjourned until three o'clock.· 
page 126} AFTERNOON ·sESSION. 
Norfolk, Virginia, February 19, 1935. 
The Court met pursuant to adjournment at the expiratio»; 
of the recess .. 
Present: Same parties as heretofore noted. 
DR. S. H. GRAVES, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, tes-
tified as follows: · 
Examined by Mr. Parsons: · 
Q. Dr. Graves, how long have you been a practitioner? 
A. Between 25 and 30 years. 
Q. Where did you receive yonr medical education, Doctor Y 
A. At Richmond. · 
Q. ·Did you take any post-graduate course Y 
A. At Medical College of Virginia, and then I was in New 
York later. 
Q. Doctor, were you called upon to examine Mrs. Curtis 
recently? 
A. I was. 
Q. Have you bad experience (if so, to what extent) in cases 
of this nature 7 
A. Yes, I have confined myself for the last twelve or four-
teen years to kidney work and bladder-called urology. 
Q. You have specialized for the last twelve or more years 
in kidney and bladder troubles? 
page 127 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. Doctor, will you state whether or not you 
were generally familiar with Mrs. Curtis' case at the hos-
pital before you made this examination Y 
A. I knew that she was there, but I couldn't say I was 
familiar with it. 
· Q. To a limited extent only! 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you examined her, will you state to the jury your 
:findings? 
A. I found the urethra contracted and inflamed. I would 
put it under the head of sub-acute inflammition; all of it is 
1 
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inflammation, the acute stage having subsided. Also the neck 
of the bladder, what we call the trigon or angle, and then 
the lower segment of the bladder. I did not find any involve-
ment of the kidneys. 
Q. Was there any sensitiveness or pain found in that re-
gion? 
A. In palpating· her bladder, pressure on top from the 
front of the stomach, I elicited some discomfort. 
Q. Was the internal muscle inflamed any T 
A. The bladder is contracted-the bladder muscles. She 
has reasonable capacity, but its capacity is much limited from 
the inflammation. · 
Q. What, in your opinion, caused this condition of the 
bladder, Doctor, having in mind the history of 
page 128 ~ the case as you know it and the history of the 
accidentf 
A. In tny opinion the bladder and bruised and subsequently 
some infection of a pusy nature had taken place. 
Q. Did you state whether, in your opinion, that came from 
any injuries that she received? 
A. I did. 
Q. Doctor, at her age, will you tell us your opinion as to 
how long this condition will continue to exist T 
A. Well, in my opinion and in my experience, bladder ail-
ments in an old person of this type of age, and especially a 
female, when they once get the bladder inflamed and irritated, 
they improve but they never recover entirely from frequency 
and irritation on urination. 
Q. In September, 1927, more than seven years ago, Dr. 
Walter Martin examined this woman, and this has been in 
evidence : ''My conclusion was that this patient was in good 
general condition, aside from a moderate hypertension, and 
probably the presence of some irritation of the bladder, not 
due to infection.'' The condition that he found at that time, 
has it anything to do with the condition coming from the ac-
cident? · · 
A. No. 
page 129 ~ -CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hughes: 
Q. Dr. Graves, the word "sub-acute" means about what 
we laymen call ''chronic'', doesn't it Y 
A. It,, is sometimes called "chronic". 
Q. And the symptoms which you mentioned, you do not 
know that they had not existed for sometime before the acci-
dent, do you f 
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A. No. 
Q. As a matter of fact, didn't her history on your hospital 
records show that these symptoms had existed for several 
years before the accident? 
A. No. I heard that she had some frequency of urination 
for some time, but not the symptoms I described. 
Q. I am not speaking of the bruises, because I would think 
of that as a symptom. I am thinking of frequency as burn-
ing, and I think the doctor had a word "tocturina". Those 
are the symptoms I refer to. I do not, of course, refer to the 
bruises. 
A. I did not get your symptom. What was it 7 
Q. Frequency and burning, and then he used a word which 
had Latin derivation; what is that word? 
A. Did he use the word '' nocturnia'' 7 
Q. That is right. How do you spell it 7 
A. N-o-c-t-u-r-n-i-a. Passing water frequently was the 
only symptom that I had known of. If she had 
page 130 ~ had straining, pain, I had not heard that; of 
course, that might come on after she had been in 
bed for a while. When you put an old person in bed they 
sometimes will get up a frequency. 
Q. If she had any symptoms such as that for several years 
before the accident, you had no knowledge of itT 
A. No. 
Q. There were no lacerations or tears of the bladder, were 
there? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Catheterization was easily accomplished Y 
A. Accomplished what 7 
Q. Catheterization was easily done-there was no danger 
in catheterizing? 
A. Oh, no. 
Q. Your examination was made on February 11th! 
A. Yes. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Parsons: 
"'Q. You took the history of this case; Dr. Southgate Leigh 
told you what had occurred before you made the examination Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. You talked also to Dr. Todd about itT 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you reached the final conclusion which 
page 131 ~ you just stated about the bruised bladder? 
A. Yes. 
--· 
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DR. M. H. TODD, 
a witness on behalf. of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, testi-
fied as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Parsons: · 
Q. Dr. Todd, how long have you been practicing medicine 
and surgery! 
A. Twenty-two years. 
Q. Where did you receive your medical education f 
A. At Johns Hopkins. 
Q. Did you take any post graduate course Y 
A. Yes; during the War under Professor Chutro in the 
treatment of. infection of bones. 
Q. Are you qualified as an orthopedic surgeon? 
.A. I am really not an orthopedic surgeon. I am a general 
surgeon with special training in traumatic surgery,-that is, 
people who get hurt. Orthopedic surgeons handle people with 
club feet, and I treat them after they fall off a ladder. 
Q. Have you had any special experience in the handling 
of pelvic cases T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was that experience Y 
A. During the World War and during ten years 
page 132 ~ as chief surgeon of the l{entucky mines of the 
Steel Corporation, I handled all told some sixty-
five fractures of the pelvis, and forty-seven of those I re-
ported in medical literature. 
Q. You handled those as an author of the Medical Jour-
naif 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Have you had experience with head injuries~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Rather extensive, or ·not? 
A. Extensive, yes. 
Q. You have been requested, have you not, to examine 
Mrs. Curtis, and have examined her on more than one occa-
sion? · · 
A. Yes, sir, I have. . 
Q. How many times would you say yon have seen Mrs. 
Curtis since yon were requested to do so 7 
A. I have seen Mrs. Curtis off and on probably half a dozen 
times. I have made a formal examination of her once. 
Q. Now, Doctor, before going into a statement of what in-
juries you found, I want to ask you if you observed Mrs. 
Curtis today when she was in the court room? 
A. Just a" little. I observed her-I just noticed her a little. 
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Q. Hav.e you observed her reactions in talking from time 
to time as you have seen her around the hospital? .. -
A. She is perfectly agreeable and perfectly habitable, but 
I think at times she is a little confused. · 
Q. Assuming that before this accident she did_ 
page 133 ~ not become confused in her chain of thought, and 
has been since that time, to what would you at-
tribute that confusion, having in mind that she did have a 
head injury, with the results as shown you 7 
A. I think the mental confusion could be attributable to 
the head injury. 
Q. Would there be anything unusual about her having 
mental confu~ion from such an accident? , · 
A. Not at all. · 
. Q. Now, Doctor, will you be good enough just to tell this 
jury what you found ·with respect to Mrs. Curtis' condition Y 
A. Mrs. Curtis had a fracture of the right side of the pelvic 
bone in two places ; she had a fracture of the lower third of 
the left ulna in the forearm at this point (indicating), and 
she had a fracture of the left hand, the fifth metacarpal at 
this point (indicating); in addition, she had a contusion on 
her head. She complained to me about numbness and dis-
comfort on the top of her right foot. I was not able to make 
out any actual anesthesia; that is, she could feel m·e pinch 
without difficulty, and I take it that her anesthesia, if pres-
ent, was only partial. She also has an old deformity_ of the 
right knee, which I think has nothing to do with the present 
injury. 
Q. Is there any reason to doubt, in your mind, that she 
has some numbness in the foot Y 
A. I think she has. She always localizes it in 
page 134 } the same spot. 
Q. Then, with the injury to the knee, which 
seems to have come from an old rheumatism when she was a 
child, if she has some numbness would you attribute that to 
the traumatic injury tha~ she received? 
A. I think I would be guided by the history. She told me 
the numbness of the foot was only since the injury, and I 
~1ave no means of knowing whether she complained of it be-
fore. 
. Q. Did you, or not, leave the question of examination of 
kidneys and bladder to Dr. Graves, or did you also examine 
her for them Y 
A. I did not examine as to that. 
. Q. Doctor, some question has been raised in· the cross 
examination of one of the doctors as to wh~ther th~s lB:dY 
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ought to have been taken from the hospital: Do you think 
. it proper to move her up to this time Y 
A. I think if she had an attendant at home to take care 
of her, she could have gone from the hospital. 
Q. You knew that she had no home other than she and 
her daughterT 
A. I did not know the circumstances. 
Q. She would then, in your opinion, have to have an at-
tendant wherever she wentT 
A. For the time being, yes. 
Q. Is she able to safely walk now without 
page 135 } crutches? 
A. She can use crutches to walk around the 
hospital corridors. It would not do for her to be out on the 
street, and she would have to watch out for stumbling in 
the house. 
Q. How about going up and down the steps f 
A. She could not go up and down steps, I am sure. 
Q. Doctor, having in mind her condition as you found it 
in this case, what would you say as to the permanency of 
her injuries and the percentage of permanency Y 
A. Her injuries will not result permanently as to the 
amount of disability that she has at present. At present 
she is right completely disabled, but as time goes on she will 
improve and she will have a residuary of twenty-five or 
thirty per cent. I base that on these facts, that in the mines 
work for the Steel Corporation iri similar injuries in young, 
strong men, laborers, we customarily granted these men dis-
abilities of about fifteen or twenty per cent bodily disability. 
This woman has in addition to her fractured pelvis a frac-
ture of the forearm and hand, with, I think, a little permanent 
disability from that, and she is a woman of advanced age, 
and for that reason is riot expected to recover as fully and 
as completely as the younger men that I mentioned at first. 
Q. Doctor, does the treatment and handling of those cases 
result in pain and suffering to the patient T 
A. For some days it does, and then later on they are pretty 
comfortable. 
Q. If there is a case of rest or sedatives, how is 
page 136 ~ that taken care of? 
A. At :first we generally have to resort to mor-
phine and opium. derivatives, and later we can get up with 
luminal and bromides, and a good many after the first ten 
days hardly need anything. 
Q. In this case, have you determined from your examina-
tion whether or not she was able to rest well at night with-
out some sedative T 
Edith Dobson-Peacock, et al., v. Lelia M. Curtis. 97 · 
A. My understanding is that she has -occasionally had to 
have sedatives, and at other times has gotten along without 
them. 
Q. Is there anything else you know about this case that I 
have not thought of to ask you which you have not said Y 
A. If so, it doesn't occur to me for the moment. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hughes : 
Q. Dr. Todd, do you find sugar pills helpful sometimes? 
A. I personally do not use them, but I understand doctors 
do use such things, yes. 
Q. Which knee was it that had the old trouble Y 
A. The right knee, as I recall it. I am not absolutely sure. 
If I remember, it was the knee on the other side from the 
pelvis trouble. 
Q. Can you tell from the records? 
A. If I may refer to my notes. May I do that? 
page 137 } Q. Yes. 
A. I have here a note it is the right knee. She 
occasionally limps a little with the right leg, which I would 
say was due to a former injury. 
Q. Which foot was it that she complained of numbness in? 
A. She feels pain from the top of the right foot about the 
same as elsewhere. The right angle seems to be a little less 
strong than the left. 
page 138 } MRS. EVA J. STEELE, 
a witness on behalf of the _plaintiff, being duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Parsons: 
Q. Mrs. Steele, where do you live Y 
A. 203 West 29th Street. 
Q. With what organization are you associated f 
A. The Y. W. C. Home, 333 West Olney Road. 
Q. What is your position with 'that home 1 
A. President of the institution. 
Q. That is a.n adjunct to the Young Men's Christian Asso-
ciation, is it? 
A. No; it is a separate organization. 
Q. How long have you known Mrs. Curtis Y 
. ~- Well, .six years or more. I would not say exactly, but 
It IS OVer SIX. 
Q. Were you rather closely associated with her for the few 
weeks prior to this accident 1 
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A. Oh, yes; I saw her every day or so before the accident. 
Q. And you talked to her, did you, frequently f 
A. Oh, yes, I had a good many conversations with her. 
Q. And yon have talked with her since that time? 
A. Yes, several times. 
Q. Is there any difference in her mental attit~de f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you tell the jury how you found her before the 
accident and after the accident T 
page 139 t A. I found her a very intelligent, bright 
woman, active mind, very alert, a good conver-
sationalist on almost any subject-any general subj·ect. She 
was an interesting woman. I never saw a much brighter 
woman, and she could talk intelligently and could converse 
on almost any subject intelligently. Since then there has been. 
a noted differ.ence-a very great difference. My last vi~it 
to her-should I tell that Y · 
Q. Tell whatever you think will indicate her condition Y 
A. My last visit to her was last Sunday morning. I had 
a long conversation with her. I found, as soon as anything 
was mentioned about her accident, how she was hurt or any-
thing of the kind, her mina seemed beclouded ; she s·eemed to 
be confused, not able to think as quickly as she had on other 
occasions, and would stop in the midst of a conversation 
and seem not able to make the statements afterwards or 
carry on the conversation for a minute or so. She has not 
appeared to me to have the same mental activity by any means 
that she had before. .. 
Q. Now, Mrs. Steele, you knew her: She was active and 
did she appear to be in good health, or not, before this oc-
currence? 
A. She appeared to be in good health. She was very active 
and would step very quickly. I expect she could probably 
step a little quicker than I. 
(No Cross examination.) 
page 140 ~ MRS. FANNIE B. BUTT, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
I~xamined by Mr. Parsons : 
Q. How do yon spell your la.st name Y 
A. B-u-t-t. 
Q. Mrs. Butt, how Iong have you known Mrs. Curtis Y 
A. Since 1925. 
Q. Did you see her quite frequently before this accident? 
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A. I have seen her quite frequently, and at one time lived 
in the same house with her. 
Q. Have you seen her frequently since the accident t 
A. I have. -
,. Q. Do you observe any difference in the mental attitude 
of Mrs. Curtis before and since the accident? 
A. 'Mrs. Curtis at present seems to be forgetful and does 
not recall th~ngs. Before that I never saw anything wrong 
'vith her mentality. She always struck me as being a very 
sane little woman. ,. 
Q. Since the accident? 
A. I have not quizzed her very closely, but it seems· that 
her memory has become defective. 
Q. Is that very peculiar with herf 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was her physical condition before this accident 7 
Was she active, or not Y 
page 141 } ~A. I think so. I couldn't tell when she was 
sick at all; I never heard of her having a doctor. 
Q. Did you ever see her around at theY. W. C. H.! 
A. No ; I didn't go there. 
(No Cross examination.) 
MRS. EVA J. STEELE, 
recalled, testified as follows: 
Examined by Mrs. Parsons: 
Q. Was Mrs. Curtis a widow and did she live at theY. W. 
C. H.? 
A. Yes; I have known her daughter for years, long before 
I knew Mrs. Curtis. 
H. A. WILLIAMS, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, testi-
fied as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Parsons: 
Q. Mr. Williams, Mrs. Curtis' daughter is associated in your 
office? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you go around to the scene of this accident and 
make some measurements of skid marks? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were those skid marks pointed out to you 
page 142 ~by Mr. Kesser and Mr. Hanbury¥ 
A. Yes. 
· Q. Will you tell the jury how long those skid marks were 
and how they went down the street-whether a straight line 
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or a curved li.J:ie, and how far they were from the. curb 7 De-
scribe them so the jury will understand. 
A. The skidding was about seventy-five feet from where 
it started to skid, and skidded down a.bout in front of Mr. 
Kes.ser 's store. I think it started about in front of 336, and 
skidded down to in front of Kesser's store which, I think, is 
344. 
Q. How far were those skid marks from the curb line Y 
A. Nine feet it measured. 
Q. Did they go straight or in a curvef 
A. They went practically straight until they came to a 
short turn. 
Q. Which way was that turn! 
A. To the right. 
Q. Where did the turn lead to f 
~ _ A. The turn led to some chicken coops right in front of 
Mr. Kesser's store, and there is a. telegraph pole there also. 
Q. You got there shortly after the accident 7 " 
A. I think about half an hour or three-quarters. 
Q. And the broken chicken coops were there then f 
A. Yes, they were there then. 
page 143 ~ Q. How long 'vere the marks after the turn 
startedf 
A. I should judge about an angle of 45 degrees, and it 
was about ten or twelve degrees from there to the curbstone. 
Q. Do you recall whether, at the time you got there, there 
was a car or cars parked alongside of the street between 
the skid marks and the curbf 
A. I think one car only. 
· Q. Where was that with reference to the storeY 
A. Just west, nearer Colonial A venue. 
Q. Do you recall whether there were a.ny on the east and 
north side? 
A. I do not recall. 
Q. Do you mean to say you· would not say whether there 
was, or not? 
A. I don't remember on the east, but there was on the 
north side. 
Q. Those marks you saw seventy-five feet long, were they 
practically parallel that length! 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAl\tiiNATION. 
By Mr. Shriver: 
Q. Do I understand that they were about nine feet from 
the ~urbingY . . 
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page 144} A. Yes, the right wheel. \Vas about nine feet 
from the curbing. . 
A.M. GUY, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, testi-
fied as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Parsons: 
Q. Mr. Guy, are you a partner of Mr. Williams? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you are in the real estat-e business 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Miss Curtis, tl1e daughter of the lady who was hurt, 
is associated in that business 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you help Mr. Williams measure some skid marks 
at the scene of the accident? · 
A. I measured them with him. 
Q. With what? 
A. A five foot rule (producing a rule). 
Q. You measured them with that rule? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Describe the skid marks, how long they were and whether 
they were parallel to the curb, so that they will understand. 
A. They began about seventy-five feet from the turn, where 
the car apparently turned in to the chicken coops, in to the 
store. That is nine feet we measured the dis-
page 145 ~ tance at the point where the car stopped; it was 
about nine feet to the inner wall where it had 
turned rather abruptly, and ran into the chicken coops which 
we saw ther-e. 
Q. Which wheel did it appear to be nine feet from the curb 
as it skidded along-the right or left wheel? 
A. The right one. 
Q. And \vere those marks up to the turn practically parallel 
with the curb, or not? 
A. Yes, sir, they were approximately parallel. 
Q. Was that a continuous mark or was it a jerky mark 7 
A. No, it was continuous. 
Q. Solid, or what? 
A. Solid, it seemed. 
(No Cross examination.) 
Plaintiff rests. . -· . ': 
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:h{r. Seawell: If your Honor please, the plaintiff has used 
and has had marks put upon this plat before the jury, and 
I think it ought to be marked by the Reporter. 
The Court: All right. · 
Note: Paper referred to is marked Exhibit No. 4. · 
Mr. Hughes: If your Honor please, we have a motion. 
The Court: Step outsid~, gentlemen. 
page 146 ~ Note: The jury retired from the court room. 
Mr. Hughes: If your Honor please, I wish to move to 
strike the evidence as to Mrs. Peacock on the ground that 
the plaintiff has not proved that this was a for-family-pur-
pose-car, and it appears t4at the member of the family using 
it was Miss Peacock, and, therefore, there was no ground 
upon which to establish any liability upon the part of Mrs. 
Peacock. I don't care to argue it. 
The Court: I overrule that. I understand it wa~ gen-
erally used by the family. I overrule it. 
Mr. Hughes: We respectfully except to your Honor's 
ruling. · 
The Court : Yes. 
Mr. Hughes: Now, I wish to move to strike the plaintiff's 
evidence on the ground that in any aspect of the case which 
may be considered, it shows that the negligence of the plain-
tiff proximately contributed to the accident, if it was not its 
sole cause. 
For the purpose of this argument, of course, the negligence 
of the defendant is conceded. It is not conceded as a fact, 
but for the purpose of argument it is conceded. 
The testimony of all the 'vitnesses shows, and particularly 
does the testimony of Mrs. Curtis indisputably show, that 
from the time she entered the street she began 
page 147 ~ to be negligent and continued to be negligent until 
she was struck. 
Now, I submit that that is true, whether there were auto-
mobiles parked there, or not, that either horn of the dilemma 
is consistent only with the idea. of Mrs. Curtis' negligence. 
She said that she saw the car way up the street when she 
entered the street. If there was no parked automobile there, 
she had a better opportunity to see it. She says that she 
saw it coming and was looking at it continuously. It is true, 
under the adroit re-examination of our friend on the other 
side, she in kind qualified that statement, but whenever she 
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was confronted with a definite declaration on that point sh~ 
said that she nev~r took her eyes off the automobile, that 
she was watching it the entire time. · 
I submit that it cannot be disputed that, in the first place, 
she should not have stepped into the street with the car 
coming, but, if she did step into the str-eet, she should have 
stopped where she stepped and should not have gone beyond 
the center line of the street. With h~r doing so, with the 
confessed knowledge· that the automobile was approaching, 
no matter how it was approaching, the more recklessly it was 
approaching the mor-e does it bring home to this plah1tiff 
necessary knowledge of the peril in which she wa~ placing 
hers~lf. I submit that when she stepped into the street ther~ 
was no possible excuse fo.r her proceeding, but she did pro-
ceed further, and all t};le time she was proceeding she knew 
it was coming. 
page 148 } If the facts had been otherwise, it would not 
have altered the situation because her failure to 
see it would have been inexcusable. 
If we take the testimony of one of the witnesses that she 
looked straight across, then she is· just as negligent as if 
crossing the street without looking; but her own testimony 
is what she is bound by and what this case must be deter-
Jnined upon, and I submit tha.t there could not be a .case where 
the plaintiff's negligence appeared more indisputable than 
from her own testimony, and it appeared to be negligence 
that started when she started across the street in the middle 
of the block, and that the very act of starting across there 
put the burden on her. That gave her an added burden, 
to start across the street in the middle of the block, instead 
of taking the trouble to go up to the corner. That is the 
first questionable thing she did. After that, her negligence 
was begun ; she stepped down there, and she .did not stop, 
and with her eyes on the automobile, and knowing what it. 
was doing, and hearing it, she continued into a position of 
danger, and she tried to beat the automobile but she did not 
succeed. 
I submit that it is not possible in any aspect of the case 
that any verdict could be sustained here, and that, as a 
matter of law, she is barred from recovery by her evidence. 
The Court: I do not think it is a matter of 
page 149 } la,v. It seems to me there is plenty of roo~ .to 
argue concurring negligence, and I thinlr that th~y 
sho!Jld .have seen her in the street _and had. a good oppor-
~nnrty to stop. For that reason it will hay~ .. to ~go·· to· the 
Jnry. 
Mr. Hughes: We except to your Honor;s:ruling._~ .. 
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Mr. Seawell: Your Honor, first, we introduce a photo-
graph of the automobile which was taken just after the acci-
dent showing the dent in the left front fender. 
The Court: Is there any objection to it! 
Mr. Parsons: No, sir. 
Note : The same is :filed marked Exhibit No. 5. 
SWIFT NELMS, JR., 
one of the defendants, being duly sworn, testified· as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Seawell: 
Q. You have been sworn, have you not¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Your name is S. G. Nelms, Jr.T 
A. That is right. 
Q. How old are you Y 
A. Twenty-one. 
page 150 } Q. Do you live in Norfolk Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You have lived here all your lifeY 
A. Sinoo I was five. 
Q. You know Miss Marjorie Peacock, do you not Y 
A. Yes, sir. · , 
Q. You were driving the car in which she was riding· a.t 
the time of this accident? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did anyone ask you to drive that car? 
A. Yes, sir. Miss Peacock called me up and said a friend 
of hers was leaving for California and asked me if I would 
come over and take her down, and I said I would be glad to. 
Q. And you had taken Miss Peacock to the train and were 
on your way ·back home, I believe f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When did this accident happen, do you know Y 
A. About between 1:20 and 1:30 in the day. 
Q. And about at what pointY 
A. Between Mowbray Arch and Botetourt Street. 
Q. And where with reference to the Model Grocery Store 
that we have been talking about on Olney RoadY 
A. Where did the accident happen T 
Q. Yes. 
A. Right in front of it. 
Q. In what direction were you proceeding! 
page 151 r A. I was proceeding west on Olney Road. 
Q. And what kind of car were you driving 1 
A. A Ford VS '34. . 
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Q. We have introduced here a picture of the car; do you 
recognize that as the car which you were driving at the time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was anyone else in the car besides 1\IIiss Marjorie and 
yourself? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What was the condition of the streets at the time, as to 
whether they were wet or dry? 
A. They wer.e dry. 
Q. I wish you would look at this photograph and state 
if there is any mark upon that car which shows where the 
impact occurred when the collision took place with Mrs. 
Curtis? 
A. Yes, sir, right here at this dent. 
Q. You are now pointing to the left front fender? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Yon say that is a dent 1 
A. Yes, sir .. 
Note: The pi~tul"e is shown to the jury. 
Q. I notice that on the front of the front left fender·; 
is that correctf . · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You say you were driving west on Olney 
page 152 } Road 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are you familiar with that locality 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. llow long have you been driving? 
A. Five years. 
Q. As you were proceeding west along Olney Road, just 
before you got to this point, on which side of the highway 
were you proceeding 7 
A. I was on the right side. 
Q. On your right side Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All right. Now, will you state briefly to this jury just 
what occurred as you approached this store that we have · 
referred to? 
A. I was coming along west on Olney Road, and I got 
around 50 feet from the point of the accident when Miss 
Peacock said, "Look out". I was looking at the same time, 
and I saw the lady, and she was coming at an angle towards 
me, looking at me. I thought surely-
Q. (Interposing) Pardon me. From which side of the 
street? 
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A. This side, the south side, coming north. I thought 
surely she would stop, and if she had stopped a second she 
would not have been hit, but she came on. 
page 153 ~ Mr. Parsons: Your Honor, I move that the 
statement be stricken out, and let him state the 
facts. 
The Court: Of course, that is not binding. 
By Mr. Seawell: 
Q. State exactly what you saw and what happened. 
A. She was out almost in the middle of the street when I 
noticed her. I put on brakes immediately, and just as I . 
got up in front of the store and tried to keep from hitting 
her (there were cars parked on the side and trees), I swerved 
to the right to keep from hitting her, and, as I did, my left 
front fender hit her and threw her out in the middle of the 
street. 
Q. Have you any idea about how far you were from this 
·northern curb as you were proceeding along? 
A. The cars were parked there, and you usually drive about 
a foot or a foot and a half away from the cars parked, 
because they are liable to run out on you .. 
Q. Were any cars parked on the north side of Olney Road? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were any cars parked on the southern side of Onley 
Road? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were any cars parked at or near the point from which 
you saw Mrs. Curtis come? , 
A. She appeared so suddenly that she come back of a car-
that is my impression, because she was not there 
page 154 ~ one minute and then there the next minute. 
Q. The back of the car parked where? 
A. Along here (referring to map). 
Q. Indicating a point marked "Concrete pole'' about op-
posite the Model Grocery Store and on the southern side of 
the street. Is that about right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, you say you saw her come· from behind there out 
into the street Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Which way was she looking Y 
A. She was looking at me. 
Q. When yon saw her, did you, or not, give any signal 
of any kind and, if so, what? 
A. I blew my horn. 
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Q. Did she continue to look at you! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. She continued to look at you Y 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. As she crossed the street, did she change her pace at all t 
A. It seemed to me she was hurrying. You couldn ~t say 
it was a run, because she is too old to do that, and you couldn't 
say it was a trot. You know how very old people do. 
Q. She seemed to be hurrying? 
page 155 } A. Yes, sir, trying to. 
Q. Then you did what 7 
A. Of course, I put on brakes immediately. 
Q. And, in addition to putting on your brakes, what did 
you do! 
A. I swerved to the right, right there in front of the Model 
Grocery Store. · · · 
Q. And how far did your car go towards the curb, for in-
stance, in front of too Model Grocery! 
A. It went over the curb and into the chicken coops which 
were right there by the tree. By this tree the man had the 
chicken coops, and it went ov-er those and a bicycle parked 
there. 
Q. That is a tree in line with the western line of the store? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. You pointed to the tree next t6 which the chicken coops 
are piled; is that right 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Parsons: That is on the west line of the store? 
Witness: Yes, sir. 
Q. (Mr. Seawell) How far did your front wheels go over 
the curb? 
A. I couldn't say, but it was around a foot, because the 
chicken coops are not very far over. 
page 156 } Q. How far would you say Mrs. Curtis was from 
that curb when she and the automobile collided Y 
A. I would say she was about a foot over the middle. 
Q. A foot over the middle line of the street? Is that what 
you are trying to sayY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And, at that time, how was your car headed 7 What 
were you doing in your car at that time Y 
A. At the time I hit her I swerved to the right. 
Q. Had yon started to swerve before she was struck Y 
A. I couldn't say that, but my idea was not to hit her; so I 
must have. I tried to swerve to keep from hitting her. 
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Q. And it w.as the left front fender that struck her f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. After this happened, what did you do Y 
A. I got out to see if there was anything I could do for 
her, but I was extremely nervous. I tried to pick the lady up, 
but couldn't, and Mr. Hanbury came there and I asked him 
if he would pick her up, and he and I both tried to pick her 
up, but I was shaking so I couldn't, and a man named 
Birtcherd 's Dairy, or some truck, came and helped him pick 
her up. 
Q. Where was she lying in the street f 
A. She was lying in the middle almost straight across from 
the tree, in the middle, with her head pointing south. 
Q. And her feet were pointing which way¥ 
A. Her feet were pointing towards the store. 
page 157 ~ Q. And her head pointing in the opposite way! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And just about in the center of the street Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you remain there for any length of time f 
A. Just about ten minutes, and I follo,ved right after them. 
Q. Do you remember Mr. Kesser coming up there? 
A. Yes, he came up there in about five minutes. 
Q. Did you have any conversation with himf. 
A. None whatsoever except that he said I skidded 75 feet 
and I said I didn't. 
Q. Did you do ·anything to show him that you had not 
skidded 75 feet Y 
A. He said, ''Look here'' ; he pointed out and said, ''You 
skidded 75 feet'', and I said, "You are crazy; it is not more 
than 25 feet''. 
· Q. Did he show you the marks Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. -There were- some marks there where you had applied 
the brakef · 
. A. Yes, sir. 
_Q. And you called his attention to the fact, when he said 
that it was 75 feet, that he was wrong? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That was imm-ediately before you left there? 
page 158 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
· . Q. Was there any other car operating upon the. 
street in that locality¥ · 
A. I couldn't say. 
Q. Did you see any other car 'vhich would interfere with 
your movements Y 
A. Except for the cars parked, I didn't notice. 
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Q. Did you see any operating a~ that pointY 
A. No, sir. 
Q. As you went up and your front wheels mounted the curb 
in front of the grocery store, did you see 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you show the jury with this little model about 
how it was sitting there \vhen you cam-e to a stopY 
A. Sitting about like that· (illustrating). 
Q. This is a little out of proportion, but that about shows 
itt 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I notice from this plat that there are a number of tre.es 
along there; do you remember those being thereY 
A. Yes, sir, I remember those being there. 
Q. And the machine cut in between those two trees7 
A. Yes, sir. It was the only chance· I had. 
Q. Was there any vehicle or any obstacle of any kind be-
tween your car, as you approached this point, and Mrs. Curtis 
which would interfere with her seeing the car ap-
page 159 ~ proaching 7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Will you state at what speed you wer-e driving as you 
were proceeding along Olney Road 7 
A. Around twenty-five miles an hour. 
Q. Around twenty-five miles an hour? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did Mrs. Curtis, before this accident and after you first 
observed her, ever stop in her crossing the street 7 · 
A. No, sir. She just kept right going-kept right on. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. 1\tir. Nelms, step down here a moment, please. You say 
at the point marked ''concrete pole'' she stepped out in the 
street ; \vas she walking straight across, or walking diagon-
ally to some extent towards you 7 · 
A. This way (illustrating). 
Q. Like this pencil lies 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is about a ten degree angle? 
A. I don't know about that. 
Q. That is approximately the angle, I will say. Ten de-
gree angle to the east as she walked across the street 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. A slight angle to the east. Now, you say that she was 
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about a foot over the center of the street when 
page 160 } you struck her Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you did not turn your car until just as you struck 
her? 
A. No, sir. I turned and tried not to strike her, and as I 
turned I struck her .. 
Q. As you ·turned you struck her Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You struck her before you completed the turn, and you 
were in the act of turning Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were turning very sharply f 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. And still, when the accident was over, she was lying 
about the center of the street at the point marked ''A''. Is 
that the point, or was she further overt You said a while 
/
o she was in front of the store. Was it there Y 
A. It was about there. 
Q. About the letter ''A'' T · 
A. _Yes, sir. 
Q. Someone said to the west of the store ; was it there Y 
A. It was right there. 
Q. At "A"Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And still about the center of the street? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 161 } Q. That is where you hit her? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you mean by that, that striking her as you turned 
with the left side of the car enough to knock a heavy dent 
in your fender in- two places, that you did not knock her off 
to the side any Y 
A. Yes, sir, she ·went off to the side. That is where she was 
when I found her. 
Q. I understand you to say that is where you hit her and 
she lay there, too? 
A. No. I thought you said is that where she laid after 
she was hit. 
Q. That is what I asked you, and you said ''Yes", and 
you said that is where you hit her. 
_Mr. Hughes: Not at'' A". 
By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. Where were you when you hit her? Put a "B" where 
you hit h~r. 
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A. (Witness marks on plat.) ·' 
Q. I will put a circle around a dot as the point where he 
says that he must have hit her. That, you say, is about 
a foot beyond the center of the street 7 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. And all the distance it moved her was from the dot to 
the point "A''f 
page 162 } A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Although you hit her hard enough to knock 
a dent in the fender and· also knocked the cowl light loose; 
is that right! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You say when she started across the street she nev€r 
stopped or hesitated 7 · - .-;, ·- · . . 
A. No, sir. She looked straight at me the whole time. 
Q. You never said anything about looking straight at yon· 
'vhen you were in the Pollee Court, did. you, when you tes~ 
tified there! 
A. I think I did; I couldn't say. 
Q. I don't find it in the record. Do you think you did 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Examine the record and see. 
A. I am not sure about that. 
Q. Did you, or not, testify at page · 38 of the testimony, 
of your testimony, as follows: "And where did she come 
from-from behind anything Y '' ''I couldn't really tell you 
that, sir, I don't lmow whether she came from behind an- auto-
mobile." Do you remember saying that! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is as true now as then? 
A. Yes, sir. I said so just now. 
Q. (Reading): "But it was along here, right there, it was 
in that distance, and as she did so Marjorie yelled 
J>age 163} ''Look out!" .Do you remember that? 
A. Yes, sir. .. 
Q. (Reading): "And I saw her. She kind of hesitated a 
little bit, it looked to me.'' You say now that tshe did not 
hesitate. Which is correct? 
A. I couldn't tell you. 
Q. Do you deny saying that? 
A. No, sir, I don't deny saying it. 
Q. Do you admit saying it? 
A. If it is down there in testimony, I must have said it. 
Q. Then, which is correct-then or now7 
Mr. Seawell: May I suggest that the attorney read the 
rest of that sentence. · · 
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J\tir. Parsons : I am dealing with the specific question. I 
insist I have the right to read the specific statement. 
The Court: You have the right to have it read to him. 
Mr. Parsons: I will read it all. 
·. Q. (Mr. Parsons) ''She kind of hesitated a little bit, it 
looked to·· me, and then she come right straight across for 
that drug store." · 
A. Drug store instead of grocery. 
Q. That is patently an error in your statement. You said 
then she d~d hesitate, and now you say that she 
page 164 ~ did not. I want to kno'v which is correct. 
A. I couldn't be exact on that. · 
Q. You don't know which one is right T 
A. No. She looked at me, and I can't describe how she 
looked, but she just looked and went on. 
Q. Now, you said in that statement that she went straight 
across, right straight across for that store; today you say 
diagonally. 
A. In that statement I placed that at the same point I did 
then. If you will look at the map you \vill see it runs diago-
nallv across or she would not have gone for the store. 
Q: I am reading the statement you made. 
A. I say she went straight across. 
Q. You said thatY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was it right then or right nowY 
A. Right now. 
Q. She went straight across Y 
A. No. What I said a while ago-diagonally. 
Q. Then, that statement was a mistake when you made 
that before? · 
.A. Yes, sir. . . . 
Q. Now, you told Mr. Seawell that you saw her come from 
behind the car. I thought you said-at first you hesitated, 
and then he assumed you said that. Did you say that Y 
. . A. Did I say in the statement I really couldn 1t 
page 165 ~ tell whether she come from behind the carY 
Q. Mr. Sea:well assumed a while ago you said 
that she came from behind the parked automobile. 
Mr. Shriver: If you will read the statement, you will find 
that he did not say it. 
Q. (By Mr. Parsons) Mr. Seawell assumed it, and I want 
to find out what you said. Did she come from behind the 
parked automobile, in face of the fact that you said you 
didn't know where she came from T 
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A. I know about where she came from. 
Q. Did you in tend to tell the jury that she came from be-
hind a parked automobile Y 
. A. I don't know what my statement was a while ago. Read 
it back. 
Q. Can't you repeat it! 
A. No, sir, I can't. You have notes ther-e and I haven't 
anything. 
Q. Can you tell us without looking at the record did she 
come from behind a parked automobile, if you know! 
/1-. (No answer.) 
Q. Do you knowt . .. . . . 
A. I would rather for the notes to be read to hear what 
I said. .. 
Q. I am willing for the stenogr~pher to read it if you 
want it, if you will tell him where to read. 
page 166 } A. You have the notes there. · 
Q. It is a simple question whetJ!er sh-e came 
from behind a parked automobile, if you know. What have 
you to say about it! 
. The Court: Can't you give the jury your best recolle.c-
tion about it, whether she came from behind it, or did not? 
Give your best judgment about it . 
. . Witness: My impression was that she was from behind 
an automobile. I am not sure as I said before. 
Q. (Mr. Parsons) The truth is what you said before you 
couldn't really .tell that! 
A. Yes, sir, that is what I said before. 
Q. Now, you say now that she was in the center of the 
· treet when you hit her, approximately? 
A. Yes, sir. . . _ 
Q. About a foot beyond? 
I A. Yes, sir. .. . Q. Are yon sure of that? A. I am positive. 
. Q. I call your attention to another statement. Yon were 
being asked where she was when she was hit, page 44 on the 
transcript I have: ''It was somewhere near this curbing?" 
''I think so.'' ''So you don't know where she was when you 
hit her Y" "I really do not.'' Is that a correct statement 
now? 
page 167 } A. If I said it, yes, sir. 
Q. If you said it then, it is correct now. Did 
you say it then 7 
A. Is it down there? 
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/ Q. It is written right here. 
V A. Then I said it. 
Q. Then, tha.t is a correct statement f 
A. Yes, sir, I said it. 
Q. Then, what you said today is purely based upon reflec:. 
tion of what you think possibly happened instead of what 
you really do know! 
A. Reasoning with my-I couldn't have possibly hit her 
anywhere els·e. 
Q. That is the reason you say today you hit her in the 
middle of the street f 
A. Yes, sir. 
/ Q. Then, as a matter of fact, you don't know where she 
/was. Today you really couldn't tell Y 
-....... A. I couldn't tell. 
·~ Q. The~, why do you tell the jury you hit her in the mid-
dle of the street if you don't know? 
A. I can tell you why I say I hit her in the middle of the 
street-
Q. Not from what somebody suggested? 
A. No, sir. They said my right front fender-the right 
side was nine feet from the curbing a 'vhile ago. 
Q. I am not talking about 'vhat they said. 
page 168 ~ A. That is why they were going on, I was nine 
feet from the curb, and that put me two feet from 
the middle, as the street is thirty-two feet. If she had been 
stepping on the curbing, the way that they sa.id, it would 
have thrown her in the chicken coop and not that way." 
Q. Isn't it a fact you hit her over near the curbstone Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Where was she when you first saw her Y 
A. In about the middle of the street, or not quite as far. 
Q .. And was that where she was when Miss Marjorie first 
yelled ''Look out!'' Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And, at that time, you were down towards the bus stop f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Where were you Y 
A. I will look on this plat. 
Q. Go ahead . 
. A. (Witness refers to plat.) About along here (indicat-
ing). 
Q. Right along the point marked "C "Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is about forty feet from whe.re ·you collided with 
her; is that right? · . 
A. Yes, sir. 
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. Q. And you say you were about fifty f~et away, according 
to your testimony a while ago, when you first saw 
page 169 } her 7 
A. I don't think I said that much. 
Q. I understood you to say that, but I may be mis~en. 
You were at least forty feet 7 
A. Forty-five or fifty feet. . . 
Q. Forty-fiv~ or fifty feet wh~n you saw her in the middle 
of the street. You heard Miss Marjorie Peacock, and you 
remember that she said, in your presence, that Mrs. Curtis 
was very near the curb, approximately, when she was hit? 
A. Will you r~peat that! 
Q. Didn't I ask you if Miss Marjorie was correct when 
she said Mrs. Curtis was very near the curb when struck Y 
¥r. Seawell: It is not proper for this witness to say 
whether another person was correct. .... 
Mr. Parsons: I withdraw it. 
The Court: It is for the jury to say who is corl:"ect. . 
Q. (By Mr. Parsons) You say you moved straight ahead 
for about what distance before you turned to the right Y 
A. About what distance? - ~ 
Q. About what distance did you go straight ahead before 
you turned to the right? · 
A. Do you mean after I put on brakes 7 
Q. Yes. 
A. About twenty-five feet. 
Q. And that· is the twenty-five feet you were referring to 
. when you were talking to Mr. Ke·sser about the 
page 170 } skid marks Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You never measured them, did you Y 
A. No, sir, but Dean Peacock and I went back about an hour 
later, and there were no skid marks to be seen. · 
Q. You saw them when you left there 7 · 
A. Yes, sir, but we went back later to measure them. ind 
it looked like somebody had taken a wash cloth and washed 
them off. 
Q. Do yon know who did it Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You could not even see ·them Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. 'Had it rained in the meantime! 
A. No, sir. 
Q. It is apparent in evidence that they were measured 
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for seventy-five feet. You are guessing at it, and you can't 
say whether they were that much Y 
A. No, I didn't measure them. · 
Q. And you did turn to the right after you skidded twenty~ 
five· feet! 
A. Yes, sir. . _ 
Q. What speed did you say you were going Y 
A. Twenty-:fiv~· miles an hou~~, 
Q. D)!fyou have good brakesY 
A; Yes, sir. · . . 
. Q. In what distance can you stop a car of that 
page 171 ~ kind on that street, going twenty-five miles an 
hourf · · 
A .. In 38 feet. That is the length you are allowed. 
Q. ~ ou were mistaken before when you testified it could 
be stopped-
A. (Interposing) I looked it up. 
Q. You said you could stop in ten feet Y 
A. I looked it np. . . . _ 
Q. You thought, until you looked it up; that it could be 
stopped iri ten feetf 
. A. I rea a that. and got it mixed up. You know these peo~ 
pie who make up the brake list. . 
Q. The Homicide Squad made oortairi tests on stopping f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you read thatY 
A. Yes, sir. . ,. . 
Q. Since you testified in the Police Courtf 
A. Yes, sir. I read it before, but got it ;mixed up. 
Q. But you testified you could stop in ten feet going twenty~ 
five miles an hour Y 
A. Yes, sir; at that time I thought so. . ' . . 
Q. And you also testified you could stop in twenty -five· feet 
-going 60 miles an hour T -
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That was a mistake f 
- A. Yes, sir. . 
· Q. If would take a. great deal longer time to 
page 172 ~ stop, going at that speed? 
. A. Yes, sir. . 
. Q. Going twenty::five ~iles tln .. hour, Y~!l ~Ol;l~d go thirty.~ 
e~ght feet, and go1ng twice that you would go twice that 
l r in a second Y · A. I don't know about that. · Q. How does it happen, Mr. Nelms, that Mrs. ·curtis ~as ot thrown over to the left side of the street if you hit 
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her as you turned and hit her so hard as to do the damage 
that was done! 
A. Do you mean way over 7 . 
Q. Yes. 
A. My conception of it is as you said that little cowl light 
on it was bent. When she came up, she slid back, and I was 
turning at the same time she did, and it threw her off rather 
than a straight course. 
Q. That would have thrown her off to the left also, wouldn't 
it? 
A. It did. 
Q. Then, when you said to Mr. Seawell a while ago you saw. 
her come from behind a car, or he assumed that in the ques-
tion, that was not exactly right, was it? 
A. As far as I know. I couldn't really say whether she 
came from behind the car, or not, but that was my impres-
sion. 
Q. Yon never saw her until she was in the center of the 
street? 
page 173 ~ A. Or a little before. 
Q. In your testimony before, you said some-
thing about three or four car lengths, that you passed by 
three or four lengths after you saw her before you struck 
her? 
Q. Did I say three or four car lengths 7 Didn't I say in 
there that you said that¥ 
Q. Let's see: ''How many did you pass after you put on 
your brake? '' ''Now, I couldn't tell you that, because I didn't 
count them at the time." "You said something about three 
or four a while ago¥'' ''Yes, sir. They were lined up right 
along there, right to this tree here, because I didn't have 
a chance in the world to cut across." "When your car was 
tbree or four cars back from this tree' '-that was the tree 
on the east side, if you will recall, the north side. I was talk-
ing in that question about this tree, because you said you 
couldn't turn in until you got beyond that. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. (Reading)i "When your car was three or four cars back 
from this tree, and this tree is opposite 345, there were three 
or four cars back of that, and that is where you first saw 
Mrs. Curtis? 
A. What do you mean three or four cars back of it¥ 
Q. You were back there somewhere, and you say you 
passed three or four cars after you first saw her, after you 
put on the brakes? 
A. Will you state that again, please? 
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Q. Did you run past three or four acrs after you first saw· 
Mrs. Curtis before you. could turn in to the storeY 
A. That is right, sir. That is the only way I could do. I 
would have turned over any other way, I am pretty sure. 
I had Miss Peacock's safety to think of; I couldn't j·eopardize 
her life.'' · 
page 174 ~ You made that statement, didn't youY 
A. Yes, sir . 
. Q. Then, you must have been three or four cars back when 
you put on the brake f · 
A. I didn't count them. I couldn't get down and say defi-
nitely. 
Q. It was pretty soon after the accident, sooner than it 
is now, when you made the statement Y 
A. It was three months after the accident. 
Q. You knew as much about it as you know now, didn't 
you? 
A. What? 
Q. When you testified in the Police Court, you knew .as 
much then as you know now Y 
A. Yes, sir, the only thing is, I am more straightened out 
now. I was scared to death at the Police Court. 
Q. Who straightened you out Y 
A. My lawyers. 
Q. You were asked: 
'' Q. You know where that bus stop is T 
A. Yes, sir, there it is, right there (indicating on the 
diagram). 
Q. Were you somewhere along in that neighborhood when 
you :first saw l'Irs. Curtis T 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Where were you with reference to the bus stop and that 
storeY 
A. When I sa'v Mrs. Curtis she was right at this tree." 
Didn't you mean at that time you were right at the tree? 
A. Say that again, please. · 
Q. I don't kno'v what it means. Skip it. At 
page 175 ~·any rate, when you came up here, you went over 
on the sidewalk and struck some chickens Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. I have a little something here which don't look like an 
automobile; it is smaller. Come and show the jury what 
part of it was on the sidewalk? 
A. (Witness indicates.) 
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Q. About in tP.at position 7 · · 
A. Yes, sir. Of ·course, the back wheels were down on the 
street. It was just the front wheels on the sidewalk. 
Q. All of your car except the back wheels had lef.t the .sur-
face of the street? · 
Mr. Seawell: I object. He said the front wheels were about 
a foot over the sidewalk. 
Mr. Parsons: I am willing for you to interpolate what 
he said. 
Mr. Seawell: I want it right. 
Q. (By Mr. Parsons.) How much of your car was on the 
sidewalkt · 
A. Just this much (illustrating). 
Q. Just the front wheels Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And was it at an anglef 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 176 ~ Q. Maybe you can indicate better with a pencil 
the angle! . 
A. I can with that little thing (placing model on the map). 
Q. That is about a ten degree angle to the west, Isn't it, 
or east, or what do you call it 7 
A. I don't know. 
Q. It is a slight angle. The jury sees it. Now, yon really 
didn't see l\frs .. Curtis ~s she came out into the street; you 
didn't see her when she first came out! 
A. What do you mean by that? 
Q. When she left the curb on the south side, you didn't 
see her at all, did you? 
A. No, sir. All it was, that she wasn't there, and,.then 
she was, just in a flash. 
Q. She fell right down to the cent-er of the street, as far 
as you 'vere concerned,-rig~t out of the sky? 
A. Yes, sir, that was my impression. 
Q. You didn't see her walk over there Y 
A. Didn't see her walk ·to the middle Y 
Q. Yes. 
A. No, sir. I couldn't have seen her. That is what makes 
me think it was from an automobile, because I was not ex-
pecting anybody to cut across the street. 
Q. Well, of course, that is a pretty good theory, but it 
happens that if there was a car parked there she had at least 
to walk sixteen feet, ten feet of which would be 
page 177 ~ perfectly clear, if there was a car parked there. 
You did not see her in that ten feet, did you t · 
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A. Sixteen feet? 
Q. The street is thirty-two feet wide from curb to curb, 
so if there was a car parked there it couldn't take up over 
six feet, and she would have at least ten feet to walk before 
she got to the center of the highway, and you did not see 
her -at all. Where did she come from, if you know Y You 
don't know, do you? 
A. She came from along here (indicating). 
·Q. But you didn't see her as she went across there f 
A. No; the time I saw her was about here (indicating). 
Q. You told us that she was in the center of the street, 
several times, before you saw her. You didn't see her when 
she left the curb 1 
A. N.o, and I 'vas not expecting to see her. 
Q. Therefore, you couldn't see her when .she passed be-
hind an automobile? 
A. Excepting that is the only 'vay I could explain it. 
· Q. You just suppose that? 
A. Yes; that is the only way I can explain it. 
Q. And yet you do not explain not seeing her for a dis-
tance of' ten feet where it was perfectly wide open and no 
traffic. How do you explain that? 
A. I was not expecting anybody out there. 
·Q. You were looking straight ahead, weren't 
page 178 ~ you Y 
A. Yes, sir. , 
Q. If anybody had been in the open space between you 
and parked cars, you were bound to have seen them no mat-
ter whether you were looking, or not? 
A. She was on the side of the car over there. 
Q. Whatf. 
A. She came out-I couldn't say. 
Q. You just didn't see her; that is the whole story? 
A. I saw her-I saw her-I can't-(witness goes to the 
map). The car. was parked right here, and there is the 
middle of the street; she come around there, and I would be 
c?ming along here like I was ; there would not be any ques-
tion of my seeing her this far away when I am along here 
(pointing to map). 
Q. In other words, you tell the jury you 'vouldn 't see her 
if she was in a clear view if yon were looking straight ahead 
-that you wouldn't pay any attention to her; is that the 
ideaY 
A. If I saw her coming out there. I didn't see her before 
she got to the middle. 
Q. You didn't see her in this open space between the 
parked car and the middle of the street? 
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A. No. . 
Q. What I have been trying to find out is why yon didn't 
see her. There was nothing between you and her, was there?· 
A. No, sir. 
page 179 ~ RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Seawell: 
Q. ~{r. Nelms, Mr. Parsons' cross examination has been 
based practically upon the statements that he has read yon 
from a record. You say you were in Police Court and were 
scared to death? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Parsons: If you are going to testify, I object. 
Q. (Mr. Seawell) Who was it that ask you all of those 
questions that he read to you t · 
A. He did. 
Q. Mr. Parsons himself 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE.:CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Parsons: 
Q. I read you from the record, Mr. Nelms, questions par-
ticularly asked you by Mr. James G. Martin on page 38. 
Where do you get the statement I asked yon the questions? 
Isn't that right, that :1\Ir. ~{artin asked you those questions 1 
A. I conldn 't tell yon. . 
By Mr. Parsons: There is the record. 
By the Jury: 
Q. Was the lady carrying anything in her hand? 
page 180 ~ A. When I picked her up there was not any-
thing in there. . 
Q. She was not carrying anything going across the street? 
A. No, sir. 
MISS MARJORIE PEACOCK, 
recalled on behalf of the defendant, testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Hughes: 
Q. You were sworn this morning, I believe, when Mr. Par-
sons examined you? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. ::Miss Peacock, skipping all of the preliminaries and tak-
ing up where you were returning home from the station, where 
were you sitting· in the car1 
A. Front seat, by the driver. 
Q. And who was driving? 
A. Mr. Nelms. 
Q. And he 'vas sitting on the left at the wheel Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The weather? 
A. Clear, a very nice day. 
Q. And it was early afternoon? 
A. About 1 :30. 
Q. Nobody else was in the car? 
A. No. 
page 181 ~ Q. As you proceeded westward on Olney Road 
and entered this block where the accident oc-
curred, do you remember about how far you were from the 
point where Mrs. Curtis was struck when you first saw herY 
A. I can show it better on there than I can-
Q. (Interposing.) Speak up. · 
A. I can show you on the map where I think it was. . 
Q. You can show me on the map if you would rather, but 
I believe we can get along faster. I want you to be at home 
and testify in the way that is most clear to you. 
A. I am not a judge of distances, but I can tell o'Ii there 
.about where it is, but not in feet. 
Q. And could you say approximately where she was with 
respect to the grocery store Y 
A. Where she was Y 
Q. Yes, when you first saw her Y 
A. She was on the other side about coming out from be-
hind a parked automobile. 
Q. Coming out from behind a parked automobile Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. How far· was that parked automobile .approximately 
from Botetourt Street-how many houses, or how mariy-
A. (Interposing.) About the middle of the second house 
from the corner. 
Q. From the corner of Botetourt Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 182 ~ Q. What was she doing when you first saw herY 
. A. .Coming towards us across the street. 
Q. She was going from the south side of the street to the 
north side on which the gTocery store stands? · · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And about what angle did she seem to be walking with 
reference to the direction of the street? · · 
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A. She was comin~ from about the middle of the second 
house like that (indrcating). . 
Q. The angle would he shown on the plat by a line from 
the middle of the second house from the corner of Botetourt 
to the middle of the grocery storeY 
A. Yes, I would say so. 
Q. Now, just pick up from there and tell what happened, 
in your own words. 
A. As soon as I saw her coming out from behind the auto":' 
mobile I said to Mr. Nelms, "Look out", and he immediately 
put on his brakes. She kept coming towards us, so we turned 
towards the right to avoid hitting her, to try to avoid hitting 
her, but she kept coming towards us. 
_ Q. Did she change her manner of walking, as far as you 
observed, after you saw herY 
A. No. She was hurrying across the street. 
Q. How was she looking? 
A .. Looking at us. . 
Q. What was the position of the car when she. 
page 183 } was struck 7 -
A. I would say that we had started to turn 
just a littJe. 
Q. Just on the beginning of the turn? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where did you come to 7 
A. Up on the curb. 
Q. How much of itT 
A. The front wheels. 
Q. When did you first see where Mrs. Curtis was lying? 
A. I didn't see her. 
Q. What part of the car struck her Y 
A. The fender--the left fender I guess it is, isn't it? 
Q. Hold up your hand. 
A. (Witness holds up left hand.) 
Q. The left hand? 
A. The left hand. 
Q. And then, after that, what did you do Y • 
A. I got out of the car immediately and went into the 
store. 
Q. Did you see her picked up by these gentlemen Y 
A. No. 
Q. Have you any judgment as to what speed Swift was 
driving when he applied the brakes and you said "Look 
out!"? 
A. I would say about twenty-four or twenty-five miles an 
hour, and not going any faster. · 
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page 184 ~ Mr. Parsons: . I didn't hear that. 
Witness: About twenty-four or twenty-five, but 
not any· faster • 
.. Q. (By Mr. Hughes) Were you able to say what part of 
her was struck by the left fender,. or how she was knocked Y 
A. No. 
Q. You were not looking at that f 
A. No. . . 
CROSS ~~MINATION. 
By Mr. Parsons: · · 
Q. Miss Marjorie, you say that she was going rather hur-
riedly across the street? · 
A. Mrs. Curtis, do you mean Y 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 
· Q .. May I ask you to ·step here just a minute : This is 349; 
is that the house you say is the second house from the corner Y 
· .A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. She apparently came out from about the center of that 
house? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. About this tree marked ''2'', and went diagonally across 
the street? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And about that way, would you say,-from 
page 185 r the center of the street to the center of the store f 
Here is the middle of the house and here is the 
tree; we would start our line here and get the middle here ; 
is t,hat ·right f · . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Note: Mr. Parsons draws a hatched line on the map. 
Q. It would com·e about in that line as it extended across 
the street! 
·A. Yes; maybe here. . 
Q. We will draw another line. It is more like thatT 
A. Yes. 
Q. The line marked "X" and '' X-1'' is now identified by 
you as the line of her course across the street Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
. Q. ·Now, when she first came out-here is the bus stop 
back here; there was a car parked opposite 341, was there 
not,-Compeco's truckY 
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A. I don't know the number of the house. The car was 
there somewhere, but I don't know the number of the house. 
Q. Do you remember the Compooo truck Y 
A. Not specially. 
Q. Was it about that point 7 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Do you . remember seeing the truck? 
A. I know it was out there. 
Q. And you saw him after you saw her, or be-
. page 186 } fore, or what? 
A. Who do you mean by her Y 
Q. Mrs. Curtis. Did you see Mr. Hanbury or Mrs. Curtis 
first? 
A. I saw Mr. Hanbury after the accident. 
Q. After the accident Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You had not seen him before Y 
A. I saw the truck. 
Q. You saw the truck there! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then, when you saw 1\{rs. Curtis, had you passed the 
Hanbury truck, or not 1 
A. I think so, but I am not sure. 
Q. You are not sure T 
A. No. 
Q. Where 'vere you when you .first saw Mrs. Curtis with 
reference to the bus stop that is over here on the north side 
of the street and one on the south side? Had you gotten to 
it, or about even with it, or had you passed it? Of course, 
I know you can't tell exactly. · 
A. I think we were two houses past the garage. 
Q. And I will put a line across here. There is a large X 
through the word "pavement". You were about there when 
you first saw her come off the curb or behind the car? 
A. I think that is so. 
· Q. While you were going from the big X in the 
page 187 ~ word "pavement" in the automobile down to the 
line you have marked across there, she was walk-
ing across the street from one side to the other? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And it was perfectly easy for you and Mr. Nelms both 
to see her as she emerged from the curbstone? 
A. I imagine she came from behind the car. 
Q. That was a space of some ten or twelve feet in there 
that was perfectly open? 
A. I don't know how many feet it was. 
Q. About that, would you say? 
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A. I told you I am no judge of distances. 
Q. Well, how about this roomY Point out in this room 
the distance that she was perfectly in view. 
A. After we saw her~ 
Q. How far across the street did she have to walk in full 
view of you before you hit her 1 
A. I don't understand the question. 
Q. Point out some space in the room. 
A. I don't understand. 
Q. She had to walk from the edge of the parked car across 
here; point out in the room how far it was. 
A. I guess from the wall to this rail. 
Q. From this rail over to the wallY 
A. That is about the width of the whole street, isn't it? 
Q. No; the street is thirty -two feet wide, and 
pag·e 188 }-.that is not over ten feet. She walked from the 
side of the car to the center of the street in plain 
view, didn't shef 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You saw her all that timeT 
A. Yes, sir, I saw her . 
. Q. I read you question and answer taken by the stenogra-
l er on page 35: "Q. You said 'Look out' just as soon as she stepped from behind the automobile! · · 
A. Yes. 
i 'Q. She then ·walked hurriedly, you sayY A. Yes. Q . .A:nd got to a point just about near the curb when your ar, the left front fender, had turned in and struck her, right 
close to the northern curb, and knocked her out this way? 
.A. Yes.'' 
Is that true, or a correct statement? 
A·. I think it is all right, and I guess it must be. 
Q. (Reading:) ''And the car went up on the· sidewalk, ran 
over a bicycle and killed some chickens?'' '' y·es. '' That is 
correct, isn't it f 
·Mr. Hughes: What are you reading from? j . Mr. Parsons: Bottom of page 35 a~d top of page 36. Q. (Mr. Parsons) That is correct, is it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. :You said something about twenty-four miles an hour; 
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you got that by Mr. Nelms taking you out in a 
page. 189 } car and trying to judge the speed by a speedome-
ter, trying to run the same speed with it Y 
A. That is right. 
Q. Otherwise, you don't know a'nything about speed par-
ticularly1 
A. No .. 
Q. You don't know in what distance you can stop -a cart 
A. No; I don't drive a car.: · · · - . . 
Q. Were there some cars parked on the north side of th..e 
street? 
.A. Yes. 
Q. About how many of those cars did you pass after you 
saw Mrs. Curtis in the street before the accident happened Y 
· A. I couldn't tell you how many we passed. 
By Mr. Hughes: 
Q. Those questions Mr. Parsons read you, and to which 
you said ''Yes'', they were his questions, weren't they Y 
A. Yes. · 
By Mr. Parsons: . 
Q. You would not answer "yes" to a question unless th.e 
facts stated therein were correct, would you Y 
A. I do not believe so. 
paye 190 } SWIFT NELMS, JR., 
recalled for further cross examination, testified 
as follows: · 
Examined by lVIr. Parsons: 
Q. Mr. Nelms, I forgot to ask you did Mrs. Peacock get 
you from time to time to drive her car for her Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Hughes: You are making him your witness. 
Mr. Parsons: I don't care whose witness. 
Mr. Hughes: I object. 
Q. (Mr. Parsons) It is true, is it not-
~{r. Hughes: I object to leading questions. 
The Court: I think he can treat him as an adverse wit-
ness. 
Mr. Hughes : All right; go ahead. 
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By Mr. Parsons: . . . 
_ .Q •. It is true, is it not, you drove the car for them, and-_ 
Mr. Seawell: You say ''for them'' f 
Q. (Mr. Parsons) Mrs.· Peac.ock, and Miss Marjorie Pea-
cock, and Dean Peacock, when any of them asked you? 
A. Yes. 
, Q. And you did it, working for them for nothing,-you 
didn't Qharg~ them Y 
A. No. 
page 191 ~ Q. That started out right after Mrs. Peacock 
·bought this carY 
A. Yes. 
· Q. And she is the first one that got you to drive itt 
A. She was the first one to get me to drive it f 
Q. Yes . 
. · A. Yes,· sir. 
·Q. She wast 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Shriver: If your Honor please, we have a deposi-
tion taken in"Portsmouth, New Hampshire, that we would 
like to read. 
Note: The deposition is as follows: 
page 192 } Examination of Witness : 
Present: Jeremy R. Waldron, Counsel for the Plaintiff; 
Arthur E. Sewall, Counsel for the defendants. 
BERNESE ·ALEXANDER, 
being first duly sworn, deposeth and saith in answer to in-
-terrogatorie~ 0 '1 follows: 
Examined by Mr. Sewall: 
Ql. What is your name T 
A. Bernese Alexander. 
Q2. And your married name is Mrs. J. T. Alexander? 
A. Yes. 
Q3. And where do you live Y 
A. My home is here in Portsmouth but I was in Norfolk-
( unfinished) 
Q4. Your home at the present time is? 
A. Union Street, Portsmouth. 
Q5. How long have you lived here in Portsmouth? 
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., 
A. Well, I have lived here twenty-five years, but the last 
fifteen years of course I haven't lived here only part of the 
time. 
Q6. When did you go to Norfolk, or when were you in Nor-
folk last! 
A. I went there,-I think I arrived about the twenty -eighth 
of October, and I was there until the fourth of December,-
third of December. 
Q7. That is of 19·34 7 
.A. Yes. 
QB. So that you were in Norfolk in the early part of No-
vember? · 
.A. Yes. 
Q9. And where did you live in Norfolk? 
page 193 ~ A. 210 Drummond Place. · 
QlO. Where is .Drummond Plaee with reference 
to Olney Road? · 
A. W·ell, I don't know as I can tell; I am not very familiar 
with Norfolk. I was only there six weeks and I went to my 
garage on Olney Road to get my car. I came down Bote-
tourt Street-( unfinished) 
Q11. In order to come from your house to Olney Road, 
what street did you come down f 
A: I came down Botetourt Street and turned right on Olney 
Road. · · 
Q12. Turned right on Olney Road? 
.A. Yes. 
].{r. Sewall: .For the purposes of the record, I will offer 
at this time a certain plan, dated ~Tanuary 16, 1935, by ·0. R. 
Mcintire, Eng., and ask that it be marked "Defendant's Ex-
hibit 1 ''. 
(Plan is marked ''Def's Ex. 1" ~n lead pencil.) 
},fr. Waldron: Note the objection of the plaintiff to the 
map until it is qualified, properly qualified. 
Q13. Showing you Defendant's Exhibit 1, I ask you if you 
are familiar enough with Norfolk to point out on this Exhibit, 
Botetourt Street and Olney Road 7 
A. This is Botetourt Stree.t and Olney Road. (Points to 
plan and indicates said streets.) 
Q14. And as you remember the locality there, does that 
·nefeildant 's Exhibit 1 fairly represent the streets, Botetourt 
and Olney streets and the houses on those streets? Is it a 
fair plan? 
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A. Yes, I should say so, of the streets. 
, Q15. And you have spoken about the ga.rage where you kept 
your car, I ask you if that appears on this plan, Defendant's 
Exhibit 1? 
page 194 ~ A. Well, yes, my garage was in the second sec-
tio:p. of garages. · This is a section of garages. 
There were two sections. 
Q16. Referring to that part of the plan· which is marked 
"Garages 73.0", that is one section of garages on Olney 
Road? 
·A. Yes. 
Q17. And your garage was where with reference to that? 
A. It was in the second section. 
Q18. Towards the west 1 
A. Yes. 
Q19. West of where appears simply on the map the word 
''Garages''? 
A. East, it would be. . 
- Q20. ·East, I mean . 
. A. Yes. 
Q21. Your garage was just to the east of what appears on 
the plan to be a three-story frame building marked Y. w·. 
C. H.? 
A. Yes, that was the Woman's Christian Home. I know 
it was Woman's Christian Home, I don't know about the Y 
part. 
Q22. Your garage was the next building to the east from 
the Woman's Christian Home¥ 
· A. Yes. 
Q23. On the 8th day of November, 1934, did you have oc-
casion to go from your home on Drummond Place down to 
Olney Road? 
A. Yes, I had to go down Botetourt Street to Olney Road. 
Q24. You went by way of Botetourt Street. What time of 
day did you leave your home? · 
A. Well, I can't tell you the exact hour. I know I was 
going to the Navy Yard to join my husband. 
Q25. In the morning or afternoon? 
A. I think it was about,-between noon and two 
page 195 ~ o'clock. I couldn't tell exactly. 
Q26. It was early in the afternoon? 
A. Yes. 
Q27. And how long did it take you to walk down to your 
garage ; how far distant is it? 
A. I don't know how far it is I had to go down, I should 
·say it would take me ten minutes. 
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Q28. About ten minutes from Drummond Place to. Olney 
Road¥ 
A. No, from Drummond Place to the garage .. 
Q29. Now on that day, on November 8, as you came down 
Olney Road, did you see an automobile accident? 
A. Yes. 
Q30. About the time you saw the accident, where were you 
on Olney Road, referring now to plan marked Defendant's 
Exhibit 1? 
.A. I can't tell you the exaet spot. I should think I was,-
there was a grocery store here, I remember, I should say I 
was about here. I was walking right along here. I WQ.S about 
opposite this spot. Of eourse I was moving all the time. 
Q31. About opposite what is marked on the plan as ''Model 
Grocery Store'' 1 
Q32. And. about opposite what is marked "#347"7 
A. Yes, I. was in front of one of these houses. There· was 
several of them. 1 should think I was about here.· (Points 
to a point on map between #347 and #345.) 
Q33. Now will you tell in your own words just what you 
saw happen? · 
page 196 }- A. Well, I was walking along. and I glanced 
toward the street and I saw Mrs. Curtis, this lady, 
in the center, about the center of the street, and I saw the car 
coming.very close to her and it happened very suddenly and 
I thought ''Isn't she going to stop?'' and-
Mr. Waldron: I object; object to that. Not what she th~$, 
what she sees. 
Q34. Well, perhaps I can help you. When you first saw 
Mrs. Curtis, she was about in the n1iddle of the street T 
A. Yes. 
Q35. And how close was the car to Mrs. Curtis when you 
first saw her T · 
A. I couldn't say. 
Q36. What would be your best judgment 7 
A. I am not very good at measurements. 
Q37. Well, measure it by car lengths; was it one, two or 
three, how many would you sayY . 
A. I can't say the distance ; I can't say how close it was. 
Q3R Was it near or .close? 
A. It was close. 
1\{r. Waldron: Object to that. . 
Witness: Well, I've already said close, quite clo~e to· it. 
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Q39. W 9uld you want to give us some idea of distance per-
haps in this roomY "\Vas it the length or width of this room, 
the distance .a partY 
A. I should not think it \Vas more than the width of the 
room. 
Q40. About the width of the room in which you are taking 
the deposition t 
page 197 ~ A. Yes. 
- Mr. Sewall: - And may it be agTeed by counsel that this 
~o-om is eighteen feet! 
Mr. Waldron: Yes. 
Mr. Sewall: It is agreed by counsel the room is eighteen 
feet wide. 
Q41. At the point where Mrs. Curtis was crossing the street, 
crossing_ O~ney Road, was there a sidewalk! Was there a 
crosswalk 7 
A. No, no. 
Q42. She was crossing between crosswalks f 
A. Yes, it was about the center of the block. 
Q43. She was crossing· about the center of the block f 
A. I should think it was about the center of the block. 
Q44. And in which direction was Mrs. Curtis walking T 
A. She was going from the south side to the north side. 
Q45. Of Olney RoadY 
A. Yes. 
· Q46. Where was she on Olney Road with referenec to the 
Model Grocery Store f · 
A. I should say about opposite the Grocery Store. 
Q47. And you say she was about in the middle of the road 
traveling· from the south side to the north side? 
A. Yes. 
Q48. And about opposite the Model Grocery Store. And · 
at that time the car that you saw approaching from the east,-
it was approaching from the east¥ · 
A. Yes. · · · 
Q49; Was about eighteen feet to the east-( un-
page 198- ~- finished). - · 
Mr. Waldron:: You're leading, I want to object. 
Q50. How far was the car and which direction from Mrs. 
Curtisf 
A. The car was going west. It was east from her. 
· Q51. And about 18 feet distant Y 
A. Yes. 
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Q52. Now in. which direction was Mrs. Curtis looking? 
A. Well, of course she was,-her back was to me. I was 
on the sidewalk and I was on the south side. I don't know 
which way she was looking but I presume-(unfrnished). 
Mr. Waldron: I object. 
Q53. You don't know which.way she was looking! 
A. Naturally not, she didn't have eyes in the back of her 
head. 
Q54. Yvere there any other cars on Olney RoadY 
A. Yes, there were cars parked on both sides. 
Q55. Could you give us any idea how many cars were parked 
on the south sidef 
· A. Well, I was on the south side. I passed one car. There 
was one car parked, I don't know how many more. 
Q56. Where was the car parked on the south side with 
reference to the Model Grocery Store? 
A. Well, it would be west, about west of the Model Gro-
cery Store, a little bit to the w-est. 
Q57. And how far would you say to the west on Olney 
Road, was the car parked on the south side Y 
A. I don't know how far. I know I had passed a car parked 
there. 
Q58. And were there any other cars that you noticed 
. · parked on Olney Road? 
page 199 ~ A. Well, there was cars on the other side of 
the street, but I don't know how many. 
Q59. And where were they with reference to the Model 
Grooory Store f 
A. I don't remember,-! couldn't say just where they were. 
Q60. Could you tell us whether they were to the east or 
west! 
A. Well, I think there was one car parked beyond the Gro-
cery Store, towards the east. As I stood there, I looked 
across the street and I could see there was cars parked there, 
one to the east and one to the west. 
- Q61. Were there any cars passing· along, any movement 
along· Olney Road outside of· that carY 
A. I couldn't say. Olney Road is quite heavily travelled. 
Q62~ ·Was your attention called to any other car except 
the car which later came in collision with 1\frs. Curtis Y 
A. No, I don't remember any. 
Q63. Now will you tell, in your own words, again, how Mrs. 
Curtis was crossing the street, with reference to whether she 
kept on walking, looked up, or what she did. Just describe 
her movements from the time you first saw her. 
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A. When I .first saw her, she was about in the middle of 
the street and she continued t.o walk across until she was 
hit. 
Q64. At the same gaitt 
A. Yes. 
Q65. And then tell in your own words just what you saw 
happen. 
A. I was walking of course all the time. I saw her in the 
middle of the street, and she continued to walk across, and I 
should say that she was hit by the left front fen-
pag·e 200 } der but-(unfinished). 
Q66. Left fender of the defendant's car came 
in collision with her 
A. Yes. It happened very quickly. It's rather difficult to 
tell exactly. 
Q67. What became of the car,-what movements did the 
defendant's car make with reference to turning left or right? 
A. The car swerved to the right and it hit the curbing on 
the opposite. side of the street, that is on the north side, and 
I believe it went above the curbing, because there was chicken 
coops and I saw the chickens reelased and flying around. 
Q68. And did you notice what became of Mrs. Curtis after 
the contact between herself and the automobile¥ 
A. I saw her lying ·in the street and I saw two men pick 
her up and that is all I saw. . 
Q69. Where was Mrs. Curtis, in what position was she, 
what part of the street was she lying in? 
A. Well, I should say just beyond the middle of the street, 
I should say. 
Q70. And would you want to say how far beyond the middle 
lineY 
A. I conldn 't say that. 
Q71. Just beyond the middle line? 
A. Yes. 
Q72. How fast will you say that the defendant's automobile 
was moving along the street just before the collision? 
A. I don't,-I can't say how fast the car was going. I saw 
it for just an instant. I really wasn't paying a great deal 
of attention and I just suddenly saw it. 
Q73. You couldn't give us any idea Y 
page 201 ~ A. Really couldn't because I did not see it cov~r 
a great deal of ground. I am not a very good 
judge of speed. 
'Air. Sewall : You may inquire. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION .. 
Examined by· Mr. Waldron: 
Ql. What attracted your attention to Mrs. Curtis in the 
:first instance 7 
A. Well, I just looked up and saw her in the middle of 
the street. I was walking along on the ~idewalk,-I happened 
to be right opposite, nearly opposite. T don."t ·know, I -just 
glanced up, as anyone would who is walking alo'ng. . 
Q2. Now you sa:y you went to Norfolk on the 28th day of 
October, 19347 
A. I left here the 26th. I think I got there the 28th, either 
28th or 29th. 
Q3. The reason that you went there was to join your hus-
band? 
A. Yes, he was aboard the ''Northampton''. That was at 
the Navy Yard there. 
Q4. In what capacity is he employed! 
A. He is pay clerk. 
Q5. Your home is here in Portsmouth, was here before 
you were married 7 
A. Yes. 
Q6. You go wherever his boat is stationed 7 
A. Well, sometimes. This was the first time I had been 
to Norfolk. 
Q7. ·This was your first trip to Norfolk? 
page 202 r A. No, I was there a short time when he came 
from Panama. 
QB. Had you been keeping your car in this garage for some 
period of time? 
A. We kept it there all the time we were in Norfolk except 
the first few days when we stayed in the hotel. After that 
we had an apartment. · 
Q9. Were you the chief user of the car, or your husband? 
A. Well, my husband rode with the paymaster quite often, 
so I had the car most of the time. 
QlO. So you went frequently to the garage there 7 
A~ Yes, nearly every day.· 
Qll. Olney Road is a very wide street Y 
A. It's quite a thoroughfare, but I shouldn't call it very 
wide. 
Q12. Well, according to this plan, it is 32 feet between the 
curbings here and when you consider that the average state 
road here in New Hampshire is 22 feet wide, that is much 
wider than the average state road in New Hampshire. 
A. It doesn't look so wide. · 
Q13. On this day, November 8, that you had come down 
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there from your house on Drummond Place, through Bote-
tourt Street to Olney Road, was there any machines travelling 
back and forth over the street that you remember? · 
A. Well, I don't remember any machine in particular, but 
I presume-( unfinished). 
Q14. What you remember¥ 
A. No. . 
Q15. So that the only machine that you saw in motion on 
· the street, was the ],ord, and it was a Ford, 
page 203 ~ wasn't it, that struck Mrs. Curtis 1 
A. I presume so, I couldn't say. 
- Q16. Didn't notice the make of the carT 
A. Noticed ·it was a black car. 
Q17. That was the only· car you saw in motion on that 
street! ~ · 
A. Yes. 
Q18~ There ·was one parked on the south side and one 
parked upon the north side of the road f 
A. Yes. 
-- Q19~ And' there was nothing there that would hinder or 
interfere with your vision of the accident at allY There was 
nothing that stopped you from seeing the whole thing, was 
there~ · · 
A; No. ·· 
Q20. Will you mark on this plan, Defendant's Exhibit 1, 
the point where you 'vere when you first observed Mrs. Cur-
tis f If you will mark that with an "A"? 
A. I don't know as I could mark the exact spot. 
Q21~ If you are· familiar with the plan so it is any help to 
you, as near as you can recall. 
A. I should say right here~ 
Q22. Have yo:u done so f 
A. Yes. 
· Q23. Now 'vill you also· mark on the plan· the point at which 
Mrs. Curtis was when you first observed her· with a "B"? 
A. I don't know the exact spot. · 
Q24. Let ns understand the plan. You have marked the 
Exhibit between the numbers 37 and 48, which is just easterly 
of a circle marked "Tree', with your mark "A", 
page 204 ~ haven't you 7 · · 
A. Yes. · 
. , Q25. In making that mark, you understood that the white 
line immediately above it was the curb· line for the south side 
of the street f · 
A. Well, I understand that is the south, yes. · · · 
Q26. That white line that is immediately above your mark 
''A'' is the curb line of Olney Road 7 · · 
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A. I presume this is the sidewalk. 
Q27. You understand the white line is the curb line for the 
south side of Olney Road. Now, do you understand that the 
white line immediately below the building marked ''Model 
Grocery'' is the curb line on the north side! 
A. Yes. 
Q28. So that the space between the white lines on each 
side of the words ''Olney Road'' and ''Asphalt Pavement,., 
is the space of the road itself, the travelled part of the road, 
the vehicular travelled part? 
.A .. Yes. 
Q29. Having in mind that is so, can you mark on here, about 
as near as you can, the spot at which Mrs. Curtis. was when 
you first saw her and designate it with a "B"! 
A. I should say she was about here. 
· Q30 . .- Have you done soT · 
A. I have. . 
Q31. ·Now you say at the time that you first saw her, the au-
tomobile was a distance of how far to the east of her! 
· A.· Well, I should say about the width of this room, if that 
is 18 feet. I am not very good on measurements. 
page 205 } I can't swear to that. 
Q32: Now Mrs. ·Curtis was proceeding from the 
south side of the road to the north side, if I remember your 
statement correctly f 
A.·Yes. 
Q33. That is, she was travelling towards the building 
marked ''Model Grocery"? · 
A. Yes. 
Q34. N o·w are you familiar with the bus stop that is lo-
cated near the Model Grocery? 
A. No. 
Q35. That does not appear,-oh, yes, it appears on the 
map, a bus -stop indicated by the words "Bus Stop" on De-
fendant's Exhibit 1. You were not familiar With the loca-
tion of the bus stop at that pointY 
A. No.· 
Q36. So that ·Mrs. Curtis' back was toward you as she 
proceeded along T · 
A. Yes. 
Q37. Was she an elderly won1an or a young woman! · 
A. I should say she was elderly. I didn't see her face well. 
Q38. From the glance- you had, you ·should say she was 
elderly? 
A. Yes. 
Q39. Did ·you see her afterwards Y 
A. I saw her lying in the street. 
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Q40. And at that time she appeared to be an elderly per-
sonY 
A. Yes, I should say she was elderly. 
page 206 ~ Q41. Did she stop in her journey from the time 
you saw her until the time she was hit? 
A. I didn't see her stop. 
Q42. How far did she proceed before the automobile struck 
herY 
A. I don't know. 
Q43. Using tliis room as our yard stick, did she get half 
of the distance across this room before she was struck? 
·A. I don't think so. 
Q44. W~ll, did she travel three or four feet or moref 
A. Well, I don't know, I couldn't say. 
Q45. Well, did she travel one footY 
A. Yes, I am sure she travelled a foot, if not more. She 
probably took several steps. 
Q46. Now there was nothing that interfered with your 
vision of her as she was going along there, was there? 
A. No, I don't think so, except the fact that I continued 
to walk. 
Q47. There was no object within the vehicular part of the 
street? · 
A. No. 
Q48. ~ o object that interfered with the driver of the au-
tomobile'_s vision of her, as you saw it there, _was there? 
A. Well, I don't know. As I saw it, no. 
Q49. She stood out there in the street,.large enough so you 
could see her? 
A. Yes, of course I was on the opposite side. 
Q50. That is true, but there were no automobiles travel~ing 
back and forth through the street? · 
· A. I didn't see any. 
page 207 r Q51. If there had been, you. :would have seen 
them? 
A. I don't remember any moving. 
Q52. If there had been any automobiles travelling back 
and forth, you would have seen them, would you not? 
.A. Well, I guess so,-(unfinished). _ 
Q53. The whole picture is imprinted upon your memory, 
isn't itY - · 
A. Yes, it quite upset me at the time~ _ _ 
Q54. I mean we don't have accidents every day and they 
~tick in our memory. 
A. Yes . 
• Q55. ~fter the automobile hi~ her, it proceeded along to 
the curbing and struck some chiCken coops! 
Edith ··Dob$an:.Peacock, .et. al., v .. Lelia M •. Curtis. Cl39 
A. Yes. . 
Q56. They were placed on. the curb on the sidewalk! 
A. They were very close to the curb. 
Q57. The Model Grocery Store was north of the sidewalk; 
on the opposite side of the street from which you were walk-
ing? 
A. Yes. 
Q58. Do you recall the breaking of the glass in the display 
wind~w of the Model Grocery Store·Y · 
A. No. 
Q59. Did you go across the road f 
A .. No. 
Q60. You stayed on the, on your side of the road_! 
A. Yes. ·l· · ' 
Q61. Did you observe the automobile after the)·accident had 
happened, to see the positioil. the automobile 
page 208 } finally came to rest in Y · · 
A. No, when I saw them pick up Mrs. Curtis, 
I went on to my garage. · 
Q62. Is the Model Grocery Store the only building which 
is located on the north side of Olney Road 7 
A. There are houses, residences all along, very close. 
Q63. So that if this plan were correctly drawn, there would 
be houses shown at the east and west of the Model Grocery 
Store? 
A. Yes. 
Q64. Did you hear or see the brakes of the car applied, or 
any other evidence to. you there that the. driver of the car 
was attempting to slow down? 
A. Yes, I heard them, the brakes. 
Q65o Was there a screeching of rubber as he went along? 
A. Yes. I heard the tires. 
Q66o Did you observe the highway to notice how far the _ 
marks on the. road would show that the wheels had been 
locked? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q67 0 Were there any other persons on the sidewalk, or in 
the road there at the time that this happened, that you ob-
served Y 
A. Well, there was quite a few people after, right after. 
068. Well. I meant immediately following. ·' 
A. Well, there were people on both sides of the street.' I 
wouldn't know them. 
Q69. What was the condition of the road, was it wet or 
drvY 
·· A. It was dry. 
0 
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page 209 f Q70. Was Mrs. Curtis knocked any distance 
when that automobile struck her? 
A. Well, I don't think she was, any great distance. She 
seemed to be lying right in the street. , 
_ Q71. You saw the autpmobile hit there,. right there, didn't 
you, or did you look away Y 
A. Well, I suppose I did like this. (Clutches hands to 
throat.) -I don't -think I. shut my ·eyes, I don't think I did. 
Q72. What I am getting at, was she thrown back toward 
you, or thrown westerly along the street in the course of the 
collision of the car 1 That is what I am getting at. 
A. Well, I don't know. She seemed to be lying about in 
the center, perhaps a little beyond the center ·of the street. 
Q73. But I meant east or west? 
- A. Oh, I see. \-Veil, I can't say. 
-· Q74. Then you don't know "rhether the automobile carried 
her along or not? · 
A. I don 't,-it didn't appear that way to me. 
Q75. Was it the noise made by the screech of the rubber 
and the. application of the brakes that first attracted your 
attention to the situation in the middle of the street there? 
A. Well, I don 't,--no, I think I looked, glanced out ·in the 
street before I heard that. 
Q76. You had travelled from Botetourt Street down to th~ 
point which you have marked'' A", a distance, if this map·is 
correctly drawn, a distance of some hundred feet or more, 
before you observed .Mrs. Curtis in the street at all. That 
is so, isn't it f 
A. Yes. 
page 210 r Q77. And there had been nothing approach or 
pass you in the street which would call your at-
tention to the street itself during that" trip of yours, . from 
Botetourt Street to the point marked ''A'' on the plan? 
. A. There was people on he sidewalk. · 
Q78. Nothing in the road that would attract your atten-
tion to the road itself until you saw Mrs. Curtis there? 
· A. I·don 't remember anything particular. There was quite 
a· lot of travel in the street. · 
Q79. I mean did you see any travel there that day Y · 
A. N.o, I didn't notice any. · 
QBO. You don't· know how Mrs. Curtis got out into the 
street? You didn't see her go from the curb 1 
A. No, I didn't see her when she left the curb. 
Q8L How. long- have· you driven a carY 
A. About nine years. 
Q.82. And as a driver of a car, you have been familiar 
with the speed you are going along, haven't you! 
"I 
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A. Yes. 
Q83. And of course familiar with the speed at which people 
were driving coming towards you? 
A. I think I can judge the speed of a car better when I am 
in it than when I am ont. 
Q84. But you have been familiar with the speed of' cars that 
were coming towards you f 
A. Yes. · 
Q85. And this car was comi11g towards you? 
A. Yes. 
Q86. Now what speed do you say this car was 
page 211 } going? 
A. Well, I can't say. 
Q87. The reason for that is that it all happened so quickly 
it was impossible for you to say? 
A. I didn't see the car travel over but a very short dis-
tance. In one glance it is pretty hard to tell how fast a car 
is going. 
QBR· How much time elapsed between the time that you 
first sa'v the car and the time it hit Mrs. ·Curtis? 
A. Well, I don't know,-it was a very short time. 
Q89. Wasn't it more than the twinkling of an eye Y 
A. Well, I don't know,-I just glanced into the street, and 
it happened very quickly. I really can't say. 
Q90. In fact it all happened practically, with that one 
glance that you got of her, the accident was over, wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q91. So that the car travelled the distance of 18 feet with 
that one glance, within that one glance? 
A. Well, yes, I don't know,-I couldn't say exactly about 
the 18 feet, because I am not,-I wouldn't swear to the meas-
urements of it, but it just seemed that distance. 
Q92. Can you tell us in car lengths, if you can't tell us in 
feet? Did he travel one, two or three car lengths Y 
A. Well, I couldn't say. 
Q93. There was nothing to have prevented him from com-
ing· by her on the side next to you, that you saw, was there Y 
There was nothing in the street that would prevent him from 
having come between you and Mrs. Curtis Y 
A. That would be the wrong· side of the street. 
page 212 ~ Q94. But there wasn't anything in the street 
that you saw, that would prevent him from com-
ing- on that side of the street? 
A. I don't know whether there was any car parked there. 
Q95. You didn't see any? 
A. I didn't see any. 
Q96. I don't wanf you to speculate for me any more than 
142 Supreme. Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
for Brother Sewall. There wasn't anything that you saw 
there that would prevent him from having used your side 
of the. street to have come by Mrs. Curtis, was there Y 
A. No, I didn't see anything. 
Mr. Waldron: That is all. 
RE-DIRECT EX.A.l\'IINATibN. 
Examined by 1\fr. Sewall : -
Ql. That ·is, at the present time, your mind doesn't serve 
you ·as to whether there was another car coming, or not t 
Mr. Waldron: Object to leading question. 
Q2. I say, you don't remember now Y 
A. No. 
Q3~ So far as you observed, did 1\oirs. Curtis attempt to 
slacken her pace from the time you .first saw her until after 
she came in contact with the automobile? 
·A. No. 
Mr. Sewall: I think that is all. 
Mr. Waldron: That is all. 
BERNESE ALEXANDER, Witness. 
page 213 ~ At 5:17 P. M. the Court adjourned until 10:00 
o'clock tomorrow morning, February 20, 1933. 
MORNING SESSION. 
Norfolk, Virginia, February 20, 1935. 
The Court met pursuant to adjournment of yesterday. 
Present : Same parties as heretofore noted. 
Mr. Hughes: If your Honor please, we wish to repeat at _ 
this time the. same motions that were made yesterday at the 
c1ose ·of the plaintiff's evidence. 
In repeating the first motion, namely, the motion to strike 
the evidence, as far as the defendant Edith Dobson-Peacock is 
concerned, I think it due the Court that I should specifically 
mention one point that may have some bearing upon that 
motion, because it was not argued yesterday. 
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· We take the position that the family-purpose doctrine 
(which has been right much of a. ''football'' among the Vir-
ginia decisions, but they went right far towards its· complete·· 
adoption in the Baptist case) applies only to the head of a 
family and does not apply to the ownership of an automobile 
by. any other· member of the family. I think that all of the· 
Virginia cases, as· far as I recall them, where the doctrine 
l1as been applied, were cases where it was applied to t~e head 
. of the family ;and I think that is the prevailing 
page 214} application of it in th~ other States were that doc-
trine has been adopted .. ·It is chiefly for that 
reason that we contend that it does not apply to Mrs. Peacock 
here. . . 
·Now, I assume that your Honor 'rill take the same action.-
The Court: I overrule that. • · ·· · , 
Mr. Hughes: W~ except, _as we did before. 
Mr. Hughes-:' In repeating the other motion, there arises a 
very ·controlling point which pertains to nearly all ~f these 
instructions which we are going to discuss, as well as to that 
motion, and perhaps I should state that point first in repe[lt-
ing the motion and then ·refer to it in discussing the inst~uc-
tions. · 
Your Honor, as I understood the ruling, held against.us on 
our motion to strike the evidence, because it is conclusively 
shown that the plaintiff's own negligence either solely caused 
or proximately contributed to her injuries, on the theory of 
last clear chance. I understood that that was the ground Y 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Hughes : That is again a doctrine which. has had its 
ups and down in Virginia. 
The Court: As to contributory negligence, nobody knows 
'vhere one ends and the other begins. . 
Mr. Hughes: I want to point out this fact, because it per-
. tains to all these instructions. The essence of the 
page 215 ~ doctrine of last clear chance, as is plainly evident 
from the phrase itself, is that there must have 
been some opportun~ty on the part of the defendant, which 
was not availed of, to save a plab;t.tiff' from the effects of his 
or her own negligence when that negligence has been seen; 
is known, or, in the exercise of ordinary care, should be. 
known to the defendant. That is the essence of the doctrine, 
and that is one. thing which does run as an unbroken thread 
throughout all the discussions, so that there must have been 
a subsequent opportunity on the pa.rt of the defendant and 
the exercise of some agency, or the failure to exercise some 
agency on the part of the defendant, which would have averted 
the accident. 
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N ow1 in this case everybody's rights were crystallized at 
the time of the beginning of the skid. A skidding car is be-
yond control. If we assume, for the purpose of argument 
and for the purpose of argument only-because we should 
argue otherwise to the jury-but if 've assume for th~ pur-
pose of this argument to the Court that the driver of the auto-
mobile in this suit was very negligent as to speed (and, of 
course, that will be contended-that is alleged and will be 
contended) and was very negligent in other particulars, all 
of those acts of negligence crystallized way up there at the 
75 feet that the witnesses· testified to as the beginning of 
the skid. ·If Mrs. Curtis, who placed herself in a question-
able situation at least, by undertaking to make a 
page 216 ~ mid~block crossing· and then, after having stepped 
into the street with an unobstructed opportunity 
to see the car, and seeing· it· as ·she said, if she 'vent on 
across the street with that squealing· skidding car coming 
all that distance, there was no act of control that Swift 
N-elms had after that time. It made no difference what he 
saw or realized, or how he would like to have done, because 
the rights of the parties had become fixed and crystallized 
at the time of the beginning of the skid. And, if your Honor-
. The Court: (Interposing) Now, Mr. Hughes, right there. 
Isn't it a fact a skid is after he applies the brakes and the 
skidding of the car begins 1 
Mr. Hughes : Suppose we do not call it a skid. I can see 
a skid might be more applicable to a wet pavement, where 
a car is turning around. Suppose "Te call it the application of 
the brakes. The argument I make applies equally 'veil to 
that. The time, if he was negligent, if he was driving at an 
excessive speed, was back at the beginning of the application 
of the brakes, and then was when he applied the brakes and 
blew his horn, and the noise, whether it was the skidding or 
squealing, it was a noise that attracted everybody's attention. 
All the witnesses were attracted by it. I say, from that time 
back, from 75 feet or whatever it was that the witnesses said, 
~rom t:Qat point and that time was the last opportunity for 
· this driver to ha:ve exercised any actual agency 
page 217 ~ over that vehicle; and no matter what he saw or 
how at fault he 'vas after the sight of this lady 
in front of him, he had done all tbat he could do. He may 
have been in fault for being beyond a. situation where the 
measures that he took were not :fina.lly effective, but however 
that may be, he had done 'vhat he could do at that time, 
and there was not any opportunity for him to do anything 
else or to stop doing anything elSJe which 'vould have brought 
into operation the essential principle of the last clear chance. 
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- · I therefore, submit that no matter which of these many 
decisions you may think most applicable to this situation, that 
here is a situation where there could not, in the nature of 
things, ha.ve been any subsequent negligence on the part· of 
the defendant, and, therefore, the last clear chance doctrine 
does not apply. · 
That is not only pertinent to that motion, but is pertinent 
to all these instructions, and it runs through the instructions 
just as much as the motion. 
The Court: As to that, I realize the difficulties of the case. 
It is an extremely difficult case. I went through all of this 
in the Perkinson case, which came from Virginia Beach. It 
is difficult where the two doctrines do not hinge on it, and I 
think it is a question to go to the jury. 
Mr. Hughes: I want to read you this paragraph from 
Green v. Ruffin: ''The doctrine of last clear chance is a duty 
imposed by law on both the plaintiff and defend-
page 218 ~ ant. If, being in plain view of each other, and with 
equal opportunity to prevent the accident, they 
are guilty of concurring negligence, there can be no recovery.'' 
The Court: That is a question of what is concurring neg-
ligence and what is the last clear chance. 
Mr. Parsons: I understand you have an instruction on the 
same theory tha.t if she could have gotten out of the way it 
was her duty to do so. 
The Court : It has almost 'viped out the doctrine of last 
clear chance-the contributory negligence. 
Mr. Hughes: I do not think it has done it. 
The Court: As a matter of fact, they have done it, and, 
as a matter of fact, they haven't done it. 
Mr. Hughes: We still have a vestige left from the old 
common law on the authority of the court, and this is a case, 
I think, where that vestige should be preserved. 
What I have said in the discussion just closed is intended 
to apply to all of these instructions and is intended to be re-
peated; and, in addition to that, I shall take the instructions 
and comment on them in numerical order. 
PJ.JAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO.1 (AS GE,ANTED). 
· ''The Court instructs the jury that the traffic laws of the 
.state provide that 'any person driving a vehicle on the high-
way shall drive the same at a careful speed not 
llage 21~ ~ gre~ter nor less than is reasonable and proper, 
haVIng due regard to the traffic, surface and width 
of the highway and of any other condition then existing. 
Any person who shall drive any vehicle upon a highway at 
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such speed as to endanger the life, limb, or property of any 
person • • "' shall be prima facie guilty of reckless driving' 
and 'any person who shall drive at a speed exceeding • • • 
twenty-five miles an hour in a residence district' shall be 
prima facie guilty of reckless driving and if the jury finds 
from the evidenc-e that the defendant, Swift Nelms, was act-
ing or driving in violation of the aforesaid law at the time 
and place of the accident complained of, then he was guilty 
of negligence as a matter of law and if the jury shall further 
find from the· evidence that such act or acts of negligence 
on his part was or were the sole proximate cause of the . 
accident, and the negligence, if any, of the plaintiff did not 
contribute as a proximate cause, your verdict should be for 
the plaintiff.'' 
Mr. Hughes: Instruction No. 1 contains a declaration that 
any person who shall drive at a speed exceeding twenty-five 
miles an hour in a residence district shall be prima facie 
guilty of reckless driving. We submit the statute does not 
say that. The statute says it just the other way. 
The Court: The difficulty is tha.t there is no proof that 
this is a residential district. · 
Mr. Parsons: The map shows it is a residence district; 
the map shows residences on both sides of the 
page 220 ~ street and the testimony is that there are resi-
. dences on both sides; but, so far as I am con-
cerned, it would be worse for him if it was a business sec-
tion. 
Mr. Hughes: I do not think that we· questioned it as a 
residence section. · 
The Court: What is your objection? 
Mr. Hughes: The objection is 'that that statute says just 
the other way. 
Mr. Parsons: The statute has been amended. 
Mr. Hughes: I think you are right, it has been amended, 
so I withdraw that. Mr. Phlegar, you can strike that out. 
The Court: You want to except to that on the general 
ground? 
Mr. Hughes: Yes, sir. We take the position that all are 
obje~tionable on that point. 
The Court : I understand. 
PLAINTIF'F'S INSTRUCTION NO. 2 (AS OFFERED). 
"The Court instructs the jury that it was the duty of the 
driver of the automobile involved in this case to exercise 
reasonable care to keep a lookout for any person or persons 
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upon the highway or street, and if the jury find from the ~v:i­
dence that Swift Nelms, the operator of the automobile in-
volved in this accident, either saw, or, in the exer-
page 221 } cise of ordinary and reasonabl-e care, should have 
seen Mrs. Curtis, the plaintiff, upon the highway 
in a position of apparent danger from which she. co!lld not 
or would not extricate herself in time for him to have stopped, 
checked his speed or turned aside, or otherwise avoided the 
accident after he so saw or should have seen the ~laintiff in 
such position, you should find for the plaintiff.'' 
Mr. Hughes: Now, No·. 2,we think should be qualified at 
the end with the addition '' unless··you beJi.eve from the evi-
dence that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence which caused 
or proximately contributed to her injuries''. . 
Mr. Parsons: I don't see how that could affect this. -That 
would amount to concurring negligence. Tha.t is what he 
seems to say, I assume. 
The Court: I understand you ask for a verdict for the 
plaintiff on these facts. I think that applies to that instruc-
tion. 
Mr. Parsons: This instruction says-
The Court: (Interposing) That is a last clear chance 
instruction. 
Mr. Parsons: It says that she apparently would not extri-
cate herself-" apparently would not''. I think adding any-
thing to that instruction would change it entirely. 
The Court: I think you are right about that. That is 
strictly a last clear chance instruction. I will 
page 222} grant that, Mr. Hughes, with your exception and 
with the amendment. 
Mr. Hughes: We except. . 
Note: This InstructioL: No. 2 as amended and granted is 
as follows: 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 2 (AS GRANTED). 
'' The Court instructs the jury that it was the duty of 
the driver of the automobile involved in this case to exercise 
reasonable care to keep a lookout for any person or persons 
upon the highway or street, and if the jury find from the 
evidence that Swift Nelms, the operator of the automol;>ile 
involved in this accident, either saw, or, in the exercise of 
ordinary or reasonable care, should have seen Mrs. Curtis, 
plaintiff, upon the highway in a position of apparent dan-
ger from which she could not or apparently would not extri-
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cate herself in time for him to have, by the exercise of reason-
a.ble care, stopped, checked his· speed or turned aside, or 
otherwise avoided the accident after he so saw or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have seen the plaintiff 
in such position, you should find for the plaintiff.'' 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 3 (AS OFFERED). 
"The. Court instructs the jury that the traffic laws of 
this State provide that pedestrians shall cross 'vherever pos-
sible only at intersections or crosswalks and at right angles,. 
and any person violating such provisions is sub-
page 223 ~ ject to a fine of not less than $2 nor more than 
$25. Any violation of this traffic regulation does 
not bar a recovery for damages on the part of the injured 
plaintiff in an accident proximately caused by the negligence 
of another, unless such violation caused or directly contributed 
to cause the accident. 
"Further,. such violation does not bar a .recovery hy the 
plaintiff on the doctrine of the last clear chance where the 
defendant either saw or should have seen the plaintiff upon 
the street in time for the driver of the automobile to have 
either stopped, checked his speed, or turned aside, or other-
wis·e avoided the accident.'' · 
Mr. Hughes: Now, Instruction No. 3, the word ''directly" 
is used in the last line of the :first paragraph. ''Proximately'' 
is the usual legal expression. 
Mr. Parsons: I have no objection to that. I. have put 
''proximately'' in my copy. 
The Court : I have the original. 
Mr. Parsons: You have the original there. 
The Court: Is there any other objection to that f 
Mr. Hughes: I think not, but I ani reading it again. 
The Court : I think it should be qualified to read "The 
plaintiff upon tl1e street in time for the driver of the auto-
mobile, by the exercise of ordinary care, to have either 
stopped''. 
Mr. Parsons: That has been amended, hasn't iti 
The Court: No. It should be. 
page 224 } Mr. Parsons: ''By the exercise of reasonable 
care?" 
The Court: It will read this way: ''Further, such viola-
tion does not bar a recovery by the plaintiff on the doctrine 
of the last clear chance where the defendant either saw or 
should have seen the plaintiff upon the street in time for the 
driver of the automobile, by the exercise of ordinary care~ 
Edith Dobson-Peacock, et al.., v. Lelia M. Curtis. 149 
to have either stopped, checked his speed, or turned aside, 
or otherwise avoided the accident.'' 
Mr. Hughes: After the word ''automobile" in the third 
line from the end of the instruction should come the words 
''in the exercise of ordinary care' '. 
The Court: Yes. 
Note: The instruction, as amended, reads as follows: 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 3 (AS GRANTED). 
''The Court instructs the jury that the traffic laws of 
this State provide that pedestrians shall cross wherever pos-
sible only at intersections or cross-walks and at right angles. 
Any violation of this traffic regulation does not bar a re-
covery for damages on the part of the injured plaintiff in 
an accident proximately caused by the negligence of another, 
unless such violation caused or proximately contributed to 
cause the accident. 
"Further, such violation does not bar a recovery by the 
plaintiff on the doctrine of the last clear chance where the 
defendant either sa'v or should have seen · the 
page 225 ~ plaintiff upon the street in time for the driver of 
the automobile, by the exercise of ordinary care, 
to have either stopped, checked his speed or turned aside, 
or otherwise avoided the accident.'' 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 4 (AS GRANTED). 
''The Court instructs the jury that the law looks to the 
immediate and not the remote cause of an accident, and if 
the jury should :find from the evidence that the plaintiff was 
crossing the public street in violation of the traffic laws of 
this State a.nd was guilty of negligence in so doing, yet, if they 
further .find that the immediate proximate cause of the acci-
dent \vas through the neg·ligence of 'the operator of the auto-
mobile which struck her, you should find for the plaintiff." 
Mr. Hughes : No. 4 seems to be subject only to our general 
objection. 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 5 (AS OFFERED). 
"The Court in structs the jury that the right of an auto-
mobile to travel upon the street between intersections is 
superior to that of a pedestrian crossing not a.t street inter-
sections, but this superior right upon the part of the driver 
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of an automobile does not relieve him from the duty of exer-
cising reasonable and ordinary care, and the management and 
control of his automobile at a reasonable and proper speed, 
and in keeping a reasonable lookout, and using and exercising 
reasonable care to a void injury to persons on the 
page 226 ~ street between intersections after he saw or 
should have seen such per_sons. 17 
Mr. Hughes : The same is true of No. 5. _ 
The Court: That should be amended at the end ''by the 
exercise of reasonable care''. 
Mr. Parsons: Put "by the exercise of reasonable care 
should hav~ seen''. 
Mr. Hughes: No. 5, in the next to the last line, after the 
w9rd ''or'' insert the words ''by the exercise of reasonable 
care''. 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION ~0. 5 (AS GRANTED). 
''The Court instructs the jury that the right of an auto-
mobile to travel upon the street between· intersections is 
superior to that of a pedestrian crossing not at street inter-
sections, but this superior right upon the part of the driver 
of an automoble does not relieve him from the duty of exer-
cising reasonable and ordinary care, and the management 
and control of his automobile at a reasonable and proper 
speed, and in keeping a reasonable lookout, and using and 
exercising reasonable care to avoid injury to persons on the 
street between intersections after he saw or by 
page 227 ~ the exercise of reasonable care should have seen 
such prsons. 
PLAINTIFF'S -INSTRUCTION NO. 6 (WITHDRAWN). 
The Court: Mr. Parsons, isn't this really a repetition? 
Mr. Parson: I think you can strike that out. 
Mr. Hughes: That is withdrawn. 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 7 (GRANTED). 
''The Court instructs the jury that the traffic la,vs of this 
state provide that the driver of a vehicle shall keep the same 
under reasonably complete control, and if they find from the 
evidence that the defendant, Swift Nelms, operator of the 
automobile involved in this accident, was operating the same 
at a high and dangerous rate of speed and to such an extent 
that he could not keep it under reasonably complete control; 
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and if under all the facts and circumstances, the 
page 228} jury find that he was operating the automobile 
in violation of this regulation, and such failure. 
'vas the immediate and effectual proximate cause of the acci-
dent, and the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negli-
gence, your verdict should be for the plaintiff." -
The Court: Now, about No. 7, about complete control? 
Mr. Parsons: That is not a repetition, because this is. 
covering the statute on speed. Now here else in the instruc-
tions is that specific statute set out. No; it covers the direct 
revision about complete control; the statute says '' c~mplete 
control'', and that is not set out anywhere. else in these in-
structions. Speed and lookout have been considered, and 
this is as to control. I have given them the benefit of the 
word "reasonably" in drawing this instruction, although I 
understand the Supreme Court says I do not have to. 
The Court: It must be a reasonable construction. 
Mr. Parsons: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Mr. Hughes, have you read over No. 7f 
Mr. Hughes: Yes, sir, but I have not anything marked 
against it. 
The Court: Just a general exception? 
Mr. Hughes: Yes, sir. 
page 229} PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
(AS OFFERED). 
''The Court instructs the jury that if they find a verdict 
for the plaintiff, they should take into consideration all the 
elements of injury a.nd damage and award her full and just 
compensation for injuries and damage, and take into con-
sideration: 
'' 1. Physical injuries sustained ; 
'' 2. The nature and extent of such injuries; 
'' 3. Any pain and suffering and inconvenience and mental 
· anguish resulting from such injuries; · 
'' 4. Any result upon the general health of the plaintiff; 
. '' 5. Any effect upon her normal physical and mental 
activity in life; . 
'' 6. Any and all doctors, hospital and medical bills incurred 
by her; 
'' 7. Any expense resulting from her said injuries. 
''And if the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff 
has not recovered from the injuries received, you should 
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in fixing your verdict include such a.n , amount as will com-
pensate her for injury and damage as will naturally and 
probably result in the future.,, 
Mr. Hughes: No. 8 is the damage instruction. 
The Court: The item 7 has been stricken out. } 
Mr. Hughes: But the last paragraph following that re-
mainsf 
page 230 ~ , Mr. Parsons.: I have added after the word 
''damage'' on the last line ''injury and damage 
and expense as will naturally and probably result''. 
· Mr. Hughes: We object to that, in that it assumes perma-
nent injury. We think it should be qualified, and the last 
clause should read-
Mr. Parsons: (Interposing) It doesn't say anything about 
permanent injury. It says. at the top ''taking into considera-
tion all the elements of injury". It doesn't say anything 
about permanent, and even if it did-
Mr. Hughes: (Interposing) We ask that the words "if 
any'' be added at the end of the whole instruction. 
Mr. Parsons: I have no objection. "Injury and damage 
and expense, if any,'' would be the proper place. 
Mr. Hughes: No. The "natural and probable result'' is 
what I am driving at. We have added the word ''there-
from''. 
Mr. Parsons : The word ''therefrom'' after the word 
"result" Y 
Mr. Hughes: Yes, and the words "if any". 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 8 (AS GRANTED.) 
''The Court instructs the jury that if they find a. verdict 
for the plaintiff, they should take into consideration all the 
elements of injury and damage and award her full 
page 231 ~ and just compensation for her injuries and dam-
age, and take into consideration-
'' 1. Physical injuries sustained ; 
'' 2. The nature and extent of such injuries; 
'' 3. Any pain and suffering and inconvenience and mental 
anguish resulting from such injuries ; 
'' 4. Any r-esult upon the general health of the plaintiff; 
'' 5. Any effect upon her normal physical and mental 
activity in life; 
''6. Any a.nd all doctors, hospital and medical bills in-
curred by her. 
/ ~ .l.. "- vtR .JtU.u ..t. 
~~~ 
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''And if the jury find from e evidence that the plaintiff 
has not recovered from the inju ·€s received, you should in 
fixing your verdict include such a amount as will compen-
sate her for injury and damage a_nd ense as will naturally 
and probably result therefrom in the f ure, if any.'' 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 9 (GRANTED). 
''The Court instructs the jury tha.t if they find from the 
evidence that Mrs. Edith Dobson-Peacock purchased the auto-
lnobile in this case involved, for the use of herself and family, 
including her daughter, Marjorie Peacock, and 
page 232 } thereafter made an arrangement and agreement 
with the defendant, Swift Nelms, to drive the car 
for herself and her daughter and husband, at such times as 
needed and requested by either of them, and he was at the 
time of the accident to the plaintiff acting in her service, pur-
suant to and in accordance with such arrangement and agree-
ment (regardless of pay), then any negligent act or acts found 
by the jury under the evidence to have been committed by 
him in such service is in law chargeable to her." 
Mr. Hughes: No. 9 is the family-purpose-doctrine. We 
object to it on the ground that the family-purpose-car-doctrine ~ 
applies only to the head of the family. , 
Mr. Parsons: There is no denial of the application of 
operation and control. 
Mr. Hughes : We filed an affidavit to that. 
Mr. Parsons: It is not in the papers. You filed an affidavit 
liS to Dean Peacock, but not as to Mrs. Peacock. 
Mr. Hughes: I don't know what you did with it. I gave 
a copy of it-
Mr. Parsons: (Interposing) I have a copy of his but not 
of hers. · 
Mr. Hughes : Both were filed the same day. I don't know 
what became of it. 
1\{r. Parsons: There are the court papers. I don't remem-
ber it as to her ; there i~ none filed, I am sure, be-
page 233 ~ cause I looked at every paper in there. 
. Mr. Hughes: It is a paper without a cover. 
Here it is. You didn't look quite far enough. 
Mr. Parsons: It was all hidden. All right. I didn't notice 
it until this morning. I don't think it makes any difference 
in this case. 
The Court: Note your general objection to that? 
Mr. Hughes : Yes, sir. . · 
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The Court : Let us take up the instructions for the defense. 
We start out \Vith .A. 
Mr. Hughes: "'\Ve want to make the additional point out-
::,ide of the family-purpose, that the evidence does not show 
there \Vas any agency on behalf of Mrs. Peacock. I suppose 
that is not disputed. 
The Court : I understand. 
DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION A (GRANTED). 
'~Gentlemen of the jury : 
. You are instructed that the burden is upon the plaintiff 
vio establish by a preponderance of the testimony the negli-gence of the defendant charged. The mere occurrence of n accident raises no presumption of negligence, and in order or the plaintiff to recover it must be established by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the defendants were guilty 
of some negligence for which' tl1ey are legally liable, and 
that the san1e was the sole proximate cause of 
page 234 ~ the plaintiff's injuries. Such negligence must be 
J 
established by affinnative evidence showing more 
than a mere probability of a negligent act. A verdict cannot 
be founded on mere conjecture, but only upon affirmative and 
preponderating proof that the injury was caused solely and 
_proximately by some actionable negligence on the part of 
·the defendant." 
Mr. Parsons: As to A, I have no objection. 
DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION B (GR-ANTED). 
''Gentlemen of the Jury: 
"If you believe~ from the evidence that the defendants were 
negligent, and that their negligence was the sole proximate 
cause of the accident, then you must find for the plaintiff. 
''But if you believe fr01n the evidence that the plaintiff 
was negligent, and that her negligence contributed to the 
accident, you must find for the defendants; or if you believe 
from the evidence that both the defendants. and the plaintiff 
·were negligent, and that the negligence of the latter con-
1 ributcd to the accident, then, also, you must find for the de-
fendants, because the law will not measure the cotnparative 
degrees of neglig·enee of the plaintiff and the defendants, 
and in the event of concurrent negligence by both, the plain-
tiff cannot recover." 
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J\llr. Parsons: I think instruction B is probably good law, 
a little adroitly drawn, but I can't object to it 
page 235 } much. · 
DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION C (AS OFFERED). 
''It is the duty of a pedestrian before crossing a street 
or highway to use duf' diligence to assure herself by the exer-
cise of her facnlties of a safe crossing. 
'' If you believe from the evidence in this case that the 
plaintiff did not ex-ercise such diligence, and that the plain-
tiff had the opportunity to observe defendant's car but failed 
to observe it, she was guilty of negligence. 
''On the other hand, if you believe from the ·evidence in 
this case that the plaintiff did observe the car of the defend-
ant approaching, and after so observing said car still at-
tempted to cross the str-eet in front of and in the path of 
the said car, she was in that event guilty of negligence. 
''If, therefore, you believe from the evidenc-e in this case 
that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in either of these 
particulars and that such negligenc-e proximately contributed 
to the accident, th~n the plaintiff cannot recover.'' 
~Ir. Parsons: I handed your Honor suggested amend-
ments. I haven't a copy of it. 
The Court: liere it is (handing paper). 
:Nlr. Parsons: ~1r. Hughes, I raise some questions about 
Instruction C. A and B are all right. I think that this in-
struction is a little bit overdrawn and should be atllended as 
follows: In t11e first paragraph, on the second line, in pla<~e 
of the 'vords ''use due diligenGe '' the words 
page 236 r "-exercise reasonable care" should be used. 
1\fr. Hughes: That is all right. 
Mr. Parsons: I doubt seriously the applicability of the 
second paragTaph in this instruction. 
The Court: I suppose you want'' reasonable care" instead 
of the 'vord "diligence''? 
Mr. ·Parsons: Yes. 
The Court : So as to make it uniform. 
Mr. Parsons: On the third line of the third paragraph 
between the word ''car'' a.nd the word ''attempted'' the word 
''still'' I believe should be replaced with the word '' negli-
gently". 
1\fr. Hughes: Wl1y not use the word ''negligently" and 
leave the 'vord "still"? 
Mr. Parsons: The word "negligently" should go in there. 
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Mr. Hughes: I have no objection to that, but I think the 
word ''still'' should be there. 
Mr. Parsons: He says that he :&as no objection to putting 
''negligently'' in there. 
The Court: Is there any objection to '' C" ¥ 
Mr. Parsons: If your Honor please, that reads further 
''negligently attempted to cross the street in front of and in 
the path of the said car". That assumes that she was struck 
in that path, and that is not the evidence in this case~ 
Mr. Seawell: We expect to argue that it is. 
page 237 ~ The Court: I want .to go back to that addition 
''still negligently''; that doesn't sound right. 
Mr. Parsons: I think the last ought to come out, because 
it is up to .the jury to say whether her going across there 
was negligence. It is not negligence as a matter of law. They 
have it here as a matter of law. 
Mr. Seawell: If she saw it and admitted.it, it is negligence. 
Mr. Parsons: That is for the jury to say. 
Mr. Seawell: No, it is not; it is up to the Court. 
The Court: I think the Court decided that in the Hendry 
case. I am inclined to think that is right. 
Mr. Parsons: Does your Honor think it under the law as 
writtenf · 
The Court: I think so. It is where the man was out in 
the street, and, after seeing the car, tried to cross. 
Mr. Parsons : I tried the Hendry case. 
The Court : I did, too. 
Mr. Parsons: It is my recollection that the Court held 
that they were both guilty of concurring negligence and the 
man didn't have time to stop. 
The Court: . No, but it held ·this man was guilty of negli-
gence in attempting to do it. That is what this instruction 
holds. My recollection is that the attempt was 
page 238 ~ after he had seen th~ approaching car. 
Mr. Parsons: The car had to be within proxi-
mate approach in order to see him-dangerously near to or 
immediately in front of him. 
Mr. Seawell: I refer to the testimony. 
Mr. Parsons: That is argument to the jury but not to 
the Court. 
The Court: Suppose you put in ''approaching dangerously 
near". I might see a car approaching, and unless it was 
dangerously near, and if it was dangerously near, then that 
is a matter of law. 
Mr. Parsons : ''Dangerously near 1 '' 
Mr. Hughes : That is the second line of the third para-
graph of Instruction C. 
·. 
Edith Dobson-Peacock, et al., v. Lelia_ M. Curtis. 157 
Mr. Seawell: That would leave to the plaintiff the judg-
ment as to whether it was dangerous, or not. 
Mr. Parsons: It leaves to the jury whether it was dan-
gerous. 
Mr. Seawell: That is not the law. What he is trying 
to get at is to say it was approaching in such manner that 
an accident might occur. 
Mr. Parsons: You might walk across the path of many 
a car and it would not be negligence. It has to be dangerously 
near. I will take my chances with th~ Supreme Court on 
that. 
Mr. Seawell: We 'vill except if it is ''dangerously near". 
Mr. Hughes: Where are you putting it? 
page 239 ~ The Court: ''Did observe the car of the de-
fendant dangerously near." 
:Mr. Hughes : We except. 
The Court : I think the jury should deal with the ques-
tion whether a car is so far. 
Mr. Ifughes: It might be dangerous without being near if 
it was going as fast as they say. 
The Court: All of these questions have to be dealt with 
by the jury. Is there any other objection to that, Mr. Par-
sons? 
1\tfr. Parsons: This assumes that she was struck in the 
path of that car. I suppose I will not object to that. How-
ever, she was in the path of the car, and this would leave 
the jury to believe the ordinary path of the car. 
The Court: I think that is all right. 
Note: Instruction C as granted is as follows : 
DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION C (AS GRANTED). 
"It is the duty of a pedestrian before crossing a street or 
l1ighway to use reasonable care to assure herself by the 
exercise of her faculties of a safe crossing. 
''If you believe from the evidence in this case that the 
plaintiff did not exercise such reasonable care, and that the 
plaintiff had· the opportunity to observe defendant's car but 
failed to observe it, she was guilty of negligence. 
page 240 ~ ''On the other .hand, if you believe from the evi-
dence in this case that the plaintiff did observe 
the car of the defendant dangerously near, and after so ob-
serving said car still attempted to cross the street in front 
of and in the path of the said car, she was in that event guilty 
of negligence. 
"If, therefore, you believe from the evidence in this case 
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that the plaintiff was g-uilty of negligence in either of these 
particulars and that such negligence proximately contributed 
to the accident, then the plaintiff cannot recover." 
DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION D (GRANTED) .. 
"Gentlemen of the Jury : 
"Under the law, wh~n crossing highways or streets within 
incorporated towns or cities, pedestrians shall not carelessly 
or maliciously interfere with the orderly passage of vehicles 
and shall cross wherever possible only at intersections or 
cross-walks. 
''If, therefore, you believe from the evidence in this case 
that Mrs. Curtis did not cross Olney Road at an intel'section 
or cross-,valk, but attempted to cross the street at a point 
not an intersection or cross-walk, that was negligence on her 
part, and if such negligeiice proximately contributed to the 
accident, plaintiff cannot recover.'' 
Mr. Parsons: I have no objection to any of the rest of 
them. 
page 241 ~ The Court: All right. You gentlemen can state 
your objections after you get through with the 
argument. 
Mr. Hughes: We have already stated them, and he has 
taken down all that was said. 
The Court: No. 6 was withdrawn, wasn't it? 
Mr. Parsons: Yes, sir. 
DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION E (GRANTED,. 
"Gentlemen of the Jury: 
''If you believe frmn the evidence that J\llrs. Curtis en-
tered the street from behind a parked automobile by which 
she was obscured from approaching· rnotorists, and that such 
act on her part proximately contributed to her being in-
jured, then she cannot recover." 
DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION F (GRANTED). 
'' Gentlem.en of the· Jury: 
"If you believe from the evidence that ~Irs. Curtis crossed 
the street diagonally instead of at right angles, and tha.t 
such crossing proximately contributed to her being injured:-
she cannot recover.'' 
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRTTCTION G (GRANT~D). 
''A pedestrian is required to exercise a greater degree of 
vigilance when she crosses a street between intersectiop.s 
. than at intersections, because between inrersec-
page 242 } tions vehicles have the superior rights. 
~'If you believe from the evidence that Mrs. 
Curtis crossed between intersections, and that such cross-
ing proximately contributed to her being injured, she can-
not recover.'' 
DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION H (GRANTED). 
"If you believe from the evidence in this case that the 
driver of defendant's car, as soon as plaintiff's position 
became apparent, or should have been apparent in th~ exer-
cise of ordinary care, to him, undertook to apply his brake 
and turn so as to avoid the danger, and that his action wa 
such that a person of ordinary prudence might have do 
under a like situation, he would not be guilty of negligen e 
because another course might have been more judicious.'' 
Note : The jury returned to the court room and the in-
structions were read by the Court. 
The case was argued by counsel, and the jury retired at 
3:25 and returned at 4:33 with the following verdict: 
"We, the jury, find for the plaintiff and fix the damages 
at ten thousand dollars. Harvey P. Randolph, Foreman." 
l\fr. Hughes: If your Honor please, we would like to 
tnove to set aside the verdict, a.nd we ·will file our grounds 
tomorrow. . 
The Court: Take it up at any time you gen.. 
page 243 ~ tlemen aocrree on. 
Note: On February 21st, counsel for the defendants filed 
the following: 
''GROUNDS FOR DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE JURY'S VERDICT OF YESTERDAY, 
FEBRUARY 20, 1935. 
'' 1. The verdict is excessive. 
~'2. The verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence. 
'' 3. The Court erred in overruling the motion to strike 
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the evidence as to the defendant Edith Dobson-Peacock made 
at the close of plaintiff's evidence and the like motion made 
at the close of all the evidence, the grounds of which motions 
·fully appeared in the record. 
''4. The Court erred in refusing to strike the plaintiff's 
evidence made at the close of the plaintiff's evidence and the 
like motion made a.t the close of all the evidence, the grounds 
of which motions fully appeared in the record. 
'' 5. The Court erred in granting on the motion of the 
plaintiff the instructions which were objected to by the de-
fendant, the grounds of which objections fully appeared in 
l:he record. 
'' 6. The Court erred in refusing certain instructions re-
quested by the defendant and in modifying other instn1etions 
requested by defendant, the grounds for which fully appeared 
in the record.'' 
Note : The motion was duly argued, and on March 23, 
1935, the Court overruled the motion, to which 
page 244 }- action of the Court the defendant, by counsel, 
excepted. 
page 245 }- I, A. R. Hanckel, Judge of the Circuit Court 
of the City of .Norfolk, Va., who presided over the 
foregoing trial of Lelia M. Curtis v. I-I. Dobson-Peacock, 
et als., in the Circuit Court of the City of· Norfolk, Virginia, . 
at Norfolk, Virginia, February 19-20, 1935, do certify that 
the foregoing, together with the exhibits therein referred 
to, is a true and correct copy and report of the evidence, 
all of the instructions offered, amended, granted and re-
fused by the Court, and other incidents of the said trial of 
the said cause, with the exceptions and objections of the re-
spective parties as therein set forth. As to the original 
exhibits introduced in evidence, as shown by the foregoing 
report, to-wit, plats marked Exhibit No. 1 and Exhibit No. 
4, maps introduced by the plaintiff and defendants, respec-
tively, which have been initialed by me for the purpose of 
identification, it is agreed by counsel for the plaintiff and 
the defendants that they shall be transmitted to the Supreme 
Court of Appeals as part of the record in this cause in lieu 
of certifying to said court copies of said exhibits. 
And I do further certify that the attorneys for the plain-
tiff, Mrs. Lelia M. Curtis, had reasonable notice, in writing, 
given by the defendants of the time and place when the 
foregoing report of the testimony, and exhibits, instructions, 
exceptions and other incidents of the trial would be tendered 
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and presented to the undersigned for signature and authen-
tication. 
page 246 ~ Given under my hand this 15 day of May, 1935, 
within sixty days after the entry of the final judg-
ment in said cause. 
ALLAN R. HANCKEL, 
Judge of the Circuit Court of the City 
of Norfolk, Va. 
I, Cecil M. Robertson, Clerk of the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk, Virginia, do ce1·tify that the foregoing re-
port of the testimony, exhibits, instructions, exceptions and 
other incidents of the trial in the case of ~Irs. Lelia. ~I. Curtis 
·v. H. Dobson-Peacock et als, together with the original ex-
hibits therein referred to, all of which have been duly authen-
ticated by the Judge of the said Court, were lodged and filed 
with me as Clerk of the said Court on the 15" day of May, 
1935. 
CECIL l\L ROBERTSON, Clerk. 
By 
Deputy Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
the City of Norfolk, Virginia. 
page 247 } BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 2 . 
. To Refusal to Strike the Evidence as to the Defendant 
Edith Dobson-Peacock. 
BE IT REMEMBERED that at the trial of this cause on 
February 19 and 20, 1935, as shown by the proceedings in 
said cause as certified by me, A. R. Hanckel, Judge of the Cir-
cuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, by certificate 
executed simultaneously herewith (which certified proceedings 
ure hereby referred to and made a part hereof as fully as 
if set out herein), defendants' coun~el at the end of the plain-
tiff's evidence on February 19, 1935, and again on February 
20, 1935 (reporter's transcript pages 120 and 189), after the 
end of -all of the evidence, moved the court to strike the evi-
dence as to the defendant Edith Dobson-Peacock on the ground 
that the car by which the plaintiff had been injured was not 
operated by or in behalf of the said defendant, and that 
the said defendant was not the head of her family and there-
fore was not liable under the so-called family purpose doc-
trine. 
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·BUT THE COURT overruled the said motions and refused 
to strike the evidence as to the said defendant Edith Dobson-
Peacock, to which action of the court counsel then and there 
excepted in behalf of said defendant and riow tender this, 
their bill of exception No. 2, and pray that the same may be 
signed, sealed and made a part of the record in this cause, 
which is according·ly done this 15th day of May, 1935, and 
within sixty days from the time at 'vhich the said judg-
ment was entered, and after reasonable notice by defendant~ 
to plaintiff of the tender of this bill of exception. 
page 248 ~ 
ALLAN R. HANCI(EL, (Seal) 
Judge of said Court. 
BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 3. 
'l7o Refusal to Strike the Evidence as Failing to Show a 
Ca:ztse of Actim~. 
BE IT REME].iBERED that at the trial of this cause on 
February 19 and 20, 1935, as shown by the proceedings in 
said cause as certified by me, A. R. Hanckel, Judge of the 
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, by certificate 
executed simultaneously herewith (which certified proceed-
ings are hereby referred to and made a part hereof as fully 
as if set out herein), defendants' counsel at the end of the 
plaintiff's evidence on February 19, 1935, and again on Feb. 
ruary 20, 1935 (reporter's transcript pages 120 and 189), after 
the end of all of the evidence, moved the court to strike the 
evidence as to all of the defendants on the ground that in _ 
any aspect of the case the evidence showed that the negli-
gence of the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of her 
injury or proximately contributed thereto. 
BUT THE COURT overruled the said motions and refused 
to strike the evidence as to the said defendants, to which 
action of the court counsel then and there excepted in behalf 
of said defendants, and now tender this, their bill of exception 
No. 3, and pray that the same may be signed, sealed and made 
a part of the record in this caus·e, which is accordingly done 
this 15th day of May, 1935, and within sixty days from the 
time at which the said judgment was entered, a.nd after reason-
able notice by defendants to plaintiff of the tender of this 
bill of exception. , 
ALLAN R. HANCI{EL, (Seal) 
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page 249 ~ BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 4. 
To ·G'I·anting and Refusal of Certain Instructions. 
BE IT REMEMBERED that at the trial of this cause on 
February 19 and 20, 1935, as shown by the proceedings in 
said cause certified by me, A. R. Ilanckle, Judge of the Cir-
cuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, by certificate 
executed simultaneously herewith (which certified proceed-
ings are hereby referred to and made a part hereof as fully 
.as if set out herein), certain instructions were offered at the 
instance of the plaintiff and defendants, respectively, the in-
structions offered by the plaintiff being designated by num-
bers and those offered by the defendants being designated by 
letter, all of which instructions are fully set out in said cer-
tified proceedings (stenographer's transcript pages 194 to 
216, inclusive). 
TO THE ACTION of the Court in granting the plaintiff's 
instructions numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 objected to by 
defendants on the grounds fully appearing in the proceedings 
certi1;ied by the court defendants then and there excepted. 
AND TO THE ACTION of the Court in modifying defend-
ants' instruction designated C, and in not granting same as 
offered by defendants, the defendants then and there excepted, 
as more fully appears by reference to the certified proceed-
. ings aforesaid, and now tender this, their bill of exception 
:N' o. 4, and pra.y that the same may be signed, sealed and 
made a part of the record in this cause, which is accordingly 
done this 15th day of May, 1935~ and within sixty days from 
the time at which said judgment was entered, and after reason-
able notice by defendants to plaintiff of the tender of this 
bill of exception. 
ALLAN R. HANCKEL, (Seal) 
Judge of said Court. 
page 250} In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, 
Virginia. 
J.Jelia M. Curtis 
v. 
AT LAW ON MOTION. 
H. Dobson-Peacock, Edith Dobson-Peacock and Swift Nelms, 
J~ ' 
·164 ~upreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
NOTICE OF TENDER OF DEFENDANTS' BILLS OF 
EXCEPTION NUl\iBERED 1 TO 4, INCLUSIVE. 
To Messrs. Venable, Miller, Pilcher & Parsons, Attorneys 
for Lelia M. Curtis: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on t.he 13th day of 1\fa.y,. 
1935, at 10 A. M. o'clock, or as soon thereafter as we may 
be heard, the undersigned 'vill present to the Judge of the 
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk defendants' bills of ex-
c-eption in the above entitled cause numbered 1 to 4, respec-
tift~ . 
DONALD W. SHRIVER, 
HUGHES, LITTLE & SEA WEIJL,. p. d. 
Service accepted of the above notice this 6th day of 1\iay, 
1935. 
~VENABLE, MILLER, PILCifER & PARSONS, 
Attorneys for Lelia l\L Curtis .. 
page 251 ~ Virginia: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the City of 
Norfolk, on the 24th day of ~Iay, in the year, 1935. · 
I, Cecil M. Robertson, Cl~rk of the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk, do certify that tile foregoing is a true tran-
script of the record in the suit of Lelia M. Curtis, plaintiff, 
against H. Dobson-Peacock, Edith Dobson-Peacock and Swift 
Nelms, Jr., Defendants, lately pending in said court. 
I further certify that the same was not made up and com-
pleted and delivered until the plaintiff had received due notice 
thereof, and of the intention of the defendants, Edith Dobson-
Peacock and Swift Nelms, Jr., to apply to the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia for a writ of error and s~tpersedeas 
to the judgment therein. 
Teste: 
CECIL M. ROBERTSON, Clerk. 
By ~1ARGUERITE R. GRONER, D. C. 
Fee for Transcript, $57.9fl. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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